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TRIPOLI STEADFASTNESS AND CONFRONTATION MEETING DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21-27 Apr 80 pp 18-19

[Article: "The Steadfastness and Confrontation Conference in Tripoli: Is It To Confront al-Sadat or To Settle Arab Disputes?"]

[Text] Last week Tripoli, the capital of Libya, was the scene of a meeting of the heads of the countries of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. The principal observation that one may make about this meeting is that it represents an Arab will that rejects the reality of a capitulatory solution, but at the same time stems from a fundamental weak point that is imposed by the reality of Arab fragmentation and contradictions.

When the meetings began the heads of five Arab countries were present. They are Algeria, South Yemen, Syria, Libya and the PLO. The presidents of Mauritania and North Yemen joined them later.

The first priority on the agenda of the fourth summit for the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front was the matter of strengthening relations between the countries of the front and solving the existing contradictions between them. Some sources indicated that postponing the opening session of the conference till Sunday morning to wait for the presidents of Mauritania and North Yemen provided an opportunity for more communications between Libya and the PLO so they can settle their differences.

[The conference] studied the Syrian working paper that was presented by President Hafiz al-Asad. The paper called for the establishment of a joint military command whose purpose would be to support Syria in case of war between it and Israel. The Syrian paper points out that it is necessary "to consider all Arab lands to be fields for the operations of the armed Arab forces." The assembled heads of state also discussed the circumstances that pertain to the possibilities of a U.S. military attack against Iran and the required Arab reaction thereto.

Optimism and Pessimism

There were numerous impressions [of the conference] which were referred to by statements made by agencies knowledgeable about the conference.

Some of these agencies focused on the consequences of the fact that North Yemen and Mauritania joined the conference. Those who subscribe to this perspective emphasize that the fact that North Yemen joined the conference increases the power of the course of unity and provides the necessary protection against the pressures that would be exerted by the ruling regimes in Saudi Arabia and Amman. Those who subscribe to this view point to the accuracy of their view on the basis of the fact that the unity of the two Yemens would enhance the strategic depth of South Yemen. Consequently, its ability to monitor the movement of the U.S. fleet near Arab shores would be increased.

Optimists are also saying that the fact that Mauritania joined the conference leads to the creation of circumstances that are necessary for better relations between it and Algeria. Accordingly, this would increase the possibilities of influencing Morocco to reach a solution to the Sahara problem, especially since this conference is being convened in the wake of a series of Arab fragmentations.

The only Arab head of state at the Tripoli meetings who had good relations with everybody was Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid. The Algerian president had spent most of March on a broad Arab tour which was described by observers as a reconnaissance tour for the purpose of becoming directly acquainted with Arab reality. The question that is being raised now is this: Did the Algerian president attempt to settle the disputes between some of the Arab parties, or was the nature of his tour merely exploratory? The reply to the first part of the question is most probably in the negative, and this means that the answer to the second part of the question is affirmative. Those who attended the ceremonies to welcome the Arab heads of state at Tripoli International Airport noticed that Iraq's ambassador attended the welcoming ceremony for the Algerian president who was the first to arrive, but then he immediately left the airport.

Libya and the PLO

If the disputes between Libya and the PLO are raising major questions about the business of the conference--in spite of the fact that the PLO is in an unenviable position as it faces pressures from different Arab parties and never ending struggles to defend the freedom of its will--the PLO remains in need of maintaining a large measure of a sensitive balance in its Arab policy. It was subjected to a confrontation in Lebanon with Syria and then with other Arab parties. It is now experiencing a period of confrontation with Libya. Some neutral agencies are saying that regardless of the reasons behind the dispute between Libya and the PLO, it was not politically appropriate for signs of this dispute to surface and for Col al-Qadhdhafi to suspend the support that Libya had been offering the organization. Nor was it politically appropriate for Col al-Qadhdhafi to say in an interview with the U.S. newspaper, THE HERALD TRIBUNE that "there were numerous Palestine liberation organizations" and "not one single PLO." The fact that Libya has formed anti-PLO groups among the

Palestinians who are working in Libya constitutes a phenomenon that is inconsistent with the notion of unity which Libya is advocating.

Regardless of the fact that an Arab party relies on the errors of another party to justify Arab disputes, it is not logical that disputes between Arab parties that belong to the same camp be so furious. Therefore, the genuine contribution that can occur in the Tripoli Conference is that of mending relations between Libya and the PLO and coming out with a more positive initiative on the Arab scene that would make it possible for parties alienated from the conference to join the conference and increase the power of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

Egypt's Position

Egypt was a principal party at the Tripoli Conference; its presence was noted by its absence. This conference was being held for the fourth time to confront the separate peace that is being established in Egypt with the Zionist enemy in the context of the U.S. strategy. At the same time this conference cannot confront what is happening in Egypt without manifesting a front that has real power, a front that can influence the course of events.

Events for the third year in a row have proven that the U.S. strategy and the capitulatory solution were more successful than Arab resistance and Arab rejection. Besides, while endorsement of the Zionist occupation of Arab land is being heightened through the peace process after it forced itself by war, the intensity of the dispute between the Arab parties is increasing, on the one hand, and the Egyptian opposition is complaining that the Arab countries do not understand its objectives or its realistic circumstances, [on the other].

The question that is being raised is this: If the Arab countries succeed in settling their differences and in affecting U.S. interests in the Middle East--and this is not an easy matter, but it is in the realm of the possible--what can the Arab countries do for Egypt directly?

For 2.5 years the steadfastness countries have been saying that they were trying to overthrow al-Sadat's regime and that they had been supporting the Egyptian opposition. News coming from Egypt, however, affirms that al-Sadat has been hurting the Egyptian opposition inside the country and moving ahead within the framework of U.S. policy towards peace with Israel. What has been the effect so far of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front? Does it represent the Arab opposition that cannot change the course of events?

This question and other questions were thrusting themselves on those who were assembled in Tripoli. If we were to take into consideration the fact that the resolutions of such a conference are confidential, all the Arab parties would be hoping that the Tripoli Conference would come out

with a general framework for an Arab strategy that would establish principles for relations between the Arab countries and determine the methods of confrontation with foreign forces which seek to establish foreign exploitation and influence and the Zionist presence firmly.

It is being hoped that the Tripoli meeting will turn into a new stage for confronting Camp David and the U.S. policy in the area. Although al-Sadat has been offering one concession after another in Washington in Carter's presence, the fact that the Tripoli Conference did convene and the intra-Arab reconciliations that took place while the conference [was in session] can only lead us to be optimistic.

This conference had another meaning also. It showed how steadfastness and resistance could change an Arab policy that could be comprehensive--not only the policy of some Arab countries--through the openness which the steadfastness and confrontation group manifest to other countries. This is like what happened with North Yemen and Mauritania. How can a steadfastness and confrontation policy turn into an Arab policy?

This was the real problem that required an answer in Tripoli. Every Arab is hoping that an answer to this problem will appear on the Arab political scene after the Tripoli conference.

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BRAIN DRAIN CRITICALLY ANALYZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21-27 Apr 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Nasr al-Din al-Khatib: "The Arab Brain Drain Abroad: Is It Immigration or Forced Evacuation? New Statistics: Half the Physicians of the Arab Homeland Are Working in Europe and the United States"]

[Text] A report was prepared by one of the Arab embassies abroad last month. So far, it has not surprised anyone.

The report states that in the mid seventies about 100,000 Arab intellectuals were living in the United States alone.

The report goes on to point out that the number of Arab physicians in the United States in 1976 amounted to 24,000; the number of engineers amounted to 17,000; the number of physicists amounted to 7,000; and the total number of intellectuals who immigrated to the West in general was estimated to be between 130,000 and 150,000 specialists. A comparison between the number of qualified persons who emigrated and the number of qualified persons who stayed in the Arab homeland will indicate that [those who emigrated] constituted 50 percent of the total number of physicians; 23 percent of the total number of engineers; and 15 percent of the total number of physicists.

These figures do not include the Arab communities outside the Arab homeland whose number approaches 3.5 million persons. Among those Arab communities abroad there are 1.8 million persons in the United States alone. Studies confirmed that 40 percent of qualified Arab people who completed their studies in the advanced countries were drawn to them one way or another and that 61 percent of Syria's engineers emigrated to work abroad. [Studies have also confirmed] that 70 percent of the physicians who graduate from the American University immigrate to Europe, the United States and Canada, and so forth.

The Cost to the State of the Immigration of Intellectuals Is as Much as Its Debts

If we were to look at the material losses that result from emigration, we would find them to be most certainly great. It would be difficult to

determine these losses and to identify their effects accurately. But presenting some indications of those losses would set forth the general features of the extent of the damage and the deceit which our countries are being subjected to.

Some studies estimate that developing countries spend about 150,000 dollars in money only to create scientific expertise. This means that from the cost perspective alone the Arab countries incurred about 22.5 billion dollars. This is equal to the sum total of Arab debts abroad. For the advanced countries the brain drain constitutes a profit that represents 75 percent of all the debts of the developing countries in Africa and in Asia.

This is from the perspective of cost only. The value of the business which is generated by the work these people perform abroad--and this constitutes a profit for the advanced countries and a loss to our countries--is difficult to estimate. How can we estimate the material value of having our medical organization doubled in size, for example, and able to save the lives of millions of citizens who do die every year because of the shortage of physicians and the inadequacy of medical organizations? How can we estimate the material benefit of a bridge or a dam which these qualified people would have helped build and construct? What material value can be placed on the discoveries of a physicist specializing in the environment, in the resources of the country, in biology, in botany and in other sciences? How can we evaluate what social scientists may leave behind in the way of reforms and ideas that would change the structure of society and the methods of its business and development? What grade, what value or what price can be placed on what these numbers [of people] can create in the body of scientific and intellectual knowledge for this and future generations? These are questions for which there are no answers. But we can let our fancies and our imaginations wonder about the consequences and the effects of the Arab's sense of loss and alienation which, like that of any other human being, cannot be evaluated in monetary terms.

Be that as it may, to offer an indication that would also help form a general picture [of the situation], let us state that U.S. statistics indicate that from 1962 to 1969 total taxes paid by qualified Arab scientists who immigrated to the United States amounted to 34 million dollars. This is more than half of the total tax on income and wealth [that was paid] in a country like Iraq in 1969.

The Immigrant Working Class

If we were to add a labor drain to the brain drain, the problem becomes much complex. There are 1,413,647 Arab citizens living in France alone; these statistics do not go beyond early January 1979. The number of workers from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia alone amounts to 43 percent, 14 percent and 47 percent of the total foreign work force in the construction, automobiles and textile sectors, respectively. At the same time the foreign work force constitutes 16 percent of unskilled labor in France;

95 percent of semi-skilled labor; 2 percent of the supervisory [personnel]; and 1.7 percent of the administrative [personnel]. In 1977 the foreign work force constituted 7.2 percent of the total work force in the Federal Republic of Germany; 7 percent in France; 18.4 percent in Switzerland; 6.2 percent in Austria; and 3.3 percent in Britain. The number of immigrant foreign workers in western Europe early in the seventies amounted to about 6 million workers. A similar number must be added to that figure [to account] for their families. This figure has now declined after prices rose and unemployment increased so that it may be said that 5 million foreign workers are actually working in western Europe now and that about 7 million workers have returned to their countries. This constitutes a case of the west exporting unemployment to our countries since 2 million other workers have lost their jobs during the last 5 years.

Three Factors for Emigration

After this general overview of the conditions of intellectuals and workers emigrating from the Arab countries and the remaining countries of the Third World to go to the advanced countries, and especially to Europe and the United States, let us move to shed light on some of the factors that cause this dangerous phenomenon.

Between the Citizen and the Regime

We can say that the first and principal reason for this phenomenon--and especially the emigration of intellectuals and qualified people--lies in a related case of dissociation between the intellectual and the social system in his country and between the intellectual and himself. An intellectual person is a person with initiative and aspirations; imposing restrictions on him would be difficult. He also has abilities that others do not have, and these abilities distinguish him from the rest of the people by giving him choices in life and allowing him to move. Therefore, when the social system of beset by a specific disorder--as is the case in most instances with us--the intellectual tends to escape this reality, thereby revealing the shortcomings of prevailing trends in the social situation, on the one hand, and his inability to confront these shortcomings, on the other. Poor working conditions, the fact that deranged minds [in control] these conditions and the lack of harmony between the scientist and the environment in which he works, or the fact that this environment does not conform to his ideas, will create repeated clashes which will alienate the weaker [party], which under current conditions, is the scientist. If we were to add to this [situation] the fact that public freedoms are absent and the fact that the spirit of a socially and personally just law does not prevail, it will be presumed that a state of permanent alienation does exist between the social system and the intellectual or the scientist.

This is one side [of the situation]. On the other hand, the intellectual or the scientist finds himself in a state of schizophrenia as a citizen

In these countries. According to prevailing standards an intellectual is someone who attended and studied courses of study and passed the tests for those courses. Perhaps among some of the evils of present courses of study is the fact that the west was made a standard for measurement and comparison. It is the source of most of the sciences and the cultures which constitute the educational foundation of our courses. The intellectual, therefore, sees himself--to a greater or to a lesser extent--in greater harmony with western standards and modes of life and thought. This applies equally to those who received their education in our schools and to those who received it in western schools. For the intellectual western culture will remain in essence and in significance the standard and the measurement [of all things] even if he were to reject this culture totally. This fact dissociates the intellectual from himself [as a citizen]. On the one hand, he seeks to serve his homeland and he may make many sacrifices that manifest his love for his country and his people, but he frequently clashes with standards that evolved in his mind and in his consciousness during his course of study and development. These standards are tied to the west and to Europe and not to the homeland and the [native] country.

It is not our intent to suggest that abstract scientific laws in the East are that much different from scientific laws in the West, but we are saying that the applications of these laws, in the manner in which they are taught, the objectives that have been set for them and the contexts that are required of them constitute the product of western life, experience and need. [We are saying that] these laws, which are the product of western life, are being conveyed to us as absolute facts quite removed from the requirements of our own application, objectives and needs. When a young man, for example, aspires to perform a rare surgical procedure on the brain and not to discover an effective remedy for an indigenous disease, he will set his sights on the United States where he can serve science more than he can in his backward country which cannot offer him advanced technology and organizations. When the scientific effort in its objective sense becomes the goal of the intellectual, with his philosophical and cultural makeup, this intellectual will always find himself drawn by his views and his standards to the ideal and the most civilized locations for science and for work. Similarly, the Arab citizen and fighter, for example, sets his sights on Palestine when liberation and return to the homeland become his goal and part of his philosophical and cultural makeup. What applies to scientific standards also applies to moral and psychological standards: thus we find that the most severe cases of dissociation are among the intellectuals. They complain in their country, and they complain in the foreign countries, thereby reflecting in both cases the negative and the positive aspects of the dissocation. Each one of these aspects has its own indications and meanings within itself and its surrounding environment, on the one hand, and, within its soul and its mind, on the other.

The second principal reason is a material one. This reason emerges as a principal factor in the case of workers who emigrate. The material motive is the primary mover for those millions who cross the borders and subject themselves to different kinds of abuse and persecution to work under contemptible circumstances and live in poor districts that daily destroy the values of honor, pride and dignity which prevail in their ranks. They do so for no other reason than to send some paper money to feed and support the mouths they left behind. From the immigrant worker's point of view this phenomenon implies a sense of awareness and responsibility that some intellectuals and qualified people must be ashamed of, especially those who are materially and socially fortunate and can immigrate. This phenomenon should also shame those regimes that have failed or are failing--for reasons that are inherent in them and not inherited from colonialism--to provide suitable work for their citizens during the period of backwardness which we are suffering from, a backwardness which we can only eliminate by putting our hands and our minds to work.

Nevertheless, the material reason does remain as one of the factors for the emigration of intellectuals. In this regard our countries are engaged in conflicting practices that encourage the growth of this phenomenon. According to the labor laws for foreigners our countries reward foreign experts three or five times as much as they reward native experts of equal [experience]. By comparison, Arab experts [abroad] are treated like local experts and occasionally even less than that.

This double standard of high wages for foreigners and low compensation for citizens and Arabs leads to the emigration of native experts and the importation of foreign experts along with all the damages that result from these two phenomena. Furthermore, the fact that the West remains a standard and a truth forces an Arab engineer and physician, for example--one of these people acquire enormous fortunes--to compare his earnings and his life not with the earnings and lives of his own people and with the deprivations and poverty they live in, but rather with the standards of work in the West and the material and moral incentives that life in the West offers. This is a natural matter when foreign standards supersede national standards.

International Division of Labor

The third reason for the emigration of native intellectuals and workers lies in the international division of labor as it is imposed on our countries by colonialism. In general, advanced countries subject us in one way or another to their needs and their demands. They specialized in industry, in branches of production and in areas of life whose service requires specialized and non-specialized labor and skills. The United States, for example, used millions of Africans in cotton, coffee and other plantations just as Europe is now using millions of foreign workers in its factories to do the work which it could not get its own citizens to do for wages that are much less than legal wages. Now, the foreign labor force in Europe constitutes 10 percent of the total labor force. Foreign

labor constitutes a higher percentage in the principal branches of production such as construction, the automobile industry and the iron and steel industry. It is no secret that using foreign labor at the reduced costs, which are well-known, saves the industry in question about 30 percent [of its total costs]. This helps the industrial countries confront the conditions of competition and commercial warfare. The fact that foreign workers are excluded from union organizations or the fact that their needs are being exploited so as to weaken their ranks does provide continuity to the branches of production that employ them. This continuity is not affected by the repeated crises which affect advanced economies. It is for this reason that the labor markets in the advanced countries attract labor from those countries whose economies have been ruined by international capitalism. At present in the context of the conditions of the international crisis, labor markets in the advanced countries are exporting unemployment to the backward countries by means of blocking employment opportunities for foreign workers.

The need that advanced countries have for working intellectuals increases as these countries specialize further in technical and electronic production, as the role of services increases and as the aspects of life develop. It is for this reason that advanced countries set up material and moral incentives to destroy the motives these intellectuals have for staying in their countries. These material and moral incentives foster the urges to emigrate and to live in the advanced countries. Thus backwardness and its aspects serve these incentives, whereas progress and its aspects cut them off.

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OAPEC DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21-27 Apr 80 pp 38-39

[Interview with Ahmad al-Sa'di: "Arab Countries Will Have Depleted Half Their Oil by the Year 2000; Seven Arab Countries Have Reserves Equal to 98 Percent of Arab Oil"]

[Text] What is the Arab position vis a vis the world energy crisis? In an interview which AL-DUSTUR conducted with Ahmad al-Sa'di, the director of energy in the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), Mr al-Sa'di explained the dangers of depleting Arab oil and of the industrial countries' selfish policy of obtaining Arab oil at low prices at a time when they do not want to bear the costs of developing their own energy resources.

[Question] Can you draw for us a picture of the status of energy and energy resources throughout the world and of the ratio that Arab countries have of those resources?

[Answer] There are many and various estimates of the world's proven reserves. According to one of these estimates, there are approximately 4,582 billion barrels of oil in the world. Western industrial countries have about 1,741 billion barrels; countries of the socialist bloc have 1,850 billion barrels; and the developing countries have 941 billion barrels of oil. The share of the Arab countries is 407 billion barrels, and this constitutes 8.9 percent of the world's reserves. It is noteworthy that the United States alone has 25 percent of these reserves or three times as much as the Arab reserves, whereas the Soviet Union has 22 percent. In addition, western industrial countries have the experience to develop these resources and to develop other new resources as well.

Nevertheless, the capitalist world, and especially the United States, cannot at the present time or in the foreseeable future give up Arab oil as a source of energy. This is what some of the western media tried to suggest in the aftermath of the oil price changes in 1973. There was a guided campaign which stated that oil prices had become extremely high and that alternatives for oil has become economical. The clearest example of

this campaign was the Energy Independence Program of former U.S. President Richard Nixon. This program was based on [the assumption] that by 1985 the United States would turn from an importer of oil to an exporter or that it would at least be self-sufficient as far as oil was concerned. At first there was a tendency to believe this or to give it serious attention, but soon the falsehood [of these claims] became evident. U.S. oil imports, and especially from the Arab countries, did in fact double. U.S. oil imports are still increasing. The organization studied energy alternatives, and it became evident that the question of doing away with Arab oil in the foreseeable future was not relevant. The dependence of western countries on Arab oil would increase, and the development of alternatives would require a long period of time and, more importantly, tremendous expenses.

Hence fears that Arab oil will stagnate in the market are unfounded. At present, contrary to what was expected, we are asking the western countries to reduce their consumption or their imports of Arab oil to prolong its life as a basic source of revenues and of energy in the Arab countries.

[Question] Does this mean, as some western sources are saying, that energy resources are dwindling?

[Answer] The fact is that energy resources are not dwindling, but cheap energy resources are. The days of cheap energy are gone. If energy resources do dwindle, it would be because of the policies of increased dependence on imported oil.

As I mentioned the United States has energy resources that are more than three times as much as those in the Arab countries. In addition, it has the advanced technology that would enable it to develop alternative sources of energy more than any other country. But it does not want to do so as long as our relatively inexpensive oil is available to it.

They do not stop making excuses. Why can't coal be developed? Because this would pollute the environment. Why isn't shale oil developed? Because costs would be exorbitant. Why isn't nuclear energy developed? Because some danger would be involved, etc.

One time the excuse is cost, another time it is pollution. They want to have to these resources without paying the price and with the least economic and social cost to them. But at the same time these costs would be exorbitant for us, the oil producing countries. This is exactly what the secretary general of OAPEC, Dr 'Ali 'Atiqah referred to in his address to the First Arab Energy Conference that was held in Abu Dhabi in March 1979. Dr 'Atiqah said, "If energy conservation policies and the gradual development of new energy resources are adopted by the new stage with the least adverse consequences on the economies of the industrial countries, such policies and such development may not take place in accordance with conditions, circumstances and forms that are consistent with the needs

of the consuming countries and in a manner which their economies would accomodate with the least possible cost unless these policies and this development are also consistent with the interests of the Arab countries. Arab oil would, consequently, be depleted at this stage without our being able to develop new Arab energy resources or establish economic sources of revenue to replace oil revenues.

[Question] Does this mean that the Arab homeland has a wealth of energy and can always remain in the category of energy exporter?

[Answer] Contrary to what many people are saying, the Arab countries consume oil and do not only export it. Based on an understanding of the need that Arab countries have for oil for purposes of economic and social development; to emphasize the fact that they consume oil, even though they are exporting it as a group at the present time; and to anticipate future possibilities, the OAPEC held the first Arab Energy conference so it can shed light on the reality of energy conditions in the Arab countries with regard to local needs and the priority of those local needs in so far as these countries are oil exporting countries is concerned.

The other fact is that energy conditions in Arab countries are not similar. If we were to look at the Arab world in detail, the picture that we would see would be as follows: seven Arab countries have 97 percent of Arab oil reserves; the population of these 7 countries is 43 million. At the same time five countries have only three percent of these reserves, and they have a population of 55 million. The remaining 10 countries, whose population is 52 million, do not yet have any known oil or gas reserves.

Regarding the longevity of Arab oil, if current export levels are maintained with a commensurate increase in local consumption, the Arab countries will have depleted 50 percent of their present known reserves by the year 2000. At that time Arab oil will last for 15 more years [only] if current Arab oil reserves are not increased. It is known that the need of the Arab countries for oil revenues or for oil as a source of energy would have doubled by then.

[Question] Does this mean that we curb local consumption?

[Answer] What I meant was that we reduce consumption for non-developmental purposes. Transportation, for example, takes up a large and an ever increasing portion of oil at a time when it is possible to limit this usage by coming up with a radical solution to the transportation problem such as improving public transportation or encouraging the use of smaller cars by increasing the price of gas. We must reconsider the pricing of oil in a manner that would serve the question of preserving this vital material on the one hand, and the development projects on the other. In the short range, however, the major drain of Arab oil comes from the oil which is exported. At present the Arab countries consume only 6 percent of the oil they produce.

[Question] Do you believe that it is possible for the Arab countries to coordinate their efforts in the areas of energy conservation and the common use of energy resources?

[Answer] There are broad areas for Arab cooperation and coordination in the field of energy. Cooperation in setting up studies, research and experiments that deal with the different affairs of energy is imperative. Such activities cost a lot of money, not to mention the cost of training the staff and preparing the qualified personnel for work in this field.

There is also a need to increase exploration in the Arab countries. Exploratory activities in many of the Arab countries has been limited in spite of the fact that there are reasonable possibilities that new oil may be found there, even at a relatively higher cost.

There can also be cooperation in the area of research to improve the ratios of extraction, and this would increase the value of current Arab reserves.

On another level the necessity and the importance of having information available becomes evident so that cooperation can be based on a scientific foundation.

In addition, there is a need for joint action to preserve and develop the sources of energy collectively.

The fact is that areas of cooperation are numerous, and it is pointless to enumerate them here. Although there is multi-faceted cooperation at present, this cooperation still leaves something to be desired. There are many areas for this cooperation which is being called for by Arab interests. If we were to look at this matter nationwide, we would find that the industrial countries, despite different energy conditions in them, did establish agencies for such cooperation on a broad scale. Chief among these agencies is the International Energy Agency. Oil and energy are more important for the Arab countries than they are for the industrial countries.

IRANIAN CONSTITUTION DISCUSSED FROM STANDPOINT OF ISLAMIC LAW

Tunis JAWHAR AL-ISLAM in Arabic Nos 7-8, 1979 pp 17-29

[Article: "Iran's Draft Constitution: Perspectives from the Standpoint of Islamic Law"]

> [Text] This booklet contains a response to a letter sent by a group of Lebanese Islamic theologians to his eminence Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr seeking a clarification based on Islamic law regarding Iran's draft constitution as proposed to the struggling Iranian people by the Moslem leader, his eminence Ayatollah Khomeyni.

Text of Letter to Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr

As you are aware, the movement to establish an Islamic republic [in Iran] championed by his eminence Ayatollah Khomeyni--may he long live--has shaken the world and has been positively and overwhelmingly received in all parts of the Islamic world or, rather, the entire world. Yet, the idea is also being challenged by secular thinkers who claim that the proposed state, or any state, is purely the work of man and must, therefore, be divorced from religion. Any attempt to unite the two, they claim, will remain a symbolic gesture devoid of substance.

Therefore, we appeal to you as a reputed scholar in all aspects of Islamic law, as a man of wisdom and integrity, and as one familiar with modern intellectual trends to shed some light on our inquiry and to provide us with some of your impressions and projections of what awaits the Islamic people of Iran with regard to this matter.

(Signed by) A Group of Lebanese Theologians

Text of Reply of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr

In the name of the most merciful God. Praise and peace be the leader of humanity, Muhammad, the blessed sages of his family and the righteous of his followers.

Please note that we esteem your concern over the blessed proposal spearheaded by his eminence Ayatollah Khomeyni, a proposal that has revitalized the hearts of all Moslems and rekindled their spirits.

We shall briefly shed some light on the subject of your inquiry hoping that our few words will help to put things in proper Islamic perspective as well as in terms of practicable Islamic proposals. We wish to emphasize, however, that the struggling imam [reference to Khomeyni], who championed the movement and brought it to victory, has the ultimate and decisive word. We are confident that his effort to bring the idea [Islamic republic] into reality and actual practice shall be crowned with great success, no less than his magnificent victory against oppression and his battle to free Iran from despotism.

The creation of a state is a deeply-rooted social phenomenon in man's history. It was advocated by the prophets and communicated to man in divine revelations. Inspired by the work of the prophets, who labored to create a social order based on truth and justice, and who attempted to preserve the unity of mankind and lead it along the path of righteousness, the state assumed its just an wholesome role as a leader of society.

God, praise be unto Him, tells us [in the Koran]: "Mankind was one single nation, and God sent messangers with glad tidings and warnings. With them He sent the Book in truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed. But the people of the Book, after the clear signs came to them, did not differ among themselves, except through selfish contumacy. God by His grace guided the believers to the truth, concerning that wherein they differed. For God guides whom He will to a path that is straight." (See note 1)

As the just cited verse makes clear, mankind was one nation, living in simplicity and characterized by a primitive understanding of life. Its worries were limited and its needs simple. As social life developed, various talents and inclinations began to appear as did disparities in ability. Man's horizons expanded and his aspirations became more diverse as his needs grew in complexity. Disputes were soon to follow and conflict between strong and weak developed. Society eventually felt the need for arbiters to define truth, establish justice, and preserve the unity of mankind. It needed an agent to channel its talents and abilities in a positive direction, one that would benefit all men and restore prosperity and security. It is at this point in history that the idea of a state originated, at first with the prophets. The prophets established the first state on a foundation set by God.

In one form or another, the prophets continued to perform their great role in building the good state. A great number of them such as David, Solomon and others assumed direct control of the state. Others, such as Moses, spent their entire lives working toward the creation of the just state. Only the last of the prophets [Muhammad], God's peace be upon him, succeeded in crowning the efforts of his noble predecessors by establishing the cleanest and purest state in history, one that marked a great juncture in

man's history and embodied completely and magnificently the principles upon which the good state must be founded.

Despite the fact that on many occasions after the death of the prophet the state was headed by leaders who failed to live up to its true goals and mission, the imamate [from imam], which was a spiritual and doctrinal extension of the prophetic legacy, as well as an heir to divine revelation, continued its effort to rectify the path and workings of the state and to restore it to the direction charted by the prophet. Over the years, the imams have made great sacrifices in this corrective effort. These sacrifices culminated with the martyrdom of the 'Father of the Free' and the noblest of martyrs, Abi 'Abdallah al-Husayn, peace be unto him, together with the purest of his household and followers on the day of 'Ashura'.

Following a period in which the imamate as a system disappeared, it was revived in the era of the Marji'iyah [This term refers to religious authorities who are entrusted with the interpretation of the divine message. More specifically, it refers to the imams who have inherited Imam al-Mahdi's mantle. The Shiite Moslems believe that al-Mahdi will reappear on earth.] as an extension of the prophet's legacy. The revived imamate continued to shoulder the responsibility for spreading the divine message, and, in one way or another throughout history, continued to do the work associated with that legacy.

The Shiite Moslems, together with all virtuous people, the weak and the oppressed, maintained a tenacious loyalty to the state established by the prophets and espoused by the imamate, rejecting all forms of evil and insisting on a return to the just state, the state for which all good men had long struggled. Throughout this period, the Moslem people of Iran formed the major element of this rejection front, heroically and steadfastly insisting on a return to the state advocated by the prophets, the imamate and the holymen of Islam. Underlying this rejection of other forms of government was the belief that they had maintained the closest link to religious orthodoxy. Through the wise leadership of Imam Khomeyni, long may he live, this rejection front reached the pinnacle of its missionary and political awareness during its bitter and courageous struggle against the atheistic tyrant, the modern pharo of Iran. The struggle not only culminated in victory against him, but inflicted the greatest defeat against godless colonialism in the Islamic world.

It was therefore natural that the Moslem Iranian people's faith in their great historic mission should intensify. Islam was seen for what it is: God's power. Through this power and with the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, Islam succeeded in smashing its gigantic manacles. Not only is Islam viewed as a divine message, but as a rescuer, the only force that was able to bring victory to this great people.

This turn of events thus naturally marked the time for proposing the creation of an Islamic republic, not only as a rallying banner and a goal, but as a reality and a living expression of the nation's conscience [or will], a

fitting crowning for the nation's struggle and a guarantee that his nation will continue in the path pioneered by Islam's victory.

As the great Iranian people accepts the torch of responsibility in the effort to build an Islamic republic, it does so not only for its own benefit, but in the hope that its undertaking will become a shining example throughout the Moslem world and the world at large. These are difficult times, and the Islamic world is looking for a savior from the domination of the European and Western world and the usurpative grip of their civilization. All nations of the earth are groping for a new message, one that will end man's domination over man.

From these premises, and in these moments, so full of history and rich in heroism, flush with the joy of victory and with determination for a new order, the Iranian people embarks on its historic role. Its aim is to create the first Islamic republic in Modern Islamic history, coupled with a determination that the constitution for such a republic shall be a magnificent and pioneering experiment in man's political history. And just as this people has succeeded in shaking the conscience of the world and in toppling its materialistic scale of values in its combat [against evil], it will once again shake the conscience of misguided humanity and the conscience of the tormented millions as it fills them with a new light, the light of Islam, which for too long has assiduously been smothered by Western man and his 'educated' agents, the very ones who labored mightily through military occupation, educational distortion, and religious fallacies to keep the light from entering the Islamic world in order to perpetuate its domination.

Islam, which has been suppressed militarily and politically and confined to the lowliest state by the colonialists, has emerged once again from Iran in a volcano-like eruption to shatter the oppressors, and to set a supreme example in building a nation of strugglers, a sharp sword aimed at tyrants and colonial interests. It has emerged to build the nation anew.

In propelling Islam forward, Imam Kohomeyni has demonstrated not only his supreme skill and the heroism of the Iranian people, but has simultaneously exposed the magnitude of the crime of those who have contributed to suppress Islam and to freeze its enormous constructive power. The new torch which has been handed to the Iranian people shall bare the evils of those governments that make false claims to Islam no less mercifully than those who have rejected it.

In what follows we shall review some of the fundamental political premises for the draft constitution of the Islamic republic. We preface our remarks by emphasizing that what we assert below reflects the sentiments of the Iranian people.

The great people of Iran subscribe absolutely to the following beliefs:

1. The laws of Islam, al-Shari'a, is the foundation on which life [including political life] must be built;

2. The supreme religious authorities, as a group, who led the struggle against oppression until victory was achieved, have the authority to speak [on matters related to religious orthodoxy];

3. Every Iranian is endowed with dignity [by God] entitling him to liberty, equality and a right to participate in building society.

Based on these premises, the following conclusions are inevitable:

1. God, praised be His name, is the source of all authority. This supreme truth is the outcome of the greatest revolution waged by the prophets in their battle to free man from the bondage of man. It follows from this truth that man is free, that no other man, class or group of men may exercise sovereignty over him. He alone is his own sovereign. Only in accepting this truth can domination and exploitation of man by man be ended. This sovereignty which was revealed to the prophets, and which is expressed in the words "la ilaha illa Allah" [there is no God but God], differs fundamentally from the "divine right of kings" which was used for centuries by kings and despots to subjugate others. Those who exercised this right gave only lip service to God's sovereignty in order to perpetuate their authority as "God's surrogates" on earth.

The prophets, however, and those who followed them or followed their trustees in the march for liberation, believed in that [God's] sovereignty, thus freeing themselves as well as humanity from all forms of acquiescence to "man's divinity" that was fraudulently perpetuated throughout history. They came to an objective understanding of the limits of man's authority over man as specified in the Shari'ah [Islamic Law] through divine revelation. No longer can an individual, family or class use the so-called divine right to consecrate its authority. Since God is the origin of all authority and since the Shari'a is the definitive expression of God's laws, it follows that the manner in which authority may be exercised must adhere to the Shari'a.

2. The Shari'a is the origin of all legislation. It is the source from which the constitution must derive. The codification of the constitution must proceed in the following manner.

(1) The parts of the Shari'a that are absolutely accepted [without disputation as to interpretation or intent], and to the extent that they relate to social life, must constitute a permanent part of the constitution whether or not they are explicitly spelled out in that document.

(2) Any part of the Shari'a admitting of more than one interpretation shall be delegated to the legislative authority, which may, in its discretion, select whatever interpretation it agrees upon to become part of the law, guided in its choice by the general welfare of the nation.

(3) Wherever the Shari'a is unclear, the legislative authority representing the nation shall have the right to put into law whatever it deems to be good, provided this does not violate or contravene the constitution. Laws falling in this category shall be referred to as the "vacuum laws" (See note 2).

this category of laws shall include those which the Shari'a expressly leaves to the discretion of the legislative body (referred to in item 2 above). The legislative body is free to assume any position consonant with the public good, provided that no such position shall violate the constitution. (Such laws shall be temporary and subject to local and time considerations.)

3. The legislative and executive authority have been delegated to the nation, which, alone, has the right to exercise these powers in the manner specified in the constitution. This right, the right to act as God's vice-regent, derives from the true source of all authority, God.

In full awareness that it is God's vice-regent, the nation will rise to the pinnacle of sensitivity in its exercise of power. For not even the nation has an inherent right to authority. Its responsibility before God is to shoulder and discharge the trust delegated to it.

"We did indeed offer the trust to the
heavens and the earth and the mountains;
but they refused to undertake it, being
afraid thereof. But man undertook it." (Koranic verse 72: Al-Ahzab).

The nation realizes the goals of that trust in the following ways:

(1) The nation bears the responsibility for electing a chief executive officer, after such a person has been nominated by the supreme religious authority in accordance with item [or article] 4. [The only reference to item 4 appears later in a statement defining the president's authority.] The elected chief executive officer will then form his government.

(2) Through direct elections, the nation shall choose a majlis [council]. The duties of this council are:

(i) To approve the appointment of the members of the government [cabinet] selected by the president to help him in the exercise of his office.

(ii) To decide which version of a given part of the Shari'a admitting of equally acceptable interpretations is to be adopted into law.

(iii) To legislate "vacuum laws."

(iv) To supervise the application of the constitution and laws, and oversee and engage in debate with the executive branch.

4. The supreme religious authority shall be the legal [authoritative] spokesman for Islam. This responsibility shall be assumed by the general deputy [Khomeyni] of the Imam (See note 3) whose duties are described below.

(1) He shall be the supreme representative of the nation and the commander-in-chief of the army.

(ii) He shall nominate or endorse the nomination of the individual or individuals who are candidates for the presidency. Any nomination made by him shall be construed as an affirmation that the nominee is constitutionally acceptable for the office of President. Such endorsement shall also be construed as a sign that the candidate is worthy and this his worthiness should be consecrated legally by electing him to that office.

(iii) He shall have the final word with respect to the constitutional status of the Shari'a.

(iv) He shall decide the constitutionality of the "vacuum laws" passed by the Majlis.

(v) He shall be responsible for creating a supreme court for adjudicating any violation of the foregoing articles.

(vi) He shall establish a grievance panel to look into all complaints and take appropriate action. The 100-member panel shall be selected from the country's top religious scholars, including a number of religious deputies, eminent authors and Moslem intellectuals. The panel shall include no less than religious scholars. The supreme religious authority shall exercise his functions through this panel.

The supreme religious authority [as a concept and as a group representing the Imam al-Mahdi] is an objective societal reality in the Iranian nation. Its legal justification is found in the principles of al-Shari'a. In practice, this authority is embodied in the person of the leader who, after a struggle of nearly 20 years, toppled the former government. He is the one whom the entire nation followed until victory was achieved.

As a supreme spokesman of the Islamic Republic, a supreme religious leader must possess the following attributes:

1. He must have the attributes of a true religious authority (See note 4), i.e., he must be characterized by absolute dedication to the study of the Koran and Islamic law and by the justness of his behavior in personal life.

2. His intellectual philosophy, as revealed in his publications and research, must show clear evidence that he is committed to the Islamic state and believes in the importance of safeguarding it.

3. His religious authority must be established and validated by his activity among the people according to established historical tradition.

4. He must be nominated by a majority of the council of religious authorities, and his nomination must be supported by a large number of those who work in the religious field (the number to be specified in the constitution), including theologians, students of religion, deputies of religious leaders (See note 5), imams in charge of mosques, preachers, authors, and Islamic intellectuals. In the event a number of equally qualified candidates render this process of nomination impossible, the matter shall be decided by a popular referendum.

5. As mentioned earlier, the nation is in charge of the divine trust. All members of the nation have equal claims to this trust before the law, and are therefore entitled to express their views and to pursue any form of political activity. Furthermore, they are all free to practice their religion. The state undertakes to safeguard the right to worship to the non-Moslem citizens of Iran, provided they are committed to political membership in the state and subscribe to its religious framework, even though they belong to other religions.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran, by virtue of its great mission and responsibility, has a number of historic goals. These goals determine the political direction along which the state will move internally and externally.

Internally, the state intends to accomplish the following:

(i) Make Islam the basis of all aspects of life.

(ii) Embody the spirit of Islam in the form of a social security system that would put an end to class inequities and guarantee a minimum and respectful standard of living to every citizen. This system would redistribute wealth legally in a manner that would make Islamic social justice a reality.

(iii) Provide every citizen with an opportunity for a constructive Islamic education, one that is designed to develop awareness and preserve orthodoxy in order to instill in the nation the necessity of safeguarding the revolution.

Externally, the state has set the following goals:

(i) To carry the light of Islam and the torch of its great mission to the entire world.

(ii) To stand along the side of justice in international disputes and thereby set Islam as a supreme example [in world affairs].

(iii) To help the weak and tormented of the earth and to oppose colonialism and oppression, especially in the Moslem world of which Iran is an indivisible part.

Just as the words of God are inexhaustible, just as walking toward Him never stops, and just as moving in the direction of the absolute never ceases, the great nation of the Koran has an endless number of goals.

(Say: "If the ocean were ink wherewith
to write, the words of my Lord, sooner
would the ocean be exhausted than would
the words of my Lord, even if we refilled it with
another ocean.") [Al-Kahf: Verse 109].

based on the preceding analysis, you can see that the system we have described is based on the following principles of Islamic theology.

1. Original sovereignty belongs to God alone, may His name be exalted.

2. Supreme religious leadership [strictly speaking, the person entitled to be general deputy of Imam al-Mahdi] should be given the holiest Kora'nic scholar, who is characterized by justness and who is deemed capable of filling the Imam [al-Mahdi] shoes. This is in agreement with the words of the Imam of the Age [al-Mahdi] (See note 6), himself, to whom the following exhortation is attributed:

"When in doubt about events, consult
'hadith' tellers (See note 7) Accept their word upon
mine, for I speak for God with God's help."

This exhortation establishes the hadith tellers as final and authoritative arbiters in all matters relating to the application of the Shari'a to life. Their distinction as hadith tellers and guardians of the Shari'a entitles them to the mantle of authority over the application of the Shari'a and over all matters related to it.

3. The vice-regency [of the state] belongs to the nation on the basis of the principle of consultation [an old Arabic custom dating to the days of the first caliphs, whereby the caliph would consult with the elders on matters of state before passing judgment]. The nation, according to the principle of consultation, has the right to run its own affairs under the supervision of the supreme religious authority [al-Mahdi's deputy].

4. The practice of establishing a majlis [a group of people empowered to [illegible] within a mid Islamic structure. When the concept is developed, subject to the principle of consultation and constitutional supervision by the supreme religious leader, it logically leads to the necessity of creating an elected national council [or people's assembly] to represent the people.

The brief outline we have presented will enable you to compare the Islamic [as based constitution [of the Islamic Republic] with other systems of government. A main point on which the drafters of our constitutional system differ with others with regard to the concept of a state, as well as the historical evolution of such a concept, is that Islamic tradition rejects the notion of a state based on strength and the ability to dominate, or the divine right of kings, as well as the theories that the state is either a social covenant or an evolution of the concept of family.

It holds that the state originated with the prophet(s) [the text is not clear as to whether the singular or plural is intended], that it is an evolution of the prophetic work, and that it appeared at a particular point in man's history.

As to the function of the state, Islamic tradition rejects all theories supporting that the state's function is to idolize an individual, keep

hands off [laissez-faire], cater to the individual citizen or society at large [on mistaken belief that either of these is the central concern of the state], as well as the socialist system. We hold that the state's function is to apply the laws of God [the Shari'a] which have reconciled the individual and society, and which have protected society, not in its Hegelian (See note 8) sense as opposed to the individual, but in as much as society is made up of many individuals and groups of individuals in need of protection and guidance.

As to the form of the government [the Islamic Republic], it is eminently legal, to the extent that the Shari'a governs both governor and governed.

We point further that Islam rejects monarchy and autocracy in all its forms, as well as a government based on aristocracy. In addition, the Islamic government proposed here, embodies all the good aspects of democratic systems, but with certain objective differences designed to safeguard against deviation. The people are the source of sovereignty in the democratic system. This is also the case in the Islamic Republic, where sovereignty and responsibility before God resides in the nation. One difference here, is that in a democracy the entire constitution is the work of man. Under the most ideal conditions, democratic rule represents the rule of the majority over the minority. In contrast, the fixed part of Iran's contitution represents the laws of God [the Shari'a], whose justice ensures the justice and objectivity of the constitution.

The Islamic Shari'a which treats publicly-owned and state-owned property on a par with private property is not reflective of a class struggle or of an intent of putting the interest of one sector of society above that of another, but, rather, of an intent to set the scales of social justice and equity. In this respect, it had established the first model of a just society. All other social justice laws, based on material and class distinctions, appeared at a later stage.

With respect to its structure, the Islamic Republic resembles a presidential system, but with major differences from those found in the democratic capitalistic systems, which adhere to the principle of separation between the executive and legislative branches of government.

In actual practice the Islamic system has consistently insisted on a form of government represented by a president who derives his authority from the constitution or directly from the people--through direct elections, or from both.

There is no room here to detail the differences between the organizational structure and delineation of powers in the Islamic Republic and the corresponding systems of other governments.

We have given you, esteemed colleagues, a brief analysis, based on Islamic law, in response to your inquiry. We hope that what we have said will give you an overall idea of the Islamic Republic proposed by the Moslem Iranian

people under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, may he live long. We do not present these analyses as definitive views, but merely as practicable proposals, representing an Islamic point of view, and subject to further study.

We ask God, praised be His name, to keep you and to grant you success in your effort to serve the cause and raise the banner of Islam.

May God's peace, His Mercy and blessings be upon you.

Dated: 21 January 1979

(Signed) Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr

The esteemed Religious Authority who resides in the noble city of al-Najaf, and whose authority is recognized internationally. As it was in the beginning, so it will be forever. God is the master designer.

Notes:

(1) Verse 301: Al-Baqarah [sic. Should be Verse 213].

(2) The "vacuum laws" demonstrate that Islam is flexible. Although Mr al-Sadr makes only a passing remark on this point, anyone interested in pursuing this topic further is referred to al-Sadr's book "Our Economic System and the Book [Koran] Need no Additional Explanation."

(3) "Imam" refers to our lord al-Mahdi, for whom I and all the faithful are willing to sacrifice our lives. Al-Mahdi is the son of the soldier Imam, al-Hasan, peace unto him, who is a descendent of the Prophet, Muhammad, peace and God's blessings be upon him. He [al-Mahdi] is mentioned in the writings of the Sunnis and the Shiites. When he re-emerges, God grant that we be among his supporters, he will fill the earth with justice instead of injustice and oppression.

(4) A religious authority is a dedicated Islamic scholar to whom Moslems have traditionally resorted in his capacity as a vice-regent of Imam al-Mahdi, peace be unto him. In addition to his scholarship, such a person must be gifted by justness, a quality that protects one against the danger of deviation from the Shari'a. He must, furthermore, avoid sins of commission and omission without a Shari'a-based justification. No distinction is made here between major or minor transgressions. The foregoing description is attributed to the eminent Islamic authority Ayatollah al-Sayyid 'Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khoni, may his memory live long, in his theological treatise "Minhaju al-Salihin" [The Way of the Good].

(5) The term deputy religious leaders refers to the group of theologians and Islamic law experts who represented the religious authority. They

act as ambassadors to the people as well as official spokesmen for the authority.

(6) The Imam of the Age is one of the titles of our lord al-Mahdi whose return is expected.

(7) The term "hadith" tellers refers to the members of the prophet's [Muhammad's] who related his unrecorded conversations [The collection of these conversations is called the Hadith].

(8) The reference is to the dialectic philosopher, Hegel.

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ANALYSIS OF PAST, PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS

Paris FAIRE in French Apr 80 pp 56-62

[Article by Gilles Gauthier]

> [Text] Coming after Iran, Afghanistan has erupted into our audio-visual field. Georges Marchais has returned from Moscow the bearer of an official truth and of a lesson of history we are not prepared to forget. As a good technician, aware of his responsibilities, he well knows that PCF loyalists cannot for a moment remain inactive in the face of confusing developments. And yet, it is indispensable for any organization to analyze, to generate a framework in which events develop--not, like G. Marchais, to build reality out of concrete. This [analysis] is what Gilles Gauthier, who has known the country [Afghanistan] for many long years, does in the following pages.

Afghanistan, like a number of Asiatic countries, is distinguished in French literature by its absense. The press dispatch is most often substituted for any other form of information.

We are totally lacking in reference works in French. The level of information, up to the most recent events, has remained almost nil on problems which affect this area of the Middle East. Because of this absense of historical, political, anthropological, and economic frames of reference, the French journalist has been unable to get hold of the present events, one of the rare exceptions being the article by A. Dastarac and Levent in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE of February 1980.

The Afghan enclave

Afghanistan, wedged between the USSR, Iran, Pakistan, and China, with no opening to the sea, is a country of recent creation (end of the Nineteenth Century). Geographically imposed, it remains very difficult even in our time to define an Afghan nation or people. Just like a number of countries

born of colonialism and randomly including oftimes strikingly divergent [local] governments and ethnic groups, Afghanistan, without ever having been colonized, results from the coming to an understanding of three imperialisms: Czarist, Iranian, and English.

Being unable to dominate the region and the recalcitrant peoples inhabiting it, Great Britain and Russia neutralized it. A concept of the buffer-state very dear to the British toward the end of the Nineteenth Century. Tibet, the small Himalayan states, result from this same political determination to divide up the Asiatic world into spheres of influence protected by neutral territories. The buffer-state thus becomes a no-man's-land from which are excluded underhanded maneuvers aimed at getting special concessions for certain powers, certain elites.

A concept of equilibrium, of sharing among the great powers, a century old, is not foundering with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghan territory.

The imposed borders bring together, while isolating, diverse ethnic and linguistic groups:

1.--A population of Persian origin and language in the west (Herat) and the northeast (Tadjiks).

2.--To the north of the Hindu Kush range, almost impassible, which divides the country from east to west, peoples of Turkish language, the Turkmen, the Uzbeks, Kirghizes, whose relations remain close to their sister-populations in the Czarist empire which tried to reduce the "khanates"* of Central Asia.

In the present day, we can still conjure up the Afghan capitals and markets (Bukhara, Samarkand) in the Russian zones, as much cultural as economic landmarks, despite the henceforth impassible barrier of the Amu Daria.

3.--In the middle, in the Hindu Kush, a population of sedentary mountain people, of uncertain origin (perhaps Mongolian, but of Persian language), the Hazaras.

4.--In the south, finally, overlapping Afghanistan and present-day Pakistan, the most numerous ethnic group (30 to 40 percent of the Afghan population), the Pashtous and the Baluchis (whose territory also extends quite a ways into Iran).

We can also add small more or less differentiated or homogenous groups:

--populations of the Pamir belonging to certain groups peopling western China;

*Khanate: Muslim principalities of varying size, whose leadership was assumed by a traditional chief, the Khan.

--the Nouristanis (pagans forcibly converted to Islam at the end of the Nineteenth Century and beginning of the Twentieth Century);

--a small Punjabi minority (originating in northern India).

In respect of religions, the Shiites, mainly represented by the Hazaras, run a close second to the majority Sunnites among the other populations.

Faced with this mosaic of cultures and local authorities, it proved rapidly necessary for the British to bring a semblance of cohesion to this totally artificial state.

Thus the accession to power of a major Pashtou tribal faction and of one of its leaders, Abd ul Rahman, will be supported. Armed and equipped by Great Britain, the emir's troops pacify the country and subdue the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, the non-Muslims (Nouristanis). The Afghan administration is centralized, not without difficulties.

The dominion of the Pashtou ethnic majority over political life will remain a constant to our day. The shahs that succeed him, then the republican leaders, then the present Marxists, are Pashtous.

The country remains very isolated throughout the interval between the two world wars, except during the abortive attempt at modernization by King Amanullah in 1920.

Archaic structures

No industry. An almost autarchic agriculture, totally dependent upon climatic fluctuations. Few means of communication, except those of the nomads, leaving many regions isolated in their particularism.

A heavy nomadic population, principally Pashtou, which comes and goes between northern Afghanistan and Pakistan depending on grazing conditions.

Surveying such a situation, the concept of feudalism comes immediately to mind. Georges Marchais several times refers us to the [begin italics] "right of cuissage [translation unknown]." [end italics] Demagogy and ignorance have never so much equalled the refusal to investigate and to pose the essential questions. Marx, however, offered the theory of a differentiated development in Central Asia and in the great Asiatic empires so that we might believe ourselves sheltered from such stereotypes, especially on the part of a communist leader. Decidedly, the discipline of history and political analysis will still long be confused with sensational literature.

Feudalism, certainly, but let us pause a bit on the plurality of relations of authority which characterize traditional Afghan society.

A large part of the Pashtous, nomads or mountain peoples, is organized around lineage relationships, clans, and tribal confederations, according

to the importance of the political stakes, along lines now relatively well studied both in North Africa and in the Middle East. To the juridico-religious framework brought by Islam is added an autochthonous code, regulating problems of territory, marriage, and honor, the Pashtoun-Wali.

In the plains, whether among the Pashtous, or the populations of Persian origin, land ownership, its employment and regulation doubtless render the power relationships more typically "feudal." The landowner, dispenser of seed and draft animals, is before anything else the master of irrigation, of the distribution of the water. He also, most often, takes it upon himself to be the link between the town and the markets. He is also a usurer.

Here again Islam only constitutes an extremely flexible framework, supplanted oftimes in daily life by socioeconomic rules without much connection with it.

In the north, especially among the Turkmen, the source of wealth, and by the same token, of power, is no longer really land and its cultivation (with the exception of the cotton-growing region of Kunduz), but the raising of karakul or Astrakhan sheep, in semi-nomadic lifestyle. Thus the ownership of land is supplanted by the ownership of flocks and the monopoly on marketing.

The big proprietor is, in the north, often at the same time involved in big commercial deals in Kabul or in the provincial capitals (import-export, rugs, etc.).

This diversity of power relations makes somewhat illusory the concept of feudalism plastered artificially or demoagogically over Afghan reality, if one refuses to give it analytic content.

The men of the Khalki* by flaunting their 1978 agrarian reform program showed a profound ignorance of the reality of their country. They spoiled in several months the potential hopes and expectations which the fall of Daoud had engendered in the country.

The Soviets play with famine

Agricultural problems and the terrible famines of 1971 and 1972 had already been responsible for the fall of the last king of Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah, on 17 July 1973.

Along with the traditional influence born of the exploitation of agricultural resources, several other groups took on a certain importance after World War II. With the opening up of the country in the fifties, an urban bourgeois class, in commerce, often closely linked to the rural wealthy, develops. To complement the traditional trade in astrakhan, rugs, and

*The party of Taraki which came to power in 1978 and was overthrown subsequently by Amin.

citrus fruits (especially starting in the sixties), import-export rapidly becomes a major source of revenue. This growth sector has interests in the import-export of semi-finished manufactures, of consumer goods or equipment, in the export of the work of Afghan artisans to occidental markets. It is sometimes closely tied to smuggling activities in the border zones. Certain international experts in 1976-1977 conclude that contraband doubtless represents one of the largest sectors of the national economy in terms of balance of trade.

This aspect is far from being anecdotal: the wealth of certain bazaars, particularly in Herat, in fact rests upon this type of commercial exchange.

For tens of thousands of Pashtous or Baluchi families, subsistence would be impossible without contraband. The Soviet occupation, beyond the almost systematically provoked destruction of the traditional agricultural structure, condemns these people, in fact, to famine.

Along with this sector, and in close relationship to it, a black market for currencies, extremely well organized, flourishes in Kabul, beyond all banking control.

Run by the Pashtous and the Punjabis, the Kabul black market remains famous as one of the richest and best furnished currency markets in the Middle East for rubles, rupees (Pakistani or Indian), Iranian ryals, as well as for the hard currencies.

In the almost total absense of industrialization, production is essentially in the hands of artisans. The rare attempts at establishing industries made by the rich countries are written off as failures. Lack of professional training, small size of the local market, lack of sufficient energy sources, absence of structures and of financial resources.

Many are the imported consumer goods, meat, matches, cigarets, beverages (tea, or processed products) as well as raw materials (paper, oil). In the face of this dwindling of basic products, a very important productive sector is developing around recycling. This type of activity is in general neglected in economic reports. Afghanistan is one of these poor countries where steel, nonferrous metals, wood, glass, paper, rubber, are systematically recovered for recycling by local artisans. Shoes, containers, machine-made products, even weaponry for the rebels presently comes from this recovery artisanry.

There seems to be great wealth below the surface. The natural gas extracted in the north has been bought in its totality, since its discovery, by the USSR. The lapis-lazuli undergoes no processing on site but is exported crude to Germany or England.

Exceptionally rich deposits of iron, oil, coal, and many other materials remain unexploited, for lack of means of communication and productive infrastructure.

Oil is supplied traditionally by the USSR and Iran, directly in the form of gasoline and gazole [translation unknown].

Electrification has not gone very far. Most of the big towns, the provincial capitals, are supplied by groups of generators, with the exception of Kabul and its surrounding region, supplied by a dam.

Excepting the great strategic axes, the road network is nonexistent. The Iran-Herat link, then Kandahar-Kabul-Pakistan, were built by the Americans. A rail project along the same route was to link the Iranian to the Pakistani network. This project has quite obviously been abandoned.

To this attempt at integrating the economy along an east-west axis is opposed that of the USSR, builder of the USSR-Herat-Kandahar, and the USSR-Kabul roads, with the penetration of the Hindu Kush at the Salang tunnel.

It should shock no one, this invasion last December. Soviet solicitude with respect to Afghanistan has always been most pressing. Its main economic partner for years, its principal customer in raw materials (natural gas, cotton), its principal arms supplier, and furnisher of technology and training; of vehicles, airplanes: the USSR invaded the country by means of strategic roads undertaken and built 15 years ago by its own technicians.

Divided Elites

In a country where there is much illiteracy, systems of education and of accession to leadership positions partition the emerging elite into small rival cells. Traditionally, before World War II, the Indian universities were favored by the business sector. Subsequently, French and German education little by little supplanted them, training jurists, doctors, academics, technicians.

With the opening up of the country toward its great Soviet neighbor (Daoud, prime minister for the Shah in 1959, then chief of state in 1973), and the establishment of a Soviet polytechnic institute in Kabul, the USSR began to train a great number of technicians and soldiers. A new elite, in a complete break, with the elite of the seventies between the traditional elite of German or French culture, and the new-born, closely linked to the USA and whose technocratic motivation admirably served for the growing implantation of Americans in the region.

We have often encountered these officers trained in the Soviet school. Often of modest origins, very desirous of changing, modernizing the structures of the country, some of them entertained, all the way to December 1979, the illusion of disinterested and open support by the big Soviet neighbor, thus losing from sight completely the negative aspect of the exclusive enclavement of their country in unique relations with the USSR. Even an abstract look at Soviet strategic aims in this area made it clear

that this position would not contribute to the desired structural reform. A number of the Khalk militants were in the same way naive victims of this illusion.

Their willingness to change remains praiseworthy, and the entry of the Red Army has surely shown many of them the error of their ways.

With this topography of forces and elites in Afghanistan as a background, two understandings present themselves:

--outside the traditional channels of influence, all reformist or revolutionary attempts to force change in the archaic structures of the state have to this day run up against ignorance of the terrain, and have been cut off from all popular support. The weak Marxist intelligentsia of Parcham or the Khalk is isolated. The Soviet strategic stakes and the massive occupation which subtends them will not support the illusion of a popular revolutionary government. Moreover, this decision to intervene directly now assimilates political life in this region into the great global maneuvers of the two superpowers. Afghanistan, from the "terra incognita" which it was, is not a pawn, an element of the game of spheres of influence.

--the deployment of the Soviet steam-roller will certainly create an organization of the masses and a heightening of awareness. The popular struggle constrains ethnic groups and socioeconomic groups to unify their demands, their efforts, to collaborate. New types of relationships should emerge from the resistance. From the shock of the nationalities will doubtless emerge a national federative Afghan sentiment. The imperatives of the struggle blur the rivalries, the obstacles posed by the fixed structures of tradition.

We cannot in any case ignore the fact that we are speaking of a necessary--but rarely sufficient--pre-condition for change. Based on what we know today, we can only hope to see emerge from the struggling populist groups, political leadership which breaks with the traditional channels of power, representative of the deep aspirations of the Afghan peoples.

Afghan Islam

This brief tour of the horizon of structural elements of Afghan political life would be incomplete if we passed over in silence the uniqueness of the role effectively played by Islam. Too much confusion has identified the situation in Afghanistan with that in Iran. Mostly Sunnite, Afghan Islam does not present the omnipresent checkerwork of an influential clergy as is the case in Iranian Shi'ite Islam. The various traditional authorities interact in a context where Islam is present but not necessarily decisive. The force of the tradition is certainly fundamental, though at the same time it cannot account for the entire political evolution of the country since the beginning of the century.

The exercise of power, the constitution of powerful socio-economic groups, often has little relationship with Islam. If the latter undeniably forms a very present framework of life, it is far from being monolithic, as some try to prove to us. Membership in the clan, in the tribe, to a particular ethnic group shows the notion of a united Muslim community rather inconsistent. There again, the ignorance of our western analysts is obvious. Just by simply considering traditional Afghan life one realizes that the totality of economic, social, and political rules result from strongly diverse traditional laws and religious culture.

Just to take the example of the wearing of the veil by women, which seems to fascinate Westerners, this rule is quite variously applied. This tradition is not imposed on the urban scene. Nomadic Pashtou women are not veiled (these nomads are around 3 million strong in a population of 13 to 15 million inhabitants). Turkmen women are not veiled.

One could go on forever about this ignorance of the Muslim world. An entire book would not exhaust it. The economic weight of the woman, her role in the education of children, in production, differs considerably by region and culture. It is now in the rural sedentary communities and among the middle classes of the towns that the traditional image of Islam evoked in literature best corresponds to reality.

Quite different is the problem of the political role of Islam. Confronting an external threat, such as the Soviet invasion, it quite obviously becomes an element of cohesion. The clamor, the struggle, is articulated in terms of Islam. The resistance, to be united, must use a unifying language. It can only be that of Islam. For a long time yet--and especially in light of the recent events touching the Middle East--Islam, religion, the context of life, will continue to be confounded with the cohesion that it brings to essentially political struggles.

The unity of this language in the traditional environment constitutes a formidable weapon of struggle, in a world which lacks any others. It only corresponds, in any case, to a definite stage of historical awakening. Islam's only reality, both with respect to the fall of the Shah and to the Afghan uprising, is in expressing, in galvanizing the opposition. Islam is not against the USSR, any more than it is against American imperialism in Iran. The Afghans unite their efforts in the fight for liberty, independence, their demands for social, economic and political change, through the unique channel of Islam.

The notion of Muslim community has never been as strong as when there are external dangers and the threat of the disaggregation of traditional structures.

By contrast, it has difficulty dissimulating conflicts and divergences. Factually, even if this is implicit, it allows formation of a common front. The renewal of Islam in many countries, the new image of Epinal [?] of journalists or specialists bereft of conceptual models, only account for

the foundering of structures under the repeated blows of the great powers (the implantation of totally foreign economic modes) and for the emergence of a new awakening.

Once again the repeated reference to the vacuity of such images leaves aside any analysis of the mechanisms at work. "A renewal of Islam" which, to our eyes, bears a strong resemblence to a rejection of the phenomenon and a refusal to seize its dynamism.

Soviet intervention

We will not put forth yet another exegesis of the process, which was after all tortuitous, of the Soviet decision to intervene. Few great powers have long held a country by supporting the accession to power of nonrepresentative elites, even with the support of thousands of tanks.

The failure it twofold. In the field, the rebellion, despite many problems, is determined to hold out, despite the considerable resources deployed against it. Diplomatically, it seems very difficult for the Soviets to generate any support or approbation, even among longstanding friends such as Indira Gandhi's India.

Our remarks will remain centered on the reality of Afghan problems. If the Soviet invasion offers the United States the unexpected opportunity to seize a new foothold in the region and to reestablish there a durable influence, after the Iranian disappointments, we nevertheless hope that the struggle of the Afghan nationalities will have an intrinsic value, a significance other than serving once again as a justification for the strategies of the great powers.

Defense of socialism there will doubtless lose many of its illusions. May the real forces emanating from the Afghan resistance generate something other than the vain petitions of "friend of Afghanistan." Romantic disillusionment, joined to regret at having lost the private hunting grounds of adolescent experiments has no more place under the present circumstances.

We cannot for one instant forget the massacres, the destruction. The battle of the great powers, has for several years tended more and more overtly to systematize scorched earth and genocide, in order to put down resistance.

We known here and now that the losses in human life in the battles, just as in Cambodia, will be nothing compared to those caused by the systematic destruction of villages, cultural regions, and the traditional economic structure. Food assistance will complete the dependence and subjection of the country, arriving in the munitions wagons of the invader to recompense the small subject minority.

This form of war and conquest is becoming generalized throughout the world. It becomes of the greatest urgency to denounce both the practice and those who perpetrate it. We do not wish to be obliged to wait 3 or 4 years as

in Cambodia to see the quite hypothetical "human rights" defended at last and the formation of convoys of supplies going to the moribund dispersed in neighboring countries. The policy of aid to refugees and the complacent conscience that the humanitarian alibi seems to procure tends more and more to be a substitute for political opposition.

We are constrained here again to come back to Marchais' statements. There is no "right of cuissage [trans. unknown]" in Afghanistan other than that ostensibly exercised by a great power, the USSR, over its weak neighbor. There can be no socialism, when one massacres, when one starves a people, when one destroys its tiny economic potential. We wish the militants of the PCF were not duped by the aberrant rationalizations of its leadership and its secretary general.

MiG's Against "Popguns"

We have been over this region for a sufficient number of years to assert with complete certainty that there has never been a foreign military presence--not even disguised--on the southern frontier of the country. The Americans have long been absent from this region. Their diplomatic personnel have even been considerably reduced in number for more than a year. If they return, it will be with the magnified justification of being constrained to do so by the Soviets.

Never, and especially not in the last 2 years, have there been any other camps on the southern border than those of miserable refugees fleeing from napalm and Soviet bombs. To them we can add the winter camps of the nomads.

If the Pashtun tribes, straddling the border, have always been armed, we can firmly claim never to have seen a heavy weapon in the hands of Afridis or any other fighting men...

The external threat brandished and reiterated by Marchais would strongly resemble a joke if thousands of people armed with popguns [rifles] (old Enfield, Lower regimentals from the English Army in India, old Sten guns) were not being massacred by the MiG's and heavy weaponry of one of the most powerful armies in the world.

The institutionalized lie, even peremptorily sounded in these television numbers about which Georges Marchais is so reserved, cannot dissimulate the sad truth about a devastating and anti-popular invasion. Nothing remains for the French right but to congratulate itself.

The Afghan peoples who are struggling against the Soviet seizure don't need sterile debate. They need weapons, medical supplies and logistical support. More than anything, it is indispensable that information circulate freely, that an objective analysis be elaborated, and that socialism be concerned about developments which affect the Middle East. Its survival and its future are at stake.

9516
CSO: 4900

MASS ARRESTS OF YOUTHS IN KABUL

[Extracted] THE MUSLIM in English 27 May 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, May 26. At least 50 students, 30 of them girls, were killed and an estimated 800 injured in street demonstrations and clashes with the Afghan militiamen in Kabul during the last fortnight, travellers reaching here today said.

"I saw very many dead bodies of my students being brought to their homes with bullet marks . . . their faces disfigured or with apparent marks of beating and torture", an Afghan teacher at Kabul University said.

The teacher, who asked not to be named, confirmed that the government militiamen had resumed house-to-house searches and were arresting young people indiscriminately.

"The university, colleges and schools are deserted, no one is attending, except for a handful of pro-Karmal students. The rest have come to streets to fight the Russians out of our country", the teacher, who was accompanied by her husband and two children, said.

They arrived on an Ariana Afghan Airlines flight and plan to stay in India till "the Russians are kicked out of Afghanistan".

A French businesswoman said at least 20 Russians were "killed or wounded" when the students ambushed them in the Bazaar (market) area in Kabul on Wednesday.

"Usually we do not go to the market after sundown, but on Wednesday I had to go. Suddenly I heard rattling of automatic weapons there was confusion, someone said that the students had attacked Russians".

"I ran for cover I saw ambulance vans carrying the Russians . . . I am not sure if these were dead or just wounded", she said.

On the same day seven girls were killed by Afghan militiamen in Kabul, she said.

"Since the big April 27 demonstration and firing, the students have been carrying out demonstrations practically every day", she said and added" at least five different demonstrations were held on Wednesday . . . all near the university. . . We heard the government troops opened fire on the girls"

She said she was not able to confirm whether 50 students had been killed during the last fortnight.

"You see (in Kabul) we hear rumours . . . it has become a great rumour city . but we do get confirmation after we talk with other people", she said.

She confirmed that the government militiamen were using "electric cattle prods" to beat up the student demonstrators.

"It is a long thing . . . gives you terrible pain", she described the prods and said that she had seen the militiamen using them on the demonstrators.

She also confirmed the sabotage of the fuel and ammunition dump at Khair Khasna, about eight kilometres from Kabul, on Wednesday.

Eight guards, five Russians and three Afghan militiamen, were reportedly burnt to death in the rebel sabotage which blew up the ammunition dump.—APP

BRIEFS

MUJAHIDEEN BLOWS UP SOVIET FUEL DUMP--NEW DELHI, May 25: Afghan freedom-fighters shelled a Soviet fuel dump north of Kabul last week, blowing up and burning dozens of tank/trucks and killing seven and injuring 32 soldiers, according to a report from Afghanistan reaching here yesterday. Flames and huge columns of black smoke rose over the capital, blotting out the sun for several hours after the Wednesday morning attack, said an Afghan source in Kabul who in the past has proved reliable. The report said the Russians lost 65 tanks, trucks, nine armoured vehicles and tanks and several other vehicles worth an estimated 16 million U.S. dollars. It was the most detailed account so far of explosions and fires variously reported at the Khai-ur-Khana Military Complex, eight kilometres north of the capital. Radio Afghanistan and other official media had said two tank trucks collided and made no mention of casualties. The Kabul source also reported a total of 27 dead and about 100 wounded, some seriously, in new outbreaks of student rioting in the capital on Tuesday and Wednesday. Earlier reports estimated from two to 12 schoolgirls killed and more than 60 wounded by gunfire and beatings by police and ruling Parcham Party vigilants. About 1,500 young students were arrested last week and arrests are still continuing, said the Kabul source. The students were protesting the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the detention of about 4,000 of their classmates reported still held after an earlier wave of youth demonstrations. The capital was reported jittery after Wednesday's explosions as well as a series of recent bomb blasts and threats. One bomb exploded near the Science Faculty of Kabul University last Monday and another in a university garden, killing a gardener, said the Kabul source. Several other bombs were located and defused after anonymous telephone calls, he added. The university has been reported on strike since April. Sketchy, reports, reaching Kabul, spoke of heavy fighting in the important provincial cities of Herat, in north-western Afghanistan near the Iranian border, and Kandahar, in the south. Soviet jets and helicopters, some believed flying directly from bases in the USSR, bombed guerilla positions in both cities last week, according to an unconfirmed report from Kabul reaching here.--APA [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 26 May 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

PRESIDENT CHADLI ADDRESSES REGIONAL PLANNING SEMINAR

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 25 Apr-1 May 80 pp 162-168

[Text] Thursday, 17 April 1980, the president of the republic, secretary general of the party, delivered an important speech at the close of business of the regional planning seminar. This is the translation of the entire speech:

"I would have liked to have taken part in the proceedings of this seminar on planning from the time it started, and numerous obligations prevented me from doing so. Nevertheless, I was eager to attend the closing session to hear in person representatives from the rank and file who experience everyday problems and know what the people long for. For this reason your opinions and suggestions take on a great importance for the Political leadership which supports the endeavor of planning and watches over the progress of the journey we have undertaken together.

Dear brothers,

Our vision of the next decade (to 1990) centers around a number of major guidelines whose object is to complete the country's development in an overall, coherent and complete fashion.

Among these guidelines is the process of increasing reliance on our own national resources human as well as material, and to utilize them according to scientific, coherent planning. You will agree with me that our potential has not been exploited as it should be.

We should aim, as another guideline, consolidate the achievements of the Revolution which have been registered during these last 15 years. This requires greater expertise in management, greater productive output, a better utilization of the Algerian cadres we have been able to train thanks to their adequate schooling, which was not available in the past and made our choice extremely limited.

So in view of the insufficient numbers of Algerian cadres we have been forced to turn for assistance to brotherly countries, friends, and foreigners. I would like to touch on another important guideline area:

setting up the proper balance between sectors and enterprises; the struggle against social ills, neglect, and waste and mobilizing activist revolutionary energies among the workers, the peasants, youth, and the mujahiddin, within democratic organizations, to build up the economy for the benefit of all. These foundations are the basis for our unanimity in everything we are working on. So planning will be based on what is actually needed by the rank and file which must have its say in regard to the country's future. In this way mobilization will build on a foundation of conviction and involvement will be an effective guarantee of results.

In this way the people do participate in planning via their representatives in institutions and in mass organizations, just as activist elements can assume their responsibilities at the level of implementation. This is, besides, a translation into practice of the slogan "Revolution by the people and for the people."

There is no doubt that the building of the Socialist Revolution is the job of cadres who have faith in the course laid out by the National Charter. Also it is through the means at our disposal, by organizing revolutionary elements, that we manage to preserve our achievements, to enhance them, and to move confidently forward toward realizing the goals marked out by our Revolution.

Keeping the Cadres on Track

I have stressed the need for scientific planning because it constitutes, for good reason, the scientific basis for overall and well-coordinated development. The needs of the people make up the broad outlines of this planning. It is at this level that the role of the wilaya and the commune surface in the preparation and implementation of the development plan.

While the state has a fundamental role to play in satisfying the needs of an individual citizen, the latter is himself prepared to participate by making his contribution, however limited the means at his disposal may be.

By way of example there is the problem of housing. The state must encourage the idea of building one's own house. In this context, and in view of our decentralized system, the requisite resources must be placed under the managerial jurisdiction of the wilayas and communes.

There is the question of agriculture. This sector suffers from numerous problems, the most important of which are linked to the human factor much more than to material means.

I have already referred at length to the agriculture question, putting heavy emphasis on how the country's future is tied to the development of this sector. It is important for us to exploit our short-lived natural resources such as oil or whatever so that agriculture can be developed. We must guarantee for future generations the maximum possible self-sufficiency in food products. This problem will be further studied, from every angle, at the time of the next meeting of the Central Committee.

Among the other guideline areas that engage our attention is the way the country's economic enterprises are structured.

The country has broken through to a high stage of development that has caused the rapid expansion of a certain number of state enterprises. This expansion has reached the point where it has become difficult to ensure good management of those enterprises however determined their administrators may be. That is why we are moving towards an overhaul of the structure of certain enterprises with the aim of ensuring better management and greater production.

Similarly we maintain a great interest in the role that can be played by national planning offices at the local level, whether in the commune or the wilaya. This role must not stay limited to the national level.

In the context, the Algerian cadre should realize how much confidence he enjoys in practice. In this regard, he must be given the necessary means to carry out his leadership mission. We must avoid direct and systematic recourse to foreign research institutions without giving the opportunity to our cadres to show their ability.

However, the fact remains that the Revolution, while having utter confidence in its cadres, requires of them that above all they be patriotic, law-abiding, and faithful to the course chosen by the people and to the principle of the Revolution. Our cadres, finally, must not be connected with one person or a group of persons. Their attachment is to the homeland for whose interest they must labor.

It is easy to accomplish decentralization if this were only a question of administrative procedure. Now then, decentralization must rest fundamentally on the rational use of people which are in a position to ensure good use of the means at their disposal.

While I have at some length insisted on the need for a rational selection process of people, to be made according to set criteria, it is how those cadres are utilized which must therefore be our major concern, particularly in the area of economic enterprises in which we cannot allow excessive expansion of numbers of employees at the national level, at the risk of damaging the production set-up and even the smoothness of working conditions.

Many cadres deplore their not being used effectively, since the State authorizes significant sums for their training, especially abroad, if they only see themselves locked up afterwards in their offices, far removed from the activities in which they had been trained.

This matter must be closely linked to the need to keep a cadre on track, problem usually based on the principle of "the right man for the right job" and not security at any price.

Therefore, we must trust the Algerian cadre with responsibility, give him confidence and job security, so that he can handle all the tasks he must accomplish.

In this connection, we must encourage a spirit of initiative on the part of the cadre, in line with the responsibilities assigned to him, so that the cadre does not turn himself into a robot, limited to carrying out orders. Of course there is a set of rules relating to the way in which work is organized which must be obeyed, but the highest objective is to do the best job possible on the work to be done and avoid setting up bureaucratic obstacles which are harmful to production and to the citizen and create a danger for governmental machinery.

Regarding planning and satisfying the needs of citizens, I will mention the problems connected particularly with marketing and supply arrangements as well as consumption goods for basic needs which we must make sure are available for each citizen. In this area, some measures have already been taken, and others will be as well. However, any such measure must be preceded by a required study which makes sure that a balance is struck between need and available resources. Specifically in this connection we must ask ourselves the question of whether national output is being achieved in the necessary quantity and quality.

Increasing Production

I had mentioned earlier the need for rational utilization of existing material and human resources. However, we must recognize that the level of production does not correspond to that of consumption. That is why we cannot fairly respond to needs without having increased production beforehand.

Imports should be limited to goods we cannot produce in our country. Unfortunately we are in the habit of opting for easy solutions, even though we are in a position to produce more.

At present we enjoy the benefit of oil and gas which permit us to import food products. But the fact that we count on those resources so completely entails a risk for the country and for the Revolution, because of the negligence which this state of affairs could create in our system of production.

We must ensure that a job is a good qualification and a measure of respect for citizens and cadres. We must also increase our production in all sectors so we can satisfy the needs of the citizenry and have a healthy economy. Moreover, this provides us a guarantee of national independence.

In this connection, we are strengthening the self-employed private sector as per the National Charter. It is our duty to strengthen this sector and make all efforts to keep an eye on it so that it does not come to take unfair advantage of labor.

Small businessmen and tradespeople are allies of the Revolution according to the preamble itself of the National Charter which I took an oath to uphold and enforce. While it may still be too soon to go into detail on this matter since the Central Committee is meant to take it up in the future, I did want in the meantime to mention the principle which is guiding us in this area, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion.

Along this line of thought I will mention the State monopoly on foreign trade. A certain number of government agencies given responsibility for this sector are not fulfilling their role as they should. Bureaucratic red tape and indifference have created shortages of certain goods relevant to the everyday needs of citizens. With this in mind, a committee has been set up at the Party level. It will study the matter from all sides and set about reviewing all the enforcement procedures which do not serve our purpose.

The economic situation of the country is good. The resources are there. What we lack is more administrative skill and everyone participating within the limits of his responsibility in the country's economic development.

One Priority: Housing, Water, Health

Here you have in partial form some general ideas about our approach to the next decade. We have mentioned our inadequacies and are unburdened by any inferiority complex. We firmly believe that the achievements of our Revolution are numerous and that the majority of our problems stem from rapid development.

Therefore it is logical for us to set about making a critical examination of our progress and to study our mistakes. I have already said on numerous occasions that a revolution which is blind to its errors is a revolution on its way out before its time.

The first evaluation we undertook allowed us to define the priorities which the next stage of development will focus on. At the time of the initial stage, following a process of collective decision-making, priority was given to industrialization. This time, priority will go to areas of social infrastructure such as housing, water and health. This is the priority to be elaborated in the Five-Year Development Plan the basic assumptions of which you are examining.

While strengthening the achievements of past years, this plan is designed to assign greater importance to satisfying social needs of our citizens. It is to build up industries which are suited to our human resources.

But industry must be run by our cadres and our workers. That is how to strengthen our national independence. Because the current impetus toward gigantic proportions in industry will lead us in future to dependence on cooperation with other countries. That is why we must

avoid its dangers and risks. On that subject, some biased voices can be heard talking about reconsidering our stand. This line is peddled by those who can find no weak point to attack us on. All true cadres have faith in the Revolution. We have no inferiority complex. We will see to it that the final decision is an Algerian decision, in keeping with the principles of the National Charter and the highest national interest.

As far as we are concerned, the interest of Algeria rises above everything. As for me, I will always be alongside the people, removed from any kind of demagoguery and getting my inspiration from reality.

The first concern of the leadership is to be always alongside the masses. Because living removed from one's countrymen leads to isolation and as a result to deviation from the revolutionary line.

Our first obligation will be to the National Charter which was openly debated by all citizens and democratically adopted. It is important for all officials at all levels to obey the will of the people that they keep to the revolutionary line and the spirit of the Charter.

All matters are initially debated at the grass roots level, democratic organizational framework in which citizens and party activists express their ideas and make their suggestions.

That is our way of working: we say yes to democracy; on the other hand, we reject anarchy. We do not run away from problems; on the contrary, we always attempt to face up to them with open dialogue in institutionalized frameworks.

All the items which have been examined at the level of the political leadership were debated beforehand at the grass roots level, and all the suggestions formulated by citizens via their representatives, elected in complete freedom and democracy, were taken into consideration. Decisions have been made only in the light of debates which took place among the rank and file and of studies undertaken by committees at the Party level. I believe that is a wholesale way of working.

The Cultural Heritage of the People: An Asset of the Entire Algerian Nation

We will not allow matters of national concern to be chaotically debated in the street which would further complicate things instead of resolving them and would give rise to minor problems. I think that we can do without all that.

We talked about the national language and the need to restore to it its rightful place in an Arab and Islamic Algerian state; there can be absolutely no room for us questioning our identity.

We are Arabs whether we like it or not. We belong to the Arab-Islamic civilization. An Algerian is treated in any other foreign country as an Arab Algerian: he has no other identity except for that one.

We are Algerians, our language is Arabic, our religion is Islam. We have a cultural heritage of the people which is an asset of the entire Algerian nation, in the deepest historical sense, and which has solidified thanks to Arab-Islamic civilization.

Things regarding the people's heritage must be quite clear. As I said, it is a national historical asset of the entire Algerian people and is not limited to one part or group.

The preservation of the values of our national character is the first concern of the revolution. The heritage of the people is included in aspects of this national character and it is one factor that makes it richer.

We have engaged in numerous efforts to preserve this national heritage and to put vitality into the cultural sector. Nevertheless, the formal examination of the culture program must follow the same procedures used to examine other items.

The program for national culture is to be set forth nationwide at the level where all citizens and political activists can participate in order from them to express their opinion and to lead up to a program of specific work to be done such as has been the case for other sectors.

No person or group can assume the right to monopolize discussion in the name of their heritage, since that is the right of 20,000,000 Algerians.

The cultural heritage of the people countrywide forms part of the values of Algerian Arab-Islamic character and represents an asset of the entire Algerian people.

Anyone who rejects this concept or attempts to go beyond it perhaps qualifies as not being motivated by Algerian patriotism.

Meanwhile, this matter should not be broached in the streets, in chaotic fashion, and only too probably with very precise political goals in mind. That is a problem which we do not put up with at all and it must not be exacerbated. By virtue of the responsibilities entrusted to me, thanks to the confidence of the Algerian people, I declare that there will be no exasperated fuss about anything which by nature would undermine national unity from near or from afar. We will fight with any means any attempt aiming to undermine national under any slogan whatsoever.

In the very recent past, the blood of the sons of Constantine, Maghnia, Tlemcen, Oran, Algiers, Tizi-Ouzou, Bejaia and other regions of the country flowed together across all the land of Algeria. In the East, as in the West and in the South, colonialism did not succeed in breaking up the unity of the Algerian people in spite of all the efforts it mounted, particularly in the area of arms, to create division according to a "divide and conquer" policy.

It is shameful that such a subject is brought up after 20 years of independence and that loyalty should be thus trumpeted to martyrs whose souls are still present among us. What use will have been all these sacrifices except for genuine independence and for genuine national unity.

Bringing up such matters in the streets and in an unorganized way could undermine national unity and succeed in sowing confusion which is of no use to us particularly at this stage when we need all our energy to finish off our national development and build the society we long for.

Talk about this matter and the form it takes belong to the old days, at the very time we are engaged in a battle with colonialism which has no formal connection with our country except for a cultural one.

While restoring our national language to its proper place, Algeria cannot seal itself off from foreign languages and cultures. We live in an age with a wide range of technology and it is imperative that each citizen, particularly young people, know other languages.

We have struck colonialism in the head and just look at how it is wagging its tail. The fact that we protect our seets and our rights has pushed some people overseas into stirring up plots with the goal of undermining our national unity and the Socialist Revolution.

We have suffered for a long time from exploitation. Every one of our protests is answered by an outbreak of plots and pressures.

Algeria has the right to defend its oil and gas wealth. She has the right to market them for a fair price.

History has the right to defend its oil and gas wealth. She has the right to market them for a fair price.

History will never be able to accuse us of failing in our duty, of having allowed the people's riches to be exploited at a very low price. That is something that we will never accept, even if we must shut down our wells.

Third-World: Algeria's Loyalty to its Own Principles

We must take note of the stand taken by the Western press against Algeria and of its campaign directed at what happens in our country. We must start seeing that facts are crosschecked and bring this to a close.

We will never go back on our stands. I am convinced that the Algerian people are fully aware of the nature of the stage we are going through. This stage requires of us all, citizens and officials, that we all lend total support when it comes to fundamental matters. It compels us to ignore minor questions raised for motives which would not escape and party activist.

Because of its clear policies and its devotion to principle, Algeria is one of the bastions of the Third World which struggles against colonialism, neocolonialism and exploitation.

By defending Third World causes and the rights of its peoples, Algeria is expressing its loyalty to its own principles. That is why she has become the target of plots and scheming.

History bears witness however that our people have at all times risen to the occasion. Each time the homeland and its Revolution have been in danger they have known how to rise above secondary internal problems.

I am convinced that sincere officials at all levels know what their duties are in this area which will make them worthy of the people's trust.

The Revolution has confidence in all its cadres. It is up to them, in the context of the principles it has outlined, to thwart all hostile attempts which aim at undermining the country's unity, its independence, and the future of its sons.

Young people in particular must bar the way to all suspicious elements inclined to play on their emotions and to falsify the true facts about certain problems in order to incite some young people to follow a path contrary to the course of the Revolution and to the requirements of national unity, all the while sowing doubt among a united people and confusion in a united homeland.

Dear brothers,

We would hardly know how to describe the firm stands taken by Algeria without making special mention of the place occupied by our country within the Arab nation.

Our recent visit to a great number of Arab countries has allowed us to further confirm how much interest is taken by the Arab nation in our country, its deep respect for the Algerian Revolution and its admiration for the Algerian people. This induces all of us here to take on together a high degree of responsibility, which it is incumbent on us to do, so that our country may deserve the trust which is shown it by the Arab nation. This requires on our part that we carefully guard our country's prestige and watch out for how faithful we are to Arab and international commitments.

Algeria enjoys great resp[illegible]e international scene and the voice of Algeria carries weight tha[illegible]ne Algerian Revolution, to the continuation of its revolutionary policy, a[illegible]to its firm, clear and principled stands regarding international problems.

This visit afforded us the chance to exchange views with Arab leaders on Arab and international questions, particularly the question on which rests the fate of the Arab nation, that is, the cause of the Palestinian people.

reaffirmed to our brothers our total solidarity and our support for the Arab struggle and just causes. I take this opportunity to thank our brothers for the reception they provided us and the marks of respect shown us out of regard for the Algerian people during our visit.

After that, dear brothers, we participated in the 4th summit of the Arab Front for Solidarity and Resistance where we made important decisions to strengthen Arab ranks on the basis of our unity of purpose, of seeing things realistically, and of approaching questions openly.

In all of that we took off from the reality of the Algerian experience and Algeria's sense of duty in the framework of the Arab struggle. By doing this we were able to leave behind certain problems still at issue between certain partners in the Front thanks to the wisdom and the joint effort of all the brothers who participated in this meeting.

In this way we led up to some important, clear and practical decisions which operate in the real interest of Arab solidarity against the common cause of the Arab nation.

The stand taken by the countries in the Front for Solidarity and Resistance was courageous and realistic, in keeping with the imperatives of law and justice, on the strength of their recognition of the Sahrawi Republic, which is the expression of the struggle of an Arab and Mohammedan people.

Dear brothers,

I wanted to give you a general survey of certain matters which were the subject of our concern during the weeks just past and at some future meeting I will not fail to address you on other matters.

My desire is to see this seminar lead to practical recommendations, which may well provide a review of all the suggestions relating to the Five-Year Plan, in such a way that the Plan may be the genuine reflection of the hopes and desires of our people, who will have to make contributions to the design and the implementation of programs.

I take this opportunity to inform you of the agenda for the 3rd session of the Central Committee which will have up for debate numerous matters among which are tourism, the role of the private sector in tourism, and agriculture, and to reaffirm that political decisions regarding these matters can under no circumstances be made outside the framework of the Political Leadership, that is to say, the Central Committee. Which means that every decision made outside the Central Committee is unfounded.

To be sure, there are decisions made at the level of executive officials so that ongoing operations do not freeze up, but a final political decision which sets out the course to follow in a specific sector is a matter for only the Political Leadership. I say this so that each one of us may make allowances for what he has heard here or there.

We left the 4th [Party] Congress endowed with an elected Leadership. I took an oath to oversee the implementation of the National Charter and the Congress's decisions. Similarly I undertook to ensure obedience to the Constitution and the law of the land. That is the road we will advance along whatever the difficulties may be.

I am convinced that all the vital forces of the Revolution and all sincere citizens will come to my assistance in order to accomplish this mission."

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FUTURE OF POST-PETROLEUM ECONOMY DISCUSSED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12, 13 May 80 p 5

[Two-part article by Hassan Bourouiba*--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

[13 May 80, p 5]

[Text] The Directorate of Statistics and National Accountability, basing itself on data from the National Customs Directorate, published a document reported by APS [Algerian Press Service] (EL MOUDHAHID of 10 Mar 1980) concerning our country's foreign trade in 1978.

From this document it appears that:

/--96.2 percent of our exports in 1978 were hydrocarbons.

/--Our exports only covered 73 percent of our imports./ Our trade balance was therefore seriously deficient.

/--The percentage of coverage of imports by exports was:
-- 110 percent in 1974
-- 78 percent in 1975
-- 99 percent in 1976
-- 86 percent in 1977
-- 73 percent in 1978./

In other words, /our trade deficit steadily increased from 1974 to 1978./

The increases in the price of hydrocarbons is going to redress the deficiency of the balance, but for how long.

I admit right away that I am not an economist. But even so, this figure of 92 percent frightens me (I do not use the word lightly), and in writing it my thoughts turn to the /post-petroleum/ period.

*Mr Bourouiba, now retired, was formerly with the Department of Education

According to estimates which seem to be objective, we can count on 30 years of oil and gas production at the present rate we are taking it out of the ground.

/Let each of us try to imagine the day when the bowels of our Sahara will be dried up, the day when we will have to have currency to buy this oil and gas which today enable us to procure this same [hard] currency to import wheat for our bread and machinery for our factories.

/In 1978, 3.8 percent of our exports were non-hydrocarbons,/ or 951 million dinars, less than one-fifth of the total of food products imported (5 billion dinars).

/If, therefore, in 1978, we had not had petroleum, or gas, we would not even have had enough to feed ourselves./ And like primum vivere [translation unknown] we would not have been able to import medical supplies or these spare parts of which we daydream, or even equipment for our industry.

/1978 was yesterday.

/2010 is coming tomorrow./

30 years passes so quickly, and we Algerians are goldsmiths surrounded by bullion, wasting our time and gaining nothing, without a second thought.

/Our country's predicament is grave./ Any citizen with a modicum of common sense can see it with only the least bit of reflection. Let him simply ponder the fact that the children born today will be 30 years old in 2010 and that many of them will have nothing to eat but Talghouda* like it was in the black days of the colonial regime.

I have thought about this problem.

I want to express my deep appreciation to EL MOUDJAHID for permitting me to pass on my thoughts to my compatriots, and I hope that each of them, feeling with pleasant surprise the stirring of an impulse he had thought permanently paralyzed, will also want /to do something/ for our dear invalid [country].

All our efforts must be brought to bear simultaneously toward what I call /the essential poles of action./ There are others, to be sure, but it seems to me that if we contented ourselves with only these, in the first stage, we would not have wasted our time and it is precisely this which constitutes our first pole of action.

First pole of action: time

Everything goes up in our country except time.

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*A wild, poisonous plant

A pleasantry which was very fashionable ran something like this: "We will make good on the Four Year Plan, even if it takes us 10 years." In what elegant terms these remarks illustrate the place which time occupies in our scale of values!

"Time is money--Time lost is never regained."

All these phrases are lost on us.

At a recent roundtable, the question was posed: An Algerian goes abroad for advanced studies. He lives for several years in a country where the race against the clock is the driving motor of national life. He returns to his own country. Instead of going to the office at 0800, he arrives at 1000. He continually puts off research, decisions. It is obvious that one cannot fault his training abroad for this.

/Is it then a congenital defect? Are we born slothful? Do we despise time because the capitalists have made of it a God?/

No, because there are students who break their commitments and remain in the country where they receive their education, and they behave completely differently than they would have in their own country: they work continually, sleep shorter hours, fulfill themselves. They even have several jobs and wish they had more than 24 hours a day to keep earning. Every minute counts for them.

Here, an order given to a monopoly on 14 July 1974 is filled three years later. An invoice of 1972 is paid...in 1979.

Construction projects which should be finished within the year drag on for three and four years. During this time, costs go up. The money allocated no longer suffices. A supplemnetary "package" is required. It becomes quite obvious that time is, indeed, money.

There are thousands of examples like that.

Journalist and photographer friends, there you have an inexhaustible mine of news, completely untapped. Friend cameraman, of the now defunct invisible camera, post yourself discreetly--as you know how to do--near a "chicks' nest" to be shut down, a gas main to excavate.

No! You're not going to film it all in one shot; you will need miles and miles of film. I can see the following sketch: 0900. Here come the three ditch-diggers to the worksite for...a pleasant sally at ditching. 0915. They are discussing it. Cut. 0955. The fellow with the thick moustache decides to begin working. Cut 1015. Snack-time. 1100. Start again, etc...

You see the point. It's your trade, too.

Has the bureaucracy, whose whole purpose in life is to waste time, been sufficiently vilified? Why do we not have a secret corps of inspectors of the civil service charged with following the tribulations of an exchange of correspondence, its long wait in a regulatory office, its painful ascension to the next stage, followed by a salutary repose, then a long period necessary to logging its "arrival"; a prolonged wait on a list of "cases." /"It takes time to do the work well,"/ thinks the official, to appease the timorous protests of his embryonically professional subconscious.

Now it's June, then July. Ramadan. You know the expression: "Wait till we drink the water."...The water is drunk on Aid-Es-Seghir Day...and it is time for annual leave. Then the return. It will take some time for settling back in. Rude awakening. There is still that letter--which, in the meantime, has been re-classified from "cases" to "urgent action required"!! Several days pass by for preparation. Entreaty to the typist.

"Get this letter typed for me!"

"You think I have nothing but that to do?"

New delay. Finally it is typed and...the final signature.

Then there is absenteeism: I am not speaking of those who arrive late, not always willingly, nor of the premature departures of those who stalk the corridors--I was going to say in search of any scam--while the/chief--arrived a little while ago--is in conference/...with his crossword puzzle.

There are standard leave periods preceded by a long period of preparation, and followed by several weeks of recuperation from the fatigue of the vacation.

There is sick leave for perfectly robust individuals who tell you: "You've got to take the government for all it's worth!" Some go as far as to use this leave to work on another job to make the bill-paying easier.

One can do better, but it would require a tremendous educational effort./ All educators, from the instructor to the faculty professor should try to create among their students--secondary or post-secondary--/an obsession with time,/ by all appropriate means.

A few minutes of moral philosophy each day, /in primary school,/ illustrations, sketches, anecdotes, rewards for he who works fast...and of course to he who uses his time best. Problems on the cost of lost time will complement, usefully, riddles about the "faucet that loses." [sic]

In high-school and on the faculty, we reason, statistics are produced, production costs are calculated. Spare time is utilized rationally. So the young must be able to do it, too.

/In the office, in the workshop on the public streets,/ clocks with a bell which chimes out the quarter-hour. /On the radio,/ give out the time after every record, between each paragraph of text. This would remind the speaker himself not to delay too long, especially with the news. /On television,/--this is already beginning to happen--to show the time in a corner of the screen. It is so nice, these numbers of the seconds following each other in little jerks, as if to hammer a nail into a rebellious brain.

It is rare to find a person stingy with his time who is not also a first-rate worker. This leads me to speak of the second pole of action.

Second pole of action: work

/We are a Mediterranean people, and as such not strongly motivated toward work. At least, that is the reputation we have gained./

We love to laugh, when we hear "Corsican jokes," not only to poke fun genially at the inhabitants of the "Isle of Beauty," but also because we can sympathize with them. It is because we so much resemble them.

However, on reflection, it is we who queen their pawn, and if we continue on the present course--living like Senators--Algerian jokes will end up burying quite a few Corsicans who will have died of laughter.

Forgive the joke. But /if we are all convinced that already we have entered the POST-PETROLEUM era, we must agree that we cannot extricate ourselves without working./

A little history, now--this is not a fad, it is a necessity. --Let us return to colonial Algeria.

The great mass of workers were in agriculture, and a good part of them were only seasonal. For a starvation wage, they worked from sunrise to sunset with a short pause to eat barley cakes with some figs or dates.

It was difficult to get training in some fields. The "boss", who was not an Algerian, did not want to give away the basis of his superiority, the secrets of tempering steel, the subleties of adjusting an engine, or the formula of a mixture. The cunning of a Sioux was needed to spy out the delicate operation, the finishing touches and then, in secrecy, to persist all the way to successful re-creation of the entire operation.

Railroads, the postal system, administration, education, justice: /We occupied the jobs at the bottom of the ladder, with the exceptions being less and less numerous the higher one went. /To ice the cake, Naegelen, the expert at the fraudulent elections, named two "natives", one as director of central administration in general government, the other as French ambassador to Saudi Arabia, to demonstrate logically that the highest offices were accessible to the autochthonous population.

Beyond this, we were businessmen, artisans, conductors on trams and buses.

Finally, in the liberal professions, we had a few representatives in the troika of lawyers, doctors, and pharmacists.

/Such was the situation of our labor market./

Comes 1962. The new team comes on board. It was a magnificent promotion for many, each in his heart wanting to merit the confidence placed in him.

But the euphoria did not last long because what was an acceptable pace of events at the start became dizzying very quickly and overturned all the assumptions in the situation.

Industrialization, massive schooling, new national companies, tourist complexes, hospitals, construction boom, the mulitplication of wilayas [trans. unknown] and dairas [trans. unknown] universities, the creation of CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative] and COFELS [fruit and vegetables cooperatives], all this drew in workers, technicians, officials, but also the "all-purpose" professional.

We separated the good from the bad. Norms were established, from which it will be difficult to extricate ourselves. It was a race for the best wages, the best perquisites, instability institutionalized, and nomadism epidemic.

How could anyone work seriously under these conditions? Go watch someone who has already spotted his place of fall, or rather the next "best wage." And then there is the all-powerful LABOR FEDERATION to protect him from and against everything.

/The finger is pointed at the bureaucracy, absenteeism, the weakness of production, the lack of professional conscience. What did the leaders of UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] do to combat these ills?/

Some will find this question, or rather accusation, extreme. I respond that it is my right to formulate them. A syndicalist and member of UGTA's first executive committee in 1956, I believe that the union mission was not correctly realized, because we allowed the erosion of the ideas of work and the worker, because we allowed, through passivity, the development of a bad state of mind, because we put all emphasis on the defense of the "worker", whatever his comportment, whatever be his professional weaknesses, whereas /a union which is self-respecting would pillory and denounce whosoever stains the nobility of work and the dignity of the worker, for the union should have as its first task the professional, civic, and political education of the worker./

One example among thousands: a production unit in a national company is in full swing. Everyone is giving his all. The unit chief manages his unit to perfection. A union chapter is created, and of course its secretary. Little by little the chief loses his authority. He makes an observation about an operation consisting of rolling cylinders. Response: "It's all I can do.

I work for the wage that is given me. And you, who order me around, why do you make more than I? Are your kids worth more than mine?"

Obviously, production falls. The chief gets to work at 0730. The labor union chapter secretary arrives majestically at 0900. To bait the chief, those standing around say: "Here comes the boss." The chief is finished. He leaves.

/Another example:/ In a monopoly, an at-home day there is no one. Where are they? At the union meeting. /A union which respects itself could not tolerate the interruption of a public service./

/Again:/ In a small private printing establishment, the workers arrive when they want, leave when they want. Go study them. Hasn't the union leader said: /This is how it is. We are against private enterprise."/

/Does this mean that good causes are defended with the same vigor?/

Nothing is less certain.

In a national [state-owned] company, the personnel director is asked to hire an applicant who has been recommended, even though mandatory guidelines require a training course followed by a test. The director refuses. Ultimatum: "I am ordering you to do it." He stands on his refusal. The national company's director cashiers him and a high union official, after a timid initiative, made at my request, bows before the noxious decision. To reestablish the balance (?), the applicant is signed up without formalities.

There are also cases of typists or secretaries transferred or laid off because too narrowminded and lacking in the spirit of cooperation...with their supervisor.

Has the union become a champion of bad causes? I will resist the temptation to generalize. One thing is certain: /it is no longer what it was before independence and in the early days of independence.

/The labor movement was a school of integrity, of disinterested devotion. It was benevolent./ Today, the union is for many a stepping-stone for obtaining advancement in career or in the political life of the country.

/Studies of the Third World have revealed in many countries a hypertrophy of public service and the quasi-public services./

There is the example of SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company] which was condemned to failure by its strangulation by the import monopoly for vehicles, wagons, tractors, engines, pumps, industrial machines, etc... Where is there room for all these brands, and within each brand, for all the models?

How many national companies, offices, or public services have been created since independence? How many directorates, under-directorates and bureaus have seen the light of day in the ministries?

And each time, the designated officeholder has a primary concern: "furnish the offices." Naturally this is of utmost importance, but it immeasurably inflates the civil service.

It must be said that every new officeholder wants to mark his tenure--even if it is brief--with is personal imprint.

/There is first of all one principle: everything which already existed is suspect.

/"There must be change."/ Is there a new director who has not /at least/ drawn a new organization chart?

/The problem of [technical] cadres is crucial./ Our president has shown us all the importance he attaches to it. /The national press has echoed the grievances of all' the cadres that remain with arms crossed, doing nothing, while their technical skills are needed elsewhere, those who are barred from the work of planning and decision-making, in order to make room for foreign advisers paid in gold or hard currency./ This anti-national behavior is explained by the inferiority complex in relation to "the Christian," contempt in relation to the Algerian, and the desire to create "goodwill" abroad. (/"You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,"/ and above all /the fear of better qualified competition./

A small example: in a public organization, there is a financial director, a young Algerian of indisputable professional worth, at his salary ceiling of 3000 D.A. per month, and next to him, an adviser, upon whom has been lavished the title "financial and fiscal counselor", condemned to the "wretched wage" of 25,000 D.A. per month.

The same obtains among engineers and pilots in Air Algeria. /This must end./

I ask that there be published /a while paper on [foreign] cooperation, giving for each national organization the number, the titles, the salary, the real functions, the degree of usefulness, the number of Algerians with the same abilities, and above all a plan for ending cooperation./ Has it not been said that one of the purposes of foreign technical assistance was to end the need for it?

Is it true that at El Hadjar there are areas reserved to advisers which Algerians, no matter who technically qualified, do not have the right to inspect? If it were true, there would be an imperialism to slay, and in the shortest possible time, even if the advisers come from a socialist country.

Is it true that the sale of natural gas--of which we have almost inexhaustible supplies--is barely sufficient to cover the cost of technical assistance in that sector (!) (EL MOUDJAHID of 23 April 80).

the "pole of action of work" is truly too powerful not to monopolize all our energies.

And first of all, let us amend the formula /"equal pay for equal work."/ Yes, but on condition that we add /"no work, no pay."/

/Our president said it clearly: we must reward he who works, but we must penalize he who does not work./ Legal sanctions are envisioned: suspension, transfer, dismissal, of course with all due respect for the regulations, and that the worker be allowed to defend himself and to denounce arbitrary action if any is involved.

These sanctions should be applied to all, even to the high officials, for whom disciplinary councils should be instituted.

/A sword attacking water,/ you will say, anticipating my conclusion.../No, if one puts all officials, all managers, all employees, under appointment./ It is technically possible, I am allowed to say, the index cards of the social security funds being able to facilitate a large part of the operation.

/After that, will the worker protect his position because he will not be able to get another???/

/Alas, no,/ for there are "matters," big and small.

/First, the "small," which go from the can of tomatoes to the 220-volt (bayonet) light-bulb, not to mention the battery and the cassette. These "small" matters are nourishment for man (I mean the human being), who considers with much pity anyone who succeeds in getting by on the inter-occupational minimum growth wage and at that, by wearing himself out.

/Next, the "big," which go from spare parts to...in vain do I lift my head, I cannot see. Perhaps the sun is dazzling me.

In each case, the nearly universal remedy: abundance. /The law of supply and demand is unpitying. We cannot escape it, because penury engenders the black market under any regime.

/When easy profits are no longer to be made, work will regain its proper place and its true worth. At that point, we will be saved even without oil.

[13 May 80, p 5]

[Text] The earth, this/life-saving mother/ thanks to whom nations great and small have made it through centuries without the help of black gold or natural gas, whose very existence was unsuspected.

The /life-giving mother/ is the mama who suckles her babe, the earth that nourishes its people.

Between the earth and the peasant who works it, as between mother and child, there springs up a maternal love and a filial love. There is the devotion even unto the supreme sacrifice of the peasant against the invader who wants to take his land from him, of the son who throws himself into the flames to save his mother.

These are eternal images, immortalized by poets who have glorified the "majestic deed of the sower" and the beauty of the harvest crop, which bows from the weight of the corn-ears, by painters who have fixed forever on their canvases the beauty of nature and the nobility of the peasant, by the singers who tell us: "how sweet the life of the fellah."

/"What has become of this jealous love of the earth which did not hesitate to shed blood over an altered boundary-line, this passion for the soil which filled the life of the peasant/ with this supreme goal of transmitting the heritage intact to his children?

We have come to the paradox that after the sacrifice of 1.5 million Algerians in order to recover the land of their ancesters, some /2,000/ lots of good, fertile soil in the Mitidja, available at no cost, are going begging. This happened about two years ago, I think.

There is worse yet: For lack of takers--or because of poor ones--of producing palm-trees, some of the "Deglet Nour" variety, unique in all the world, withered away for lack of care. /"Can there be anything more tragic for a Saharian than to see a palm-tree die?/

A last detail and it has its importance: someone has spotted wormwood (Echchih) in the Mitidja. Knowing that this plant lives on the pre-Saharan steppes, /one asks oneself if the process of desertification has not begun at the gates of the capital./

Explanations of this deplorable state of affairs have been given.

/--The rural exodus toward the towns,/ which, one must emphasize, began during the revolution. Our countryside and our mountains became depopulated because life there had become impossible.

/--Industrialization/ which has literally sucked all the agricultural manpower to the factories for less onerous work and greater remuneration. The height of this can be illustrated by the following--true--anecdote:

"You know, ia mra, I am very concerned. I have received a summons from the daira. Since we came here (it is a village of the agrarian revolution), I have not tilled the soil (literally, I have not struck a single blow). We live well off my wages from the factory, but I think that we're going to have to say our good-byes to our lodgins. They're going to boot us out the door."

He goes to the hearing, fearing the worst. He arrives at the daira. People, garlands, a platform with officials. "Sit there." A moment later, he is

called forth to receive...an envelope. It is his share of the profits realized by the cooperative.

/Another reason for the rural exodus is the commercialization of agricultural products,/ which deprives the peasant of the fruits of his labor to the profit of money-hungry organizations which are often incompetent.

The agents of Les Halles were presented to the peasants as exploiters, and they have been replaced by organizations which exploit them even more.

A farmer in EL MOUDJAHID (of 9 April 80) declares, after having enumerated his labors and problems during a year's time: "when the moment of settling accounts arrives, our property was in deficit. Then we learn that COFEL [the fruit and vegetable cooperative] made so much profits, and on their side, that neither OFLA [Fruit and Legume Office] nor ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office, nor SAP [expansion unknown] are having any problems in their finances. So one is told that /"something is not right."/ Then, /"Ours are the pains and fatigue, ours the worries and the tedium, and in the end the results of all this work escape us."/ Then, with undemonstrable logic (journalist's license): "So who gets the profits? The offices which revolve around production. It is this which explains their prosperity."

/Other quotations:/ (EL MOUDJAHID of 10 April 1980) "One can see when a field does not produce enough. But who pays attention when an office fails to deliver the seed and fertilizer on time?" Then, also because of commercialization, "No one in Mascara has forgotten the catastrophe of 1978 when several thousand tons of potatoes were destroyed while the rest of the country..."

/The profit margin of offices./ Before giving the figures, let us address this serious accusation (EL MOUDJAHID of 14 April 1980): /"In every commercial transaction, there is always a buyer and a seller. But there, there is only the buyer and the witnesses to a theft."/ The reader may judge for himself from the following figures, the first being the price paid to the fellah, the second the price paid by the consumer: olives, 1.63 DA and 20 DA; artichokes, 3 DA and 8 DA; beans, 5 DA and 10 DA; tomatoes, 1.30 DA and 7 DA (EL MOUDJAHID of 14 April 1980).

/We must also speak of the ageing of agricultural manpower./ The rural exodus does not alone explain it away. The children of the farmer go to school, to high-school, to the university. Whether they will or no, they think that tilling the soil is work for illiterates. And as they themselves are not--at least, so they think--they prefer to go to the city to earn more money, to lead an easier life, far from the constraits of a familial environment which has not yet accepted the "freedoms" of modern life.

/The peasant's work is certainly onerous, but it is exalting for him who loves his land,/ for him who, after the ploughing, takes it in his open hands and rubs it lovingly between his fingers. /In place of the doctrine: "The land to him who works it," I would gladly substitute: "The land to him who loves to work it."/

/The land is the patrimony par excellence./ If it is no longer the symbol of stability and the perennial character of familial goodness, it no longer holds the same attraction. / It is nothing more than a temporary enterprize which one exploits without feeling to get out of it a temporary profit, perhaps the last./

This is a truth it is absolutely necessary to absorb.

The soil does not wait

Another thing: /Work on the land does not lend itself to fixed hours: 0800 to 1200, 1400 to 1800, with rest on Thursday afternoon and Friday. The soil does not wait./

What a painful spectacle to see these "workers on the land" who, "like those in the offices," arrive on the field at 0800 to..., lean resolutely on their hooked stick and continue the conversation begun on the road.

That they work 40 to 44 hours per week on the average is fine, but that should not relieve them of the obligation to "make a special effort" when necessary, whether or not they get paid for overtime.

But even with this corrective, I believe the "functionalization" of agricultural work is nonsense. /That it be well-paid, is only justice, but not at any price should it become functionary./

From the time of the colonial regime, the ideal for the "native" was to become a functionary: neat work, not tiring, stable pay, retirement. It was necessary, all the same, to work hard for the administration or one would lose everything.

Today, there are the advantages of the functionariat without the major drawback which is dismissal.

So, you have 10 agricultural workers on a piece of land. Necessarily there is one who works less than the others. You may be certain that his work rhythm will end up determining the pace of everyone. Like any human being, the agricultural worker does not want to be a "fool": /So for equal wages, an equal pace./

/The agricultural worker makes himself scarce, and what is scarce comes dear./

I have been permitted to say that the olive pickers divided up the harvest, in equal shares, with the proprietor of the olive trees, with the mid-day meal as a bonus--consistent, if you please.

There is, however, manpower available...but not to work. Explanation: in the back-country, too, some products are rare, those of the towns, first of all, and then those of agriculture: fertilizers, seed, various products. Our clever fellows form a line and resell the products, with usurious profits--to the very people who would have wanted to make them work.

/The land constitutes the greatest wealth of our patrimony. Let us objectively acknowledge that we have, since independence, poorly managed this patrimony./

The remarkable series of articles in EL MOUDJAHID on /"Ways and Means of Recovery" for our agriculture/ is edifying.

/The land is often in bad hands./ One reads in EL MOUDJAHID of 9 April 80: "The self-administered and cooperative farms have fallen into the hands of parasites, of profiteers, of people who want to make money without tiring themselves...of people who, when they finish their 8 hours...leave the fields. ...st like functionaries. /And to work the soil it is not functionaries who ...e needed, but peasants...real peasants..."/

/Lacking care, the patrimony shrinks. 30,000 hectares of the Sig-Mohammadia region are threatened by a swamp/ which was formed 10 years ago (EL MOUDJAHID of 6 April 1980). In the same region, /thousands of hectares are going to become barren/ from surfacing of salt. All of it could be saved by rehabilitation of the drainage system. Is this an impossible task?

The wine-growing district of Mascara (a source of hard currency) which was producing/800,000 qx [expansion unknown] in 1970/ now produces no more than /200,000/ because of the ageing of the vine-stocks.

/The same for the orange-groves/, the renovation of which has not been considered: from which the decline in production of citrus fruit.

/Where are the fruits and vegetables of yesteryear that were once the reknown of our country?/ The article by Mohamed Arabdiou in EL MOUDJAHID of 18 and 19 April has enough to make one cry for more than a year.

However, let there be no mistake. Putting to one side the clementine, the thomson, and the washington, all of which existed before 1830, I will for my part mention a variety of grapes which was called "sbaa el aroussa" (wife's finger) and which had become rather rare even well before independence.

Will we one day dream of these beautiful fruits?

/Let us speak of productivity:/ In the Cheliff valley, in the Sersou, the wheat yield was/4,000 kg per hectare and more./ Today, the same land yields /1,000 to 1,500 kg per hectare./ Why? Before there were tractors, polysocs [translation unknown], fertilizers. Today, there are no tractors, polysocs, fertilizers.

Could it be that the ploughs, poorly adjusted, scrape over the soil instead of going down 50 cm* and that the fertilizers are poorly chosen or poorly

*EL MOUDJAHID of 4 May 80 confirms my suspicions. "One is astonished to learn for example that there has been no deep furrowing in the Mitidja for some 15 years. Only a superficial layer going to a depth of 30 cm is tilled, a layer [of soil] which year by year becomes more exhausted."

spread? /Could it be that the mechanization of agriculture has been too precipitate?/ Perhaps Fodil Ourabah's peasant was right when he said (EL MOUDJAHID of 6 April 1980): /"With hourses, the plough can be held better, one has it well in hand and one takes the furrow where one wants"/, and the journalist adds: "Bent over the beam of his plough, eyes riveted on his plowshare (beautiful picture!) the laborer said that with full conviction. /And believe me, these are not the words of an ecologist."/

In Annaba some 10 days ago I fillowed on television a speech to the fellahs given by the Tunisian prime minister: after having spoken of hot-house agriculture, he called on young Tunisians to orient themselves resolutely toward work on the land, saying: /"The worker on the land is not any longer what he was before, one must see him as a scientist in a white shirt working in a laboratory."/

And it is certainly true: /agriculture was once uniquely the lot of the countries called backward because not industrialized. Today, it is the ultimate weapon,/ ahead of the atomic bomb and ahead of oil, since it allows one of the great powers on earth to blackmail, by wheat, the other great power on earth which had neglected agriculture for the advancement of heavy industry.

By the time this article will appear--and I think it will appear--the problem of agriculture will have been debated at length in the Central Committee of the FLN [National Liberation Front], and thanks to the wisdom of our president, measures will have been taken to break all the shackles which fetter its flourishing.

But so that no one is deceived: /It is not just a question of making agriculture a flourishing national enterprise; we must restore to it the spirit it no longer has.

And who could better perform this miracle than enthusiastic youth. We have in fact realized that the average age of our agricultural workers is often greater than 50.

What a magnificent opportunity for our young people and for our country to answer "Yes!" to this challenge. /There are women's cooperatives. Why could there not be young people's cooperatives?/ Let it be tried experimentally. I am sure that it will snowball and that /many young people will soon prefer the healthy life of the countryside and the mountains to the idleness, the delinquency, and the physical and moral pollution of the city./

Fourth pole of action: management

All of us are managers, from the child whom one teaches about thrift to the chief of state responsible for the economic life of the nation.

Our patrimony consists of riches which cannot be renewed (oil, gas, minerals) riches which can be renewed (the water, the land) and riches created by work.

/The great problem that plagues us immediately is that of oil and gas./ A [illegible] measure has been taken:/ production will be reduced by 10 percent in 1980./ A wise decision since it will mark a shrinking of the hemorrhage which is presently bleeding our country. It is to be hoped that it will be extended, in order to keep as long as possible this precious resource.

/But we must also think about alternate energy sources./ I found, to my great pleasure, in the two first issues of SCIENCES SOCIAL, PANORAMA that we have researchers interested in solar energy, an inexhaustible source that one.

We are also thinking about /wind energy, water power [lit. "white coal"], the blue coal of the Mediterranean, the geothermal energy of Hammam Meskhoutine and other thermal sources.

/The hydraulic policy of our country is very positive/ on condition that we add to it the upkeep of our dams by regular dredging, and the recovery of used water by appropriate treatment.

/The environment/ which has its ministry and in which experts are interested (EL MOUDJAHID of 8 April 1980) is vital for the conservation of our patrimony.

Official warnings have signalled /the sterilization of lands/ by cement dust, very easy to observe--the sterilization--at Ras Hamidou and at Meftah, in the plain of Annaba and elsewhere, not to speak of the/danger for the inhabitants who inhale these dusts./ Walk around the quarter which overhangs the ex-Lafarge cement-works. You cannot help saying: /"How can human beings survive in this atmosphere?"/

[illegible] Annaba and climb to Seraidi. You will see the town choked in a dirty haze. Approach the phosphates complex. You will be disagreeably struck by an acrid and acid odor.

[illegible] a walk along the beach from Salamandre to Mostaganem. A poor beach and [illegible] fish. The paper-mill's emissions will continue their deadly work if they are not stopped.

In the [illegible] area, at Annaba near the Kouba quarter, along some roadsides, I have observed with concern /eucalyptus trees--the most resistant of trees--[illegible] dying/. Our Agronomists would do well to take an interest in [illegible].

/There are urgent measures to be taken./

[illegible] habitations and demography.

[illegible] to be parsimonious with the wealth of the nation, it means to [illegible] establishing factories, complexes, to provide for the upkeep of machinery, to maintain everything which turns and rolls. In a word, it [illegible].

Alas! We have had the sad privilege of seeing on the Cheragas road a graveyard for buses. (Incidentally, what became of their ashes?) In Oran, the television showed us a graveyard for taxis. In the south was pointed out a cemetary for trucks, elsewhere a heap of abandoned tractors.

"This construction--I use the word reluctantly--was laid out from east to west. I want it from north to south." "But it cost 40 million." "Don't argue."...and the jackhammers go to work.

In Algiers, near the ministry of information, they were going to build a CEM [college of intermediate studies] The site is surrounded by fencing to bar any access. Flags. Begin construction. Cubic meters of concrete flow. One would think they were going to build a fortress.

In the beginning, the excavators worked through the night by the light of floodlights. It was magnificent, but it was only a dream. It has now been several months since the work stopped. Could we be given a small explanation?

/Can we speak of waste without mentioning spare parts? A machine, a car, a truck, a tractor, work when they are new. Afterwards, it is put up on blocks while waiting for providence to provide a spare part.

In the wilaya of El Asnam (EL MOUDJAHID of 9 April 1980), /"agricultural equipment has a high rate of breakdowns, reaching 35 to 40 percent."/ The causes: "Negligence and poor maintenance on the one hand, lack of spare parts and auto repair shops on the other."

The worst part is when a mine is immobilized, for lack of a part, an entire sector of the complex paralyzed for lack of masks. It's enough to take the breath away.

This winter we suffered cruelly from the absense of windshield wipers, platinum-plated screws, discs, clutch-plates, spark-plugs.

/It is absolutely inconceivable that no one has yet been able to solve the problem of spare parts which dates back 10 or 15 years./

In the back-country, there was an expert who called himself the commissioner and who, before going into town, took orders from the whole village, bringing them back for a fair fee. Could not one give this function to buyers who would cross the sea with an import authorization properly drawn up, or, perhaps, create a national company--yet one more--which would centralize all orders and satisfy them very quickly. /Millions of dinars could be recovered in this way!/

/"Stretch your legs to the fit of your covers,"/ says one of our proverbs.

/A good manager must fit his lifestyle to his resources and his possibilities

So when the television shows us an inhabitant of the Casbah complaining of the cramtiness of his unhealthy lodgings, touch the loose bricks on one wall, say that he wakes up throughout the night at the least noise for fear that he and his family will be crushed by the collapse of the house and tells us, with a modest complacent smile, that he has 8 children and that his wife is expecting her ninth, don't think his imprudence is without precedent.

Let's look at the national picture. Is it humanly possible, economically possible, to build enough apartments, primary schools, secondary schools, universities, and hospitals, to keep pace with our demography?

Absolutely not, even if we discover new petroleum deposits, or gas, and even gold.

/Thus we must stop the population explosion, restore the population growth to a reasonable rate./ Great China, with more than a billion inhabitants, virtually limits births to one child per family.

Why don't we do as much, with a ceiling less draconian to be sure.

/And above all let us not turn against our religion. Islam prohibits abortion--except where the life of the mother is obviously endangered. It does not forbid birth control, because the essential principle of Islam lies in the full responsibility of the individual/, and a father--it is he above all who is responsible--will have to stand and account for himself on the Last Judgement Day because he gave life to children, knowing full well that they would be doomed to hunger, ignorance, and delinquency.

The same television report showed that there is some popular support for birth control, by having us listen to a father on the one hand, and a mother on the other, who have taken the decision to limit themselves to two or three children. We were also showed graphics which demonstrate a clear increase in the number of cases seen at the specialized centers.

/Friends of the High Islamic Council and you, Minister of Religious Affairs who are my colleague and true friend, assume your responsibilities. Our country has performed magnificently in fixing the dates of religious holidays. Let it do as much for regulating the number of births. It will be a service both to Algeria and to humanity./

/A sound management is one which, leaving no stone unturned, neglects none of its potentialities./

I have already spoken of the [technical] cadres available in our country which should be judiciously utilized. But /it must not be inferred that all our cadres are paragons./ Some have lesser, some have greater faults.

Two examples to illustrate my remarks.

An engineer presented himself a few years ago to ask for work in a research bureau. He was very valuable, and he knew it. Right away he made his demands: 8,000 DA per month, a car, and a villa.

Response: We'll go for 8,000 DA, we'll go for the car, but as for the villa, ...you can't ask for the impossible.

A doctor--yes, at least from his diplomas--makes almost the same statement to all his patients, after making a grim face: "You are seriously ill. But I can fix you all up. Only it's going to cost a bit of money, 350 DA!"

The victim, happy to get off that easily, agrees...and it is always the same medications: aerosols and injections. Pointless to add that the patient will get well if nothing serious was wrong, and will stay sick if he was already.

Far be it from me to generalize, for there are bandits in every profession.

Now I must speak, and it is the heart of my proposal, /about the cadres and the brains that live outside the country, and there are many:/ technicians, doctors, surgeons of high standing, professors of higher education, extremely well regarded engineers, who would not be loath to return to their country, and who weep when they think of it.

It would be a good thing for the country to get them back. The attempt has been made. I know it. But promises made have not always been kept.

/But one must not be afraid to say that all the fault is not ours./ The esteemed gentlemen at the top of migration affairs are demanding and often set conditions difficult to meet; for they seem not to be aware that there are technicians who have acquired their titles while remaining in their country, and that they too have their rights.

A doctor of law will not agree to come unless he is given the rectorship of a university, a valuable assistant will not agree unless he can open a private clinic right away, an experty will not agree unless he be given the directorship of an institute...

Many are motivated by a superiority complex in relation to Algerian peers, and by a mercenary spirit. All fine gentlemen. They should stand in line like everyone else. With all its virtues and its faults, Algeria has been independent for 18 years. You can't just wave a magic wand and right away recover all your losses...

We must recognize that all who live in exile have acquired habits with which they are reluctant to part. They are completely out of phase. So many things have changes since they left.

/As for returning to their homeland, they will not be able to come back unless they have a speck of love for their country that would enable them to accept certain small privations.

/"Paris is well worth a mass,"/ said Henri IV.

/Algeria is well worth doing without camembert./

We are all involved

My aim, in writing this article, which was inspired by the remarks by our president on the Post-Petroleum period, has been to drive home the necessity for political authorities as well as for all citizens /to begin the struggle today, on all horizons, without waiting for the day of reckoning.

/Intense psychological preparation/ should drive home the urgency of the problem.

Also it is essential that those who hold the levers of power be infused with this urgency, I mean our political authorities, the press, radio, and television.

They alone can create, /by their writings and their words, a climate of opinion which will concentrate all efforts of the nation toward the goal to be attained./

It can be done, but only if we succeed in convincing the citizenry that it is their concern, that it concerns their future and that of their children.

/Now, ever since independence, it has been rare that political speeches have not spoken of demobilization of citizens on all levels./ This is a reality which no one can deny and which, in itself, merits careful consideration and development with, necessarily, much candor and...many "green lights."

I am not color-blind, but nevertheless I clearly perceive green reflections on the red disk. The proof is this article which follows the one that I wrote on Arabization (EL MOUDJAHID of 3 March 1980 naturally). If I waited 18 years to give out my opinion, it is because I could not do it before. But it was not for lack of desire to do so. There was a time--before the revolution--when I wrote two articles a week in a nationalist journal. It is for you to say that never [line missing]

I am sure you want an explanation.

I will give it to you squarely.

/The worst thing that can happen in a country is for the citizen to feel he is no longer involved in what is happening./

Does this mean that he no longer loves his fatherland, that he no longer suffers with the suffering of its people, that he is no longer indignant about the squandering of the national patrimony?

No. Absolutely not, and I call to witness the militants who had the chance to escape the turmoil and have spent years shivering with cold.

/Not to feel oneself involved is to recognize one's impotence, it is to have the conviction that one can do nothing about conditions, it is not to express one's opinion because it would serve no purpose--and because it is dangerous--. A useless risk has never attracted anyone.

Our president stated at the closing work session of the regional planning seminar:

/"As far as we are concerned, Algeria's interest come before anything. For my part, I will always be on the side of the people, far from any demagoguery and drawing my inspiration from reality."/

Is this not the wish of all citizens?

/Our country needs more than slogans and anathemas. It cherishes those who tell it the truth to its face--even if it is bitter--and who commit themselves resolutely to work to improve things./

It does not cherish, by contrast, certain demagogues who would go so far as to attribute the shortage of vegetables on the market to "imperialism or Zionism and internal or external reactionism"-- and who, to parody Moliere's doctor, say: /"Better the country should perish by the book /(of their airy theories) /than recover going against the book."/

In the /Koran/ it is said of their ilk: /"Blind, deaf, and mute, they understand nothing"/ and in the Gospel: /"They have eyes but will not see, they have ears and will not hear."/

And then, perhaps, one should dig beneath the superficial veneer of some of them to discover their real nature and, perhaps, their character and motives.

/Is not a reactionary also one who, content with a given situation, doesn't want to change it whatever be the consequences...for others?/

The post-petroleum era is thus certainly a matter concerning all citizens, and the galvanizing force of patriotism which, after having seized independence, will give to everyone a sense of his responsibility, can, in the next 10 years, create a second miracle, that of giving life and prosperity to Algeria, WITHOUT PETROLEUM.

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MILITARY DECIMATED BY REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVALS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 May 80 p 9

[Article by Bobo Scheutz: "Only Wreckage Left of the Army"]

[Text] Tehran (SvD). The failed American attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran was at least as painful to the Iranian generals as to the American generals.

Despite the subsequent victory celebrations, it is clear that the Iranian military, which is to protect the country against all kinds of imperialist attack, had no idea of what was going on, and that it had obvious problems with explaining satisfactorily how the American force was able to reach central Iran without being discovered.

The answer is simple, however. The costly and to some extent advanced army the shah had built up in close cooperation with the United States has since the revolution broken asunder, and the wreckage is not adequate to maintain the defense the country may need with its reckless foreign policy.

No Confidence

Nor does the revolutionary regime have confidence in the army personnel. To be sure, large parts of the top leadership have been purged, imprisoned, or executed, but no doubts exists that in the event of a military conflict with the United States involved in some way, the officer corps, mainly American-trained, could not be depended upon without reservations.

Poor Morale

And in the lower echelons morale is very poor. Among the troops the regime used in the Kurdistan war, desertions are common and the will to fight extraordinarily low. A couple of weeks ago it became known that the soldiers of the Tehran garrison were preparing for a demonstration against the war in Kurdistan. Nobody knows for sure how far the planning had gone, but in any case nothing came of the demonstration. Nor have the many

rumors of recent weeks to the effect that groups in Iran friendly to the United States are preparing for a coup of some kind increased the regime's confidence in the army.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic relies upon the revolutionary guard, which more and more stands out as the private army of the religious groups. Its members, mainly recruited among the young Islamic enthusiasts of the revolution, are to act as protectors and the police of the revolution, but gradually they have been assigned ever more military tasks. Large Guard units have been sent to battle the Kurds, and the Guard has taken over much of the guarding of the border with Iraq, the enemy.

In addition, in the propaganda much is made of the ability to call out the entire populace in the struggle for the revolution if this should be necessary, and Khomeiny likes to talk about the 20-million army of Iranians who have had some form of weapons training.

This chimerical army is not armed, however, and its military training merely symbolical. The truth is that dissatisfaction is growing in large parts of the population, and the regime would not dare put weapons into the hands of people it cannot control.

The only ones who openly carry weapons today are the members of the Revolutionary Guard and of the many revolutionary committees that serve as the regime's representatives on the local level. Following the failure of the American rescue attempt, armed police appeared, but in the streets of Tehran an armed soldier is never seen. A further sign of the regime's distrust of the army.

Air Force Unusable

Since the revolution the advanced materiel of the air force has become unusable gradually due to lack of maintenance and spare parts. Of the 76 American F 14 Tomcat fighter planes the shah managed to purchase, none is airworthy, in part because they are not functioning, in part because pilots are not available to fly the advanced aircraft.

Of the 276 planes of type F 16 (plus 24 of the training version) it is calculated that less than half would be able to take to the air. The same estimate applies to the total of 182 F 4 and F 5 aircraft, while it is calculated that practically all 150 C-130 Hercules transport planes are still airworthy.

Of the close to 600 helicipters of various types the shah kept in the air, fewer than 400 are today operable.

The Air Force is the part of the armed forces hardest hit by the disturbances of the revolution as concerns materiel, but the dissolution tendency is most marked in the army. The shah's over 300,000 men-strong field army,

has today shrunk to about 100,000. Discipline is very poor, desertions are common, and disaffection among the officers great. It is unknown how many of the about 900 British-built Chieftain tanks and approximately the same number of American tanks (most of them of the Scorpion type) are still in operation, but information is available to the effect close to 400 have been mobilized in Kurdistan, and that most of them still function.

Navy Intact

The branch of the service that escaped the revolutionary chaos with least damage is the navy, in which both discipline and materiel are reasonably intact. The main strength of the Iranian navy is accounted for by the three destroyer Artemis, Babr, and Palang, the three being in fighting condition. Artemis, of 2,325 tons and with a crew of 270, is the largest. The two others are somewhat smaller, of 2,200 tons and with crews of 247, but their armament is somewhat heavier: 127 mm guns, compared with the 115 mm of the Artemis.

There are 4 frigates of 1,110 tons, mounting 115 mm guns, and 4 corvettes of 900 tons and 76 mm guns.

Further, there are a number of torpedoboats and a considerable number of gliders intended for troop transport in the Persian Gulf.

In the event of a real military conflict with Iraq the navy would play an essential role since the conflict in part involves the borderline in the approaches to the oil ports, in part the three islands in the sound of Hormuz, occupied by Iran in 1971. Iraq's navy has been strongly built up in recent years, however, with, among other things, units armed with missiles, and the outcome of a test of strength is difficult to predict.

Iraq Air Force Superior

On the other hand, Iraq's air force is clearly superior. Today it consists of 120 Soviet Mig 21s, 80 Mig 23 B, considered much advanced, and about 100 attack bombers. In addition, Iraq has about 20 bombers of larger types, about 130 Soviet-built helicopters, and almost 100 French helicopters.

Further, Iraq has 36 French Mirage aircraft, and plans purchase of an even further advanced Mirage type.

If the Iranian crisis should develop into full-scale war, the wreckage of the shah's armed forces is nothing to be reckoned with. And even if the Revolutionary Guard could go to the front in the right spirit and at least part of the people's army should hear the same war cry, they cannot stand up against a well organized war machine, regardless of whence it might come.

11,256
CSO: 3109

DICK GREGORY RELATES BLACKS, IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 May 80 p 10

[Interview with Dick Gregory by Mahmud Jojrat]

[Excerpts] Dick Gregory, a well-known American black leader, famous comedian, writer, sportsman and an old friend of Dr Martin Luther King and world-famous boxing champion Mohammad Ali Clay, who has been visiting Iran for talks with the Imam and high government officials has, in his long conversation with KEYHAN, related his vies concerning the world-wide repercusion of Iran's Islamic revolution, the solution of the hostage crisis and its effects on U.S. domestic politics, etc.

Let us learn more about Dick Gregory as he introduces himself in his own words: "I was born 48 years ago in St Louis, Missouri, to a very poor family. I learned what it meant to be poor early in childhood and was often told by my mother that I was not really poor and that poverty was actually a state of mind. She used to tell me that I was not poor, but temporarily out of money. That made the Dick Gregory of today. I am now a rich person, respected by millions of American blacks. I have 10 children, 7 daughters and 3 sons, ranging from 6 to 20 years of age. My life actually began when I was in high school and made it big in sports.

I was the first black in the U.S. to defeat the whites and win in the one-mile race. Up to then whites were the winners in the long-distance races such as the 1,500 meters. Blacks usually won the 100 meter races. I was also the first to win in the four-mile race (6 kilometers). Ron, a black friend of mine, was able to break the world record in the one-mile race among high school students."

Dick Gregory further adds: "I was able to enroll in the university through a scholarship I received for sports but soon lost interest in college education because I came to realize that what they were teaching about us, blacks, and the Indians were nothing but lies. Realizing they were telling lies about the things I myself was involved in, it was not possible for me to believe in the rest of what they talked about."

"I must also add that because of the atmosphere of distrust that existed among blacks and the whites, and their continued suspicion of one another, the university in which I had enrolled in could not provide me a suitable place for learning. Southern Illinois University in which I had enrolled had, at that time, some 4,000 students of which only 150 were blacks. That very same university has now some 28,000 students. My most important and positive experience at the university was the realization that the number of white students who were decent human beings outnumbered those who were not. I also learned for the first time in my life that I was not inferior to the whites."

Following is the details of our conversation:

Question: Mr Gregory, what made you decide to visit Iran?

Answer: There is a great similarity between the Iranian struggle and the black movement in the U.S. during the sixties as the two relied on religion. The black movement, led by Dr Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership, was basically a religious coalition. It was their faith in God which enabled the American people to embark the movement.

At the beginning, the black masses were afraid to die. There existed a system in the U.S. aimed at annihilating us gradually but made it apper that we were dying of natural causes. It was racial discrimination that was aimed at eliminating us. American blacks have not yet lost their timidity and submissiveness. Only those who actually engaged themselves in the struggle had been able to overcome their fear and sense of submissiveness. Those who were ready and willing to die in martyrdom encouraged others to join the movement all over the U.S. Living means freedom from colonialism and exploitation, freedom for fear and self-hate. These are the similarities that exist between the Iranian revolution and the black movement and the comparison reveals the hand of God in both movements. But 200 years of black slavery could not be compared with the suppression of the people of Iran during the old regime.

In the United States we were aware that our problem was rooted inside the country and did not come from a foreign power trying to exploit us. For years we tried to make the American people listen to us and hear our grievances. The American government and the people could have given us our freedom any moment they had decided to and they did not seek permission from any foreign power to do so.

In Iran, the shah, who was actually an American and CIA puppet, had no power to give freedom to his people and I am confident that if the shah had decided to give his people freedom he would have been replaced by the CIA.

I dare say that the oppression of the Iranians by the shah's regime had no historical precedent. In the age of technological advances the regime of the shah did not hesitate to use all modern means of torture against his people including the use of drugs capable of paralzying the mind. Yet, despite the oppression and hardship experienced by your people it was the will of God which enabled them to resist and stand on its own feet becoming free and live not fearing colonialism.

The main difference between the Iranian's struggle for freedom and that of the American blacks lie in the fact that Iranians became masters of their own country after their victory while blacks faced, after their first round of victory, the ve y same system that enslaved them, with the policy of racial discrimination still continuing. At this moment, I believe that we, like Iranians, should put our faith in the power of the Almighty God.

The problem faced by our movement in the United States has its roots in tradition, beliefs, habits, opinions and politics which have helped prevent the movement from following its courses. I hope that the Iranian struggle will be able to follow its courses without facing problems for overcoming colonialism and exploitation in only a small part of the game. It is nowthe time for the rebuilding and the reconstruction of the nation and the country. The Iranian people must realize that control of the natural resources is not everything. More important is the people. In my opinion the reorganization of the government and the state is not so important. What is more important is the breaking of the chains that have been put on the minds of the people. This is the problem the blacks are faced with in the United States.

I suggest that the minds of the people be cleansed from the past negative events. The shah is no longer here but he is still in the minds of the people. The shah's departure from Iran and his being here is divided by a very narrow line. He still lives in the people's mind. CIA is not there but in the people's mind. We must begin immediately to better understand each other and live in peace and harmony. This is the only way to overcome hate and prejudice and enable men to love instead of hate. Suffering and pain is short-lived and does not matter how long it lasts but happiness and joy is forever.

The best way I can put it is that Iranians, after being suppressed for some 37 years, have by the grace of God, opened their eyes and are awakened to see the sun once again. Having been suspicious of everything from some 37 years, these millions of people are not going to easily abandon their suspicion. Elimination of poverty and illiteracy should remain their major goals which requires planning that could not be prepared and launched in an atmosphere of tension and unrest.

In connection with the struggle of Iranians and the American blacks let me say that we, the American blacks, were engaged in a struggle against cultural habits and tradition of the people. In Iran, the struggle was against a handful of rich people in the U.S. government [sic]. American blacks are fighting against, habits, custom, tradition, fear, racial discrimination and the American masses way of life.

In Iran, the struggle of your people, in the past or now, never has been against the American masses. The American masses were never aware of how a handful of Americans were and are treating your people and the nations of the Third World and Africa. I try to separate your struggle with that of the American blacks. We were fighting the American states but you were only fighting the U.S. [government]. Most Americans did not know that the shah was a bad man but most of them were aware of the fact that we had harsh discriminatory laws in the United States.

For the peace-loving people like us, it is shameful to think of what has taken place in Iran and in South Africa and the raising of voices against it is far more effective than bullets. It is with that feeling as a human being that I have come to Iran to see what I can do to remove the every-increasing atmosphere of tension between Iran and the United States and East and West.

Symbol of Expolitation and Colonialism

Question: You have been in Iran for 1 week. How do you feel about your visit and the talks you have had in Iran?

Answer: I believe that the greatest feeling I have had was the thought of how it must have been under the shah. I do not believe we knew how it was. We knew that things were not right but did not know the reasons and the extent. Millions of Americans know now that we were wrong. I did not know the extent of our interference in Iran until after I arrived here and examined the situation first-hand. I became aware of the depth of the tragedy after visiting the embassy.

We saw films showing people happily climbing the shah's palace and capturing it but were were not aware of the fact that it was a symbol of power. I knew all the time that the United States was running Iran but I never believed that the embassy enjoyed such symbolic importance, for those in there only were carrying out their orders. I can now understand the symbolic importance of the embassy for Iranians, It reflects what has happened in the past.

One has to come here and see it personally or will not believe the symbolic importance fo the embassy. For Iranians it is the smybol of exploitation and colonialism."

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CSO: 4405

SWEDISH BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN COUNTRY GREATLY REDUCED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 May 80 p 5

[Article by Bobo Scheutz: "Long Wait for Better Times"]

[Text] TEHRAN (SvD). In the shadow of the economic chaos that has existed in Iran since the revolution of last year, about 20 Swedish enterprises hold out in the anticipation of better times. Sooner or later, it is reasoned, the wheels must start to turn again, and there will be a great need for foreign goods and services.

Swedish enterprise will then probably be welcome. Sweden has not thus far joined the economic boycott imposed by the United States, Japan, and the EC, and many Swedish enterprises today located in Iran have both the products and the know-how in the very areas the revolutionary regime has said are to have priority.

Practically all construction and entrepreneurial activity is now shut down, and the regime is attempting, with very uneven success, to get it going again, above all in order to lessen the frightening unemployment, amounting to up to 30 percent, perhaps more.

According to Tommy Arwitz, commercial counselor of the Swedish embassy in Tehran, Iran will in this sector need to import, among other things, steel and construction machinery.

Iranian agriculture was high on the list even at the time of the shah's economic planning, and according to Tommy Arwitz statements have been made in responsible circles in the ministry of agriculture concerning interest in Swedish agricultural machinery. As concerns power transmission as well, great future projects can be discerned, and the revolutionary regime's clearly stated intention of to the extent possible making Iran economically independent of the rest of the world makes it probable that the pace will be increased of exploiting the country's great resources of coal, iron ore, and copper.

Great strains

It is in the expectation, among other things, of these parts of the economy soaring [illegible] Swedish experts that the Swedish enterprises remain in Iran. However, the 19 months following the revolution have produced great strains for all foreign interests in the country, and the number of Swedish enterprises has been greatly reduced.

Those that have managed best and, in Tommy Arwitz's judgment, will be profitable over the long term as well, are the companies that are pure sales organizations. They have no capital invested in Iran, they are financed in Sweden, and the Iranian customers pay directly to the Swedish suppliers.

In this group are found, among others, ASEA, Alfa-Laval, and L.M. Ericsson, as well as a number of Swedish enterprises with Iranian participation: Atlas, Fruktimport, Astra, Frigorifik, Saab Iran, and Trelleborg Iran. Some [illegible] plants ready for installation of machines and a certain amount of production of welding electrodes, but a decision has not yet been made about bringing in production equipment from Sweden.

Volvo Penta acts as a sales company, but has certain stocks in Iran and [illegible] business in spare parts and service. However, the enterprises that sell from stocks in Iran are paid in local currency, difficult to export into Swedish money, and they also run the risk of the stored products becoming obsolete since hardly any new sales are made and reexport possibilities are slight. Losses on the capital invested in stocks must therefore be reckoned with.

Unpaid claims

The problems of the [illegible] consulting firms are concerned. Most of these have large unpaid claims, and as is known, the willingness of the revolutionary regime to settle claims from the time of the shah is slight. In this group are found, among others, Agrimasult Iran, SCAAN (Scandinavian Consultants and Engineers).

The enterprises that have had and still have the greatest problems are those that produce in Iran, or at least those that work [illegible] Iranian interests. The nationalized banking [illegible] and for the Iranian enterprise participants [illegible]. This has caused great strains for the foreign [illegible] and in many cases the cooperation has been fraught with friction.

Uncertainty

[illegible] the framework of Iran's future economy that guide the [illegible] for foreign-owned production enterprises

will be very limited. Even if the ideas of extensive nationalization are not implemented, significant state influence will probably be demanded.

Nor have Swedish shipping interests in Iran, consisting of Gulf Agency, Irano-Scandinavian Shipping Agency, owned in part by Broström, escaped problems, but choose to view the future with optimism. Nevertheless, some Swedish interests are on their way out of this market.



Sweden's Trade With Iran
Swedish exports have been drastically reduced

[illegible]
[illegible]

SWEDISH FIRMS SEEK COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 May 80 p 5

[Article by Uno Skold: "425 Million in Claims"]

[Text] Swedish industry has insecure claims amounting in round figures to 425 million kronor in Iran. Since the revolution in that country payments are delinquent. Several Swedish enterprises have written off parts of their claims and in some cases show losses on their activities in Iran last year.

With the aid of the Foreign Affairs Ministry efforts are now being made in Tehran to get order into the payments.

At the present time it is uncertain what response the Swedish efforts will receive. In several cases, the response is said to have been positive. It is still in doubt, however, how large a part of their claims the Swedish enterprises can count on receiving.

Enterprises Apply Pressure

In general, the largest expert enterprises attempt themselves in various ways to apply pressure to have the debts adjusted. Money flows in, but slowly.

At times, the enterprises are not willing to state clearly how large their claims are and how much they count on receiving, fearing that this may impair their chances of receiving the money.

Volvo is one of the enterprises which refuse to say how large their claims in Iran are. The company has exported extensively to Iran and even now has rather large sales there, primarily of spare parts for trucks.

Volvo says it is certain, however, that it counts on receiving payment in full from Iran, and that in regards trade relations with Iran as normal.

Among those who have reduced their activities in Iran is the Johnson group. Johnson has had much activity in Iran. When the revolution broke out, the group employed 200 persons. Activities have now been reduced, so that Johnson now has only 40 employees in Iran.

Recently, the Johnson group announced a book-closing decision that shows a loss of over 27 million for its Iranian daughter company. The losses were in part deficits on the activities themselves, in part depreciation on stocks on hand and claims upon customers. The net value of Johnson's remaining claims in Iran amounts to 18 million kronor.

The largest Swedish construction in the foreign market, The Cement Foundry, recently announced book closing showing a loss of 8 million in the concern's activities in Iran.

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BARGAINING POINTS IN UPCOMING BEGIN-CARTER TALKS ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Apr 80 p 11

[Article by Dan Margalit: "Two and a Half 'No's' and a Question"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menachem Begin will arrive this afternoon for his first talk with President Jimmy Carter. In his briefcase are two and a half 'no's' and a question. The no's are clear.

First, Begin will turn down any call to convene a legislative council for autonomy. He knows that if the military rule is abolished, it will be necessary to find some sort of substitute to be involved in workable legislative which, so far, has been handled by officers of Zahal (the Israeli Army). But a legislative council is the first step towards the establishment of a Palestinian State. Begin will remind his conversation partner that American Law begins with the words, "the American Congress." He is not prepared to establish a Palestinian Congress whose fundamental authority will be to compete sovereignty.

Second, Israel is not prepared to grant voting rights to the institutions of autonomy for the Arabs of East Jerusalem. This step would undermine the unity of the city under Israeli sovereignty.

The "half-no" concerns the demand for the establishment of a committee for internal security affairs for autonomy. On principle, Israel is prepared to deal with this issue, but the timing is not right. Jerusalem is afraid that Cairo will agree in this meeting to concessions but will demand in exchange a change in the Israeli position on the subject of the legislative council.

Begin's question is more complex. At the end of the visit that Anwar Sadat [illegible] in Washington, the Egyptian president agreed to postpone the target date for the autonomy negotiations which had been set initially [illegible] to make this postponement conditional on "significant progress" [illegible] this first target date. What would constitute the [illegible] "significant progress"? Experts in Jerusalem were unable [illegible] the Prime Minister a clear-cut answer to this. Even the mediator,

Sol Linowitz, did not issue an answer in his recent talks with Ambassador Ephraim Evron. The prime minister and his ministers can only deduce that Egypt wants, at this stage, an Israeli disclaimer of its stated position. Egypt is willing to be satisfied with a purely cosmetic concession as long as it stands out and is conspicuous.

At A Good Time

Begin knows that he will find a president in the White House who is struggling. On the one hand, Carter wants to help Sadat. His Egyptian friend is a solid pillar, one of a kind, in the strategic construction, planned to be a fortress, which has not yet been established in the Middle East. Against a background of powerlessness demonstrated regarding Afghanistan and Iran, and while still trying to give the impression that he has a military option to rescue the hostages in Teheran, Carter needs a strong Sadat in Cairo. This requires an immediate Israeli concession.

On the other hand, Begin is arriving in Washington at a good time for Israel. Carter has behind him his failure in the New York primaries. Ahead of him in a week is the new race in Pennsylvania with a large Jewish vote. The state sends 185 delegates to the Democratic convention. It is considered to be an urban state. Carter cannot afford to lose its delegation.

One can argue, whether, in the long run, the Jews of New York improved the outlook for Israel when they transferred their support to Senator Edward Kennedy. In a discussion in the dining room of the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), Defense Minister Ezer Weizman feared retaliation on Carter's part when he is reelected in November for a second term in the White House. In contrast, Knesset member Yitzhak Rabin felt that the U.S. respects the lan language of power and that Jewish muscle in New York made a difference.

About a week after that, Rabin pointed out something else. Waiting on the horizon for Carter is not only a squaring off with Kennedy but, even more, with the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, who is making all kinds of promises about Israel. But what does he really know about the Middle East? Recently, he asked if it was true that Christians and Moslems were living side by side in Lebanon. In face of the challenge from Reagan, Carter is likely to be restrained.

Begin's aides are not able to speak as freely as the opposition members of Parliament. They also remember that Israel was not forgiven by American public opinion for Rabin's intervention on behalf of the Republican, Richard Nixon. Begin and his entourage, therefore, are not speaking in Rabin's style, but are merely citing it as one of the prevalent views in Israel.

To Return To A Freeze

In this situation, it is clear what Carter will not be able to get from Begin. There will not be support in the American Congress for a process

which the Prime Minister can describe as the establishment of a pro-Soviet Palestinian State. They will also not want to broach the sensitive issue of Jerusalem. To some extent, Begin has profited in this area because the Americans do not accept the distinction that he has made between autonomy for residents and territorial autonomy.

In one analysis, it was said that even the Army's operation in Misgav-Am helped Israel's image. Archie Bunker, whose opinion is sought after by every candidate for the presidency, knows that the Israelis are "o.k." They free their own hostages. And this is irritating when considered against a background of what in Jerusalem they are calling the American "counting of the Omer" (the days between Passover and the Pentecost). News broadcasts in the U.S. end with how many days have passed since the taking of the hostages.

The conclusion arrived at by analysis in Jerusalem is an uncertain one. It is likely that the president will try right away to get a concession from Begin on the subject of the establishment of a joint Israeli-Egyptian security committee with the knowledge, which is not pleasant for the prime minister, that the natural choice would be Weizman. If he fails in this "smooth" path, Carter will ask Begin to freeze the settlements for a certain period. When Begin dismissed the idea in an interview with Barbara Walters, he based this on its uselessness rather than on the grounds of principle. There is a point of view in Jerusalem that Carter will try to convince Begin to return to the freeze on settlements which they had once agreed to, temporarily, between themselves.

In the final analysis, Begin knows, and he has heard this once more early this week from his friend, Senator Henry Jackson, that the problem of the settlements is the only issue that he can stand up to Israel about even in an election year. Jackson did not say so in those words, but his observation that the establishment of the settlements was a "serious mistake" can only mean one thing. Carter would prefer, when it is necessary, to put pressure on Begin with regard to an issue about which there is "national consensus" in the U.S.

WEIZMAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Apr 80 p 13

[Article by Amnon Barzilay: "Weizman Awaits the Liberals"]

[Text] Next month it will be three years since the political coup, and on June 20 it will be three years since Begin became prime minister. Even if the Alinement and Ezer Weizman get their wish, the Likud falls, and the elections take place early, it will be impossible to take away from Begin his place behind David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, and ahead of Moshe Sharet and Yitzhak Rabin in the scale of Prime Ministers who remained in their positions for a long period of time. These facts are probably the strongest response to the contemptuous attitude displayed since May 1977 towards the ability of Likud to hold on to its position in the government.

In the face of these facts, however, stands the final date, Novemeber 1981. It is the legal time for elections to take place in the tenth Parliament. And from many political perspectives, it does not matter at present when elections take place, whether they are held early or on time. The unofficial starting signal for the opening of the election system has already been given. And Ezer Weizman's appearance the day before yesterday in "Moked" is one indication of that.

Like four years ago, today the political excitement is focused on what is called "the center of the political map." Then too, Yigael Yadin appeared in May 1976, about a year and a half before the elections which were scheduled for November 1977. And despite the disappointment with Yadin and with the DMC (Democratic Movement for Change), even today, in the centers of political parties, the appearance of a central political body is not ruled out.

The Considerations Are Becoming More Clear

No one believes in the appearance of a new party in the manner of "something from nothing" like the DMC. But just as in 1976-77, when people spoke of the explosion of political frameworks, today similar forecasts are being made--with one difference. DMC as a central party threatened the Labor Party. The appearance of a new central political body threatens to shatter Likud.

The two political personalities who are causing this great unrest in the political system are Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. Begin is causing the unrest by his firm decision to continue to lead the Herut movement and Weizman because he sees no reason to be "number two" in the movement.

Whoever needed proof got it in abundance in the interview with "Moked." When Weizman speaks of early elections, knowing what most of the public thinks of Likud, there is only one conclusion to be drawn. Weizman will not mourn if Likud loses to the opposition. In other words, Weizman is not enthusiastic about serving a second term in a Likud government with the same "administration."

The question whether the issue is that of not being willing to serve another term in the Likud government or whether the Defense Minister will quit the government in coming months is for now unknown. Weizman, like others in Likud and in the coalition parties, has decided to await the outcome of internal elections in the Liberal Party in order to determine what his next political move should be. Weizman's statements about early elections were prepared and did not come as a response to a question by one of the interviewers. One can interpret them as one of the first shots in the political intra-party battles. But they probably express a certain sense of security on Weizman's part that his position is assured despite his outspokenness.

The Herut movement will fight him and his positions vehemently. There will surely be those who will demand that he leave. But Weizman's departure will only hasten the fall of the government as a whole. Activists in the Herut movement who are not enthusiastic about that possibility will weigh carefully the political price they will have to pay before they wage war on Weizman.

Expectations about what would happen in the Liberal Party have increased Weizman's power in the government. The convening of the conference and preparations for internal elections, after delays which lasted almost two years, helped to improve somewhat the shattered public image of the Liberal leadership. And it is no accident that Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir began a series of talks and meetings with the Chairman of the Executive of the Liberal Party, Simcha Ehrlich, and the Chariman of the Party Central, Aryeh Mintzis. Tamir, like Weizman, has assessed that under present conditions, the Liberal bloc could be a last resort and perhaps even a spring-board for advancing his political career.

The basis is for Weizman, "there is nothing to look for" in the Herut movement with Begin at its head, especially when the appraisals in the Democratic Movement are like those accepted by the Liberals and by Weizman's followers. They see that Begin and David Levy, Yitzhak Shamir and Moshe Arnas are leading Herut on the Likud side its climax the time comes to the "battle over the West Bank." These goals do not suit the Democrats or the Liberals who fear that this policy, which was never acceptable to them, destroys for good their chances of remaining in the government after the elections.

Good Cards for Bargaining

Ehrlich and Doltzin are inhibited from speaking openly as are Yitzhak Modai and Gideon Fass. Even though in the internal elections, the personal struggle among them is not direct and is channeled through a contest between polls, every Liberal minister is hesitant today to express views and is afraid that every expression will be used for internal political purposes by the minister who is his opponent. Ehrlich and Doltzin are both competing for the position of Chariman of the Party, a position which has not been filled since the resignation of Elimelech Rimalt. Doltzin was supported by Yitzhak Modai who is considered to be a hawk and closer to the positions of Herut. But Doltzin was the one to initiate the idea of offering Weizman the leadership position in a new government which would get the support of the Liberals and of other major political forces.

According to the majority of the active Liberals, Ehrlich holds the same views. But as Vice Premier, he has to be more loyal to Begin. He is certainly less free than the Chairman of the Agency administration whose tenure is not dependent at all on the Likud government.

The assessment that the Liberals hold good cards for political bargaining has been accepted by the heads of the Democrats for a long time. More than once in the last two years, there have been talks between members of the two parties. But this week the curtain of silence was lifted for the first time. There are no more attempts to belittle the importance of the meetings that Tamir has been having with Ehrlich and Doltzin concerning the possibility of cooperation between the two parties. Herut party workers believe that the Herut movement has the masses of voters wrapped up. But the Liberals have a potential for political strategies and a significant number of members of Parliament (13 people) which can represent a core group for a revolution even before the official term of the ninth Parliament is over.

Shmuel Tamir and the Liberal leaders have a clear interest in not giving up ownership of the center of the map to the movement led by Amnon Rubenstein and Meir Amit. Amit's and David Golomov's leanings towards rejoining forces with the Labor Party weaken [Liberal] chances of accumulating much strength. And, just as Tamir has a big stake in not allowing Rubenstein to succeed, so does Simcha Ehrlich have good reasons to want to take revenge on Parliament member Yosef Tamir who left his party at the head of a group of Liberals to join [word missing].

To Prevent A Confrontation

The Liberal sector has become a political focus for basic political changes. The growing interest shown by Tamir in Ehrlich and Doltzin is likely to put a barrier between him and Yigael Yadin and Dr. Israel Katz. The latter two are likely to withdraw in coming weeks. The Liberal Party does not have a place for them.

Shimon Peres also hopes for the establishment of a major force around the Liberals led by Weizman. This would be the logical partner for the Alinement in putting together a coalition. Weizman would be the candidate for the position of Defense Minister in Peres' government. And this would do away with the threat for Peres of his party having to appoint Yitzhak Rabin to this position.

Key events likely to influence the political developments in the coming months include: the internal elections of the Liberal Party which will take place on the 27th of this month and the convening, on the same day, of the Council of the Democratic movement to decide about its future direction in the government.

In contrast to the continued existence of the Likud in its present composition as a federation of parties and factions led by Begin, Weizman and Ehrlich, a possibility now exists that the month of May will herald the beginning of a change. This change involves the first exploratory steps towards the establishment of a Liberal Center which would include the Liberal sector, the Democratic movement (minus Yadin and Katz) and parts of [labor]--all led by Ezer Weizman.

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CSO: 4508

POTENTIAL AND PROBLEMS OF PERES ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Apr 80 p 13

[Article by Amos Eilon: "Peres' Problem"]

[Text] The history which accompanied Shimon Peres this week on his trip to the U.S. testified, without a doubt, to a total lack of confidence within the present government in all departments. Peres is not, as Likud people are saying, a "traitor" because he accepted President Carter's invitation to visit him in the White House. He is on the brink of rising to a position of leadership in the government. This is what bothers the Likud ministers and perhaps also the National Religious Party, and not the fear that he will plant dangerous ideas in the minds of the Americans. When Begin visited Washington in 1957, right after the Sinai campaign, to protest the withdrawal, he would have given his right arm for a meeting with President Eisenhower. But the Americans did not take him seriously then.

Peres' situation is completely different. The government will or will not be brought down by next Fall, but we will never see Shimon Peres so close to being the head of the government as we do today. Begin made peace with Egypt and changed history, something the Alinement perhaps would not have done. But from a public and perhaps political perspective, he spoiled his chances and his popularity by an unprecedented depression. It is not just the economic situation. Even the peace he brought, he made loathsome with oppressive rhetoric and sterile tactics which destroyed the original hope. Public support is built up by planting hope, not by sowing despair.

In contrast, Shimon Peres took charge of the Alinement when it was broken, but he succeeded in reconstructing it from the ruins despite the efforts of Allon and Rabin to stop him. The referendums now forecast a chance for an absolute majority for the Alinement in the coming Parliament. The Alinement is on the rise in almost all circles (like Likud was in the mid-70's) and especially among the youth and the Eastern communities. In Cairo they are saying openly that the main problem at the moment is to "get through the year."

The Big Problem

In Cairo they are also waiting for Peres, not because they prefer him over Begin. On the contrary, there is some truth to the notion that Sadat personally prefers Begin. But the Egyptians, like us, follow the internal situation in Israel and the referendums. And quite a few of Sadat's close aides fear that Begin's government is a "lame duck." The Egyptians are not satisfied with a separate peace with Israel. They want to see progress towards a general settlement. They see that in the present situation, there is no chance for this kind of progress.

In 1977, many thought that the Alinement was through for a long time and that Likud would be in power for at least a decade. Who imagined then or after Camp David that its creators would be overthrown so soon? The public at large has been following these vicissitudes with shock blended with cynicism. Many are fed up with the Likud government. But the Alinement, for whom they will probably vote, does not stir up much hope. The reversal of 1977 and the one indicated now has contributed to Israeli political development. Perhaps it raised some false hopes, but in other Western democracies it has not yet been shown that changes of government really make a difference.

As in 1977, now too, things are being turned upside down not necessarily for positive reasons, such as faith in the rightness of the Alinement's path, but rather, I fear, from motives that are essentially negative--in other words, disgust with the present government. The same thing that toppled the Alinement in 1977 is toppling Likud today. The Alinement that is next in line does not arouse, at present, much hope.

Likud is disliked. The Alinement, even though many of us will vote for it, is regarded with suspicion. In the new satiric revue STARTING A NEW WEEK (YOSHIH AL HA'SHAVUA), the audience claps to the song by Ephraim Sidon who wonders about Shimon Peres' attempts to develop a new "image," dovelike and hawklike at the same time:

> They are sewing a suit for Mr. Peres
> And it reminds them at times
> Of those clothes of the King
> Seen only by men of wisdom
> They are sewing a suit for Mr. Peres
> But they still look to the heavens
> Hoping only that no little boy will appear
> To shout that the King has no clothes.

The main reason for this lies not only in the fact that Peres is still unpopular but mainly in Peres' staying halfway between the two camps of hawks in his party and trying as hard as he can to negotiate, reflect and satisfy everyone. The biggest problem of Shimon Peres is also personal. Few people in Israeli politics have suffered and still suffer as much as he does from a "credibility gap." Now, when the delicate fabric which he

reconstructed not long ago with such great effort forced him to continue to tread on a very fine line, he still suffers from this gap. There is something terrible, even tragic, in the continuing difficulty which Shimon Peres has in stimulating confidence.

He is blessed with a lot of imagination, too quick perhaps, and with a characteristic which is rare in this country of autistic doctrinairians of recognizing his limitations and the constantly changing circumstances of reality. He is not a careerist. In 1965 he was one of the few in Israeli history to leave his position because of loyalty to his conscience. Changing reality has punished him more, perhaps, than any other Israeli politician. His learning has come from many sources--from events, from joy and fear, from young friends in the party who push him to the Left, from his critical associates in the Socialist International who have broadened his intellectual horizons and have turned him into one of the few Israeli politicians in recent years who has looked honestly and without illusions at the world we are living in.

All this, as anyone who has followed him from close up knows, has brought him to a new political conception, interesting and perhaps full of possibilities. But, for whatever reasons, he has not yet been able to impart confidence to this conception. He is brimming over with interesting ideas in the areas of foreign affairs as well as internal affairs. But till now he has not succeeded in sparking hope in people's hearts that these ideas are more than just gimmicks for choices. Perhaps it is because words have died in this country and they do not mean anything to us. And perhaps it is because of his formulations which are smooth and at times too eloquent.

In the coming elections, many will probably vote for him for these reasons and for others. In order for them to have good reasons as well to vote for him, he will have to be more explicit in his views.

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FACES AND FACTIONS OF THE PLO DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Apr 80 pp 9, 13

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "PLO: On the Road to Change Between the Progressives and the Reactionaries?"]

[Text] In an interview published in February of this year, Nayif Hawatmih, leader of the "Democratic Front for Palestine Liberation," speaks in AL-HURRIYAH, in the mouthpiece of the organization, about the two currents in the national Palestinian movement. There is the "progressive left" faction which is also nationalist and fundamentalist, and there is the right faction which, according to him, is cooperating with American plans for the application of the Camp David agreements whose main element is the autonomy plan. In the interview, Hawatmih emphasizes that the differences between the left and right are not ideological but are rather practical. It is between those who are working to assure the success of the national plan of phases and those who are working against it. Whoever supports the plan must vigorously oppose the Camp David agreements and the autonomy talks. He calls on people to ostracize those Palestinians "in the occupied territories and outside" who are cooperating with these plans. According to him, two trends stand out in the "ranks of the revolution and of the PLO." One is the trend which stresses adherence to the plan of phases represented by all the "democratic and leftist forces in the revolution." The second direction in the PLO, according to Nayif Hawatmih, cooperates with those forces and people who are not opposed to Camp David. This direction in the PLO, continues Hawatmih, gives support--political, organizational and material--to those people. Nayif Hawatmih mentions some of their names: Rashid al-Shawwa, Ilyas Frayj, Anwar Nusayba, Anwar al-Khatib and their associates.

A Channel For Cooperation

The head of the democratic front points out in the same interview that the PNF, the Palestine National Front in the occupied territories, is the only channel available for cooperation between the PLO and residents of the territories. Hawatmih attacks those who are trying to weaken the Palestine national front in its present composition and, at the same time, bring reactionary forces like Rashin al-Shawwa and his associates into the leadership

of the PNF in order to create a connection between the PLO and the "internal front" (namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

"The big battle that was waged in November-December 1979 about Nablus and the excitement and the collective resignations demonstrated clearly," says Hawatmih in the same interview, "two approaches to the immediate national problem in the ranks of the revolution and of the PLO." He continues. "We took the initiative, together with all the national, fundamental and progressive forces, to collectively resign in order to compel the enemy to abandon its plan to do away with the municipal councils. Meanwhile, the 'rightist' trend was working to stop the collective resignations and to spare the Nablus municipal council. This would create an opening which would fit the enemy's plan to bring about the further downfall of the municipalities of Ramallah, Al-Bira, and, later, Halhul."

Matti Steinberg from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who is preparing a doctoral thesis on the subject of "the philosophy and ideology of the organizations in the PLO," on which this article is based, says that for a long time the democratic front of Nayif Hawatmih took different stands on various problems. There was a middle language for a long time between Fatah and the popular front. On some issues, they went with Fatah. On others, they went with the popular front. For example, the democratic front was the one to create the Palestinian concept of phases. Fatah joined to a large extent and gave it validity. In contrast, the popular front did not accept the plan of phases very well at all. At first, it turned it down. Only at the end, did it accept the plan. In this respect, Fatah and the democratic front cooperated.

After Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel, the popular front and the democratic front adopted a similar stand. They were upset by the possibility that Fatah will sacrifice Palestinian interests through diplomacy and through the policy it might adopt. Finally, the democratic front adopted opposing views. This issue is also evidenced in the occupied territories. Followers of the democratic front in the territories work together with other resistance organizations.

When the joint American-Soviet communique was made known in October of 1977, the democratic front expressed limited support for this announcement. It saw in it an essentially positive element. The exclusiveness which the U.S. had exhibited in the political process was being balanced in the American-Soviet statement by Soviet participation.

Two organizations which are less independent and rely almost exclusively on the countries which established them are al-Sayqah, a Palestinian organization that was founded in December 1968 by the Syrians, and the "Arab Liberation Front," which was founded in April 1969 by the Iraqis, to some extent as a reaction to al-Sayqah in order to represent the Palestinian outlook of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. In both organizations, there are Palestinian members with Ba'ath viewpoints. One can see this in the slogans of the two organizations which are clearly Ba'ath slogans: unity, freedom and socialism.

The former leader of al-Sayqah was Zuhayr Muhsin. He was killed last year in Cannes. Today Sami al-Atri is the head of the organization. Al-Sayqah is under complete Syrian control and represents faithfully the Syrian Ba'ath position with regard to the Palestinian issue. The approach of the Arab Liberation Front is a rejectionist approach. This organization is unique in that till today it is reserved about territorializing the Palestinian question. It is even opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian State in the occupied territories. This is consistent with its strict adherence to Ba'ath ideology. The Arab Liberation Front sees the solution within an all-Arab framework. Its members, therefore, believe that the solution will not be found in further fragmentation of the Arab world, which would be the case if an additional state were created.

Deviation From Pan-Arabism

While the Arab Liberation Front pictures as a goal the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in all the territories of Israel, only it sees such a state as an integral part of the Arab world. The Arab Liberation Front is afraid that a Palestinian state in the territories signifies a provincial goal, and a deviation from pan-Arabism. In the past, this front was opposed to the establishment of a democratic state in all the Israeli territories since it was opposed to a fragmentation of the Arab world. However, since the other organizations, in particular the popular front and the democratic front went ahead and adopted the system of phases, the Arab Liberation Front has accepted the idea of the democratic state.

For many years, Dr 'Abd al-Wahab Khayali, a historian who has written many books on the conflict and on the history of Palestine, stood at the head of the organization. He was pushed out, and today the head is 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad. The Arab Liberation Front includes non-Palestinians also, in keeping with its philosophy that no distinction should be made between Palestinians and other Arabs.

The sixth organization included in the PLO executive is Ahmad Jibril's organization, the "Popular Front--General Command." This organization separated from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at the end of 1968. Ahmad Jibril is a Palestinian who was an officer involved with sabotage in the Syrian army. His organization excelled in apoliticism and a high degree of professionalism in its operational activities. The saboteurs in this organization who were caught are characteristic of his leadership. He is apparently a charismatic leader. He runs his organization like a military command. In general, this organization adopts a rejectionist position.

Two other organizations--"Front for the Popular Struggle" led by Sima Usha and the "Front for Palestine Liberation" are not included in the PLO executive. These two organizations are supported by rejectionist nations, especially Libya and Iraq. For this reason, there was an internal battle in the 14th national conference of the PLO. All the Syrian organizations and, especially,

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine supported the participation of these two organizations in the executive [leadership], since these two take rejectionist positions. Fatah has a majority on the National Council and was able to prevent their entrance to the executive [leadership].

Fatah, however, was finding itself more and more isolated in its positions in comparison with other organizations to the point where it threatened to leave the PLO. The threat to leave goes beyond tactics and strategy. Matti Steinberg compares it to marriage. When someone brings up the subject of divorce, first just as a threat, the threat itself has meaning.

Finally, it was decided that the two organizations--the Front for the Struggle and the Front for Palestine Liberation would have representation on the National Council. Yassir 'Arafat did not oppose, this since Fatah has a majority on the Council.

The current executive leadership has 14 members (in the past this body has had 11 members and 15 members). This is the highest body of the PLO, a kind of cabinet. The link which connects the executive leadership and the National Council is the Central Council with 53 members. The Central Council meets more often than the National Council. The Central Council and the National Council meet mainly in Damascus. Fatah does not like this, because members are subjected to Syrian influence which, in most cases, does not agree with Fatah's positions.

Fatah In Isolation

There are 301 members in the present National Council. Representation in the decision-making forums of the PLO does not match the relative power of the various organizations. There is in this situation a structural anomaly. In the executive, the smallest organization (of Ahmad Jibril) has almost the same power as Fatah, which is the largest. It is estimated that Fatah has 6000 fighters and Jibril has 300. In contrast to Fatah's 6000, all the rejectionist organizations together have about 5000 fighters, and the army of the Palestine Liberation group has another 4000-5000 fighters.

The main battle with the executive leadership is carried on by six or seven independent members of the executive, but these are split in their support according to their attachment to various organizations. In the past, the al-Sayqah and the Democratic Front supported Fatah on some of the issues. Today, Fatah finds itself isolated from the other organizations, especially on political issues. It is, therefore, in a minority in the executive leadership.

At the last national convention which took place in January 1979 in Damascus, Fatah asked that the organizational structure be changed in order to reflect more accurately the relative power of the organizations. In other words, it would have given Fatah a freer hand. All the other organizations opposed Fatah, including al-Sayqah and the Democratic Front. They demanded that the old 1972 version of parity representation, be kept.

On the subject of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, with the exception of the Front for Arab Liberation which is against such a state for ideological reasons, all the organizations, including al-Sayqah support the setting up of a phased goal of a Palestinian state in the territories. On the question of the state to be established, every organization is trying to dictate its own ideology. A further difference exists with respect to the question of concessions which will be required in order to attain the objective (a Palestinian state in the territories). On this issue, Fatah stands alone in its recognition that there is no way to avoid some kind of concession.

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HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION: AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Apr 80 pp 9, 13

[Article by Natan Donvitz: "High School Education: Matriculation or Ignorance--Grades Are Not Everything"]

[Text] In discussions with senior scientists who know what is going on in educational institutions in Israel and who "benefit" from the fruits of this system, the following picture has been drawn. Many graduates of these institutions have not mastered the Hebrew language. They have difficulty expressing themselves in writing or verbally. They do not know about their country. Their fund of knowledge is poor. They come to the university to learn a profession, to graduate and to get out.

I told one of them that when I arrived on the campus of Tel Aviv University, I asked students how to get to Sherman Building, the location of the Faculty of Life Sciences, and most of them did not know. Everyone knew only his or her own building or the one right next to it. "Yes, it is understandable," he agreed. Those who showed us the way were employees, not students.

"Do you believe that there can be another kind of school? Where will you get different teachers? And what about matriculation exams? The exams are based, for the most part, on the program of studies in the higher grades. If the matriculation exams are discontinued, the universities will start announcing entrance exams, and schools will advertise that they prepare their students for entrance exams to universities. The same woman in a differnt coat. What's the difference?"

I also asked Prof. A. Kochba, the Dean of the Faculty of Life Sciences at Tel Aviv University if it is impossible to develop a system of education which would watch over the student's education, provide enrichment and achieve better results than those achieved by today's system. Prof. Kochba is considered to be an authority on the subject of high school education. He was the Chairman of the committee which planned the reforms in the upper classes of high school education. He was also the representative of the institutes of higher learning on the Shield committee which examined the format of the matriculation exams.

Prof. Kochba is pessimistic about my question. And the reforms which the committee he chaired recommended were only successful, according to present indications, in the large and good schools. They work in the large ones because only a large school can offer a wide variety of courses and subjects. They work in the good ones because it is not enough to offer a wide selection. You also need good teachers who can interest the students in those subjects, namely those topics and areas which enrich the student's fund of knowledge. Two examples are Art or Philosophy.

If t' [illegible] are not enough students, due to the size of the school, who are int[illegible]ested in studying Art, the school cannot offer this subject. And if the school makes a special effort and gets enough students for this subject, then they may have a hard time finding a good teacher. So it goes in Philosophy and in several other areas.

The reforms also allow students to write a long composition on a subject they like instead of taking an exam in another subject. All this takes place, of course, only with the permission of the school's administration. In order to write this paper, the student must receive guidance from a scientist who is an authority in this field.

"Resistant" Teachers

"Now here," a senior scientist tells me, "a student approaches me with a letter from his teacher. She asks that we supervise him in his work. Fine. We are ready. We only ask that the teacher phone us, set up a joint meeting with the student and the teacher so that we can coordinate the work. And then, almost always, I am sure that that will be the last we hear. The teacher doesn't phone and the student does not come. The teacher is not willing to come in the afternoon hours." This is not the rule, and there are certainly teachers who are happy to cooperate with the academic institution. But I have heard about this phenomenon of "resistant" teachers from other sources.

Utopia?

We [illegible]ome back to Prof. Kochba. "Will you allow me to propose a wild, perhaps utopian, plan?" I ask. "Certainly," he answers, "let's hear it."

"Let's begin with the assumption that the institutions of higher learning arrive at a consensus that a drastic revolutionary change must take place in the educational system. A qualified representative of the institutions, a famous and respected scientist, meets with a man known as a big contributor to various institutions in Israel. Let's say it is Sayre Isaac Wolfson. And the scientist says approximately the following to the philanthropist:

'Sir, till now you have contributed to many important causes in various areas. It is well known nowadays that one of the weakest points in Israeli society is the educational system. All of the other systems are negatively

influenced by its weakness. We have arrived at the conclusion that it is time for a general overhaul. For this reason, we are proposing that a completely new school be established which will serve as a model, if it succeeds, for other schools. This will be a school which will educate and will produce students with a rich fund of knowledge. This will not be a school that prepares students for lower level, intermediate and matriculation exams, but will be concerned, instead, with what seems to us most important--education and enrichment.

'For this purpose, which is especially important to the security of our country, we propose that you help us with the funding of this project. We, for our part, will offer any kind of assistance required. I am confident that there are exceptional teachers and educators who would be happy to contribute their experience and their extensive knowledge. There is a longing among good teachers in various schools for the establishment of such an institution as the beginning of a new Eden in the educational system.

'The teams involved in setting this up will choose a teaching staff for the school, will do the initial planning of a schedule of studies, will arrange to get equipment, and will plan the building. While the building is under construction, the teachers will be preparing for their new objectives. They will be sent for observation and advanced study outside of Israel, will return and develop entrance exams based on criteria which will be set up by means of in-depth exploration. As in every new and revolutionary operation, there will certainly be defects, failures and problems which no one will have foreseen. And there will surely be objections raised by others about the path taken by the new institution. Sir, are you prepared to help us?'

"The philanthropist was enthusiastic and agreed. A new institution was started. And it should be made clear that it will not operate according to criteria set by the Ministry of Education. It will not be given over to the directives of superintendants. It will decide what material will be learned in which books and by which methods. The Ministry of Education will not interfere. Observers will be allowed, of course, to see what is happening from close up and to apply innovations or methods that they see to other schools. There is no copyright.

"Such an institution will become, in a short time, prestigious. Parents will want to send their children there. Students will want to study there. Teachers will want to work there. This has alwys been the case when a school was considered prestigious. And if this model works well, it will have imitators. Past experience has taught us this. And maybe, just maybe, Zion will be redeemed."

Prof. Kochba says this about the idea. "First of all, it is not such a wild idea. But the problem I pointed out still exists. If there are no matriculation exams and no matriculation certificates, there will be no way to avoid having to prepare extensive entrance exams in the universities. And then, in the reality of Israel, after several years of military service, the person

will have to sit down and study for exams which will be, essentially, like matriculation exams. And, of course, it is a lot harder to study after completing the military service than it would be before. So what have you gained?"

The Cost: One Year

I answered: "I have also thought about this. There is a solution. A student will be accepted by a university on the basis of a report which proves that he studied at that institution, a psychometric examination and a personal interview. And you already set up such exams nowadays. During the first year of studies at the university, the student will not be taught the subject he wanted to learn but will, rather, prepare himself for the next year's studies and for the intermediate exams. You are interested in having him learn Hebrew, English and Mathematics. He is prepared in these subjects according to your needs. What can be better than this?"

Prof. Kochba: "This is not right. In our reality, a young man or young woman goes to the Army. And at the end of the military service, you want to load them down with yet another year of studies?"

My answer: "Absolutely. Several faculties are already doing this without calling it by name. What is the year of pre-Law, and do they learn Medicine, generally, in the first year of medical school? And if we recognize the fact that the issue of education is no less important or vital today than the security of Israel, then why do we allow Zahal (the Army) to extend the length of the regular military service for men and women but are not allowed to do so in the educational system? There is all the more reason since the reform would not take anything away from the student but would, rather, give him something.

"During his twelve years of study in school, he will recieve an excellent education, will be enriched with a great fund of knowledge, will be familiar with and delve deeply into subjects which truly interest him. What is the high price demanded of the student? His whole life will look different. He will not be a technocrat who only knows the area in which he is involved. He will enjoy life more.

"In addition, a teacher in such an institution will have much greater prestige. People with superior abilities will turn to teaching as a profession. This possibility, which is brought up and waved in every discussion about raising the salaries of teachers, will appear realistic for the first time."

Prof. Kochba agrees that the low prestige of teachers plays a role in the present condition of the educational system. "School principals come to us from good schools and ask us to give them Biology teachers. There are not enough Biology teachers. And I propose this to the staff here. 'Go teach, and in the afternoons and on your days off, continue your research here in the laboratories. In this way, you will continue to make progress in your

work and will also make a contribution to the schools.' And they refuse. They are not willing to go and teach. There are those who prefer to get their degrees and work in an office or in a factory just so they will not have to teach. For teaching has no prestige."

"In that case," I offered, "why not have the mountain come to Mohammed? Why not bring the students whose major is Biology for one intensive day of studies every week to the university? They would experience an academic atmosphere, near scientists and students, in fine spacious laboratories. What could be better than that? The future tie with the university would be formed while the youth was still a student in school."

There Is No Challenge

Kochba says: "For our part, I think it would be possible. There are classes that come to study here. But I am afraid that the teachers would not agree to come here with their students. That is what our experience tells me."

And all this is happening while, in schools in Northern Tel Aviv, perfectly good and expensive electronics laboratories are closed. The schools are having difficulty finding teachers, and the students, lacking explanation and encouragement, are not choosing to study electronics within the framework of their elective studies. And a large per cent of those graduating in the Natural Sciences will be officers in the Army in one or two years. A basic knowledge of electronics is vital to the officer in today's army.

It is the same in other subjects. There are no good teachers, no challenge for the students, no students. And the elementary schools this year hired almost a thousand uncertified teachers, among them some who don't even have their certificate of matriculation.

It is a gloomy picture. In the next article, we will deal with intellectual life in schools.

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SARKIS AND MARONITE PATRIARCH DISCUSS SITUATION IN SOUTH

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 18 Apr 80 p 17

[Article: "Lebanon Receives International Advice To Leave Aside Matter of Palestinian Presence In South At Present Time; Fall of Sa'd Haddad's Militia Wall After Being Crossed By Misgav 'Am Operation."]

[Text] President Ilyas Sarkis left the presidential palace late Friday afternoon, and, after a long absence, visited the Maronite patriarchate in Bkirki. It is situated above the city of Juniyah on the seaside road between Beirut and Tripoli, accompanied by an escort.

President Sarkis had a lengthy meeting with Maronite Patriarch Antonius Butrus Khuraysh during this visit. Their discussions essentially dealt with the situation in southern Lebanon, following the overt incursion of Israeli military forces into southern territory, taking positions close to strategic heights and beginning to build military fortifications. As President Sarkis himself said, this action is a challenge to Lebanese sovereignty, the decisions of the UN Security Council and the presence of international forces in the area in question.

President Sarkis had already expressed some concern before he went to Bkirki. That is why he stressed to Patriarch Khuraysh the importance of the support of friendly countries to strengthen the position of Lebanon at the Security Council. He particularly insisted on the part which may be played by France itself with reference to having the Israelis leave the South. This would be in addition to pressures which may be exerted by Pope John-Paul II to have the Israelis leave the positions already occupied by them, and to use this situation to back up possible joint pressures by the European Community and the Vatican to strengthen the situation of the international forces in the South, and undertake an attempt, independent from efforts concerning the Middle East crisis as a whole, to put an end to the part played by armed forces which interfere with the action of the Lebanese government in its urgent need to spread its authority over the southern areas up to the international borders. This would contribute to the implementation of the most important clauses of the agreement announced some weeks ago by President Sarkis.

People from the president's entourage told a former head of government Friday evening that the patriarchate agreed with the president of the republic on stressing the importance of the support of the European countries and the Vatican in favor of Lebanon. These countries are convinced that it is necessary to hold urgent contacts--which actually have been started--with friendly international authorities to persuade them that the situation in the South should not be allowed to stagnate and that Israeli occupation of some positions in the South should not be allowed to become permanent. The reply of the international authorities came in the form of an advice to abstain from openning the dossier of the Palestinian presence in the South at the present time.

The president of the republic was asked specific questions on the same day about the results of the Lebanese contacts with the major powers to compel the Israelis to leave Lebanese territory, impose a truce and prevent the international forces from leaving the south.

These questions were given official replies, whose tenor ranged from optimism to apprehension over possible developments. This is a paradoxical situation which has constantly dominated the Lebanese scene due to the fast pace of events in the area, the lack of complete information regarding them, and the inability of the Lebanese government to exercise any influence over their course in the area.

One of the most important questions asked of the president of the republic, was addressed by Patriarch Khuraysh in Bkirki: "The information we have, and which we hear about the purpose of the Israeli incursion into the southern territories is replete with contradictions. It was said that the Israeli forces of incursion started to withdraw Thursday night, but Israel promptly refuted that information, stating that its forces would remain in their positions until they complete their mission. What is the actual situation according to your own information?"

The reply given by President Sarkis was somewhat vague with reference to prevision, particularly when he said, with reference to the matter of dealing with the Israeli aggression, that no final decision had been reached and that anything was possible. However, contacts made to date tend to confirm that the Israeli presence in the area of the border strip will be neither long nor permanent. The forces which entered the southern territory will return to the positions from which they came. However, there is nothing certain about that, since the question is to force the Israelis to end their occupation immediately, without giving them any chance to change their presence in the South into a playing card for bargaining and extortion.

On what facts did President Sarkis rely for the information he gave Patriarch Khuraysh?

The chain of events began with the Palestinian resistance's commando operation against the Misgav 'Am settlement, followed by the violent

reactions of the Israeli authorities. With reference to this, Menachem Begin, head of the Israeli government, said that "even the devil could not set any bounds to the revenge required for the murder of a child. Israel shall retaliate and put an end to the domination of the Palestinian resistance over one third of Lebanese territory!"

The government immediately contacted the Secretariat General of the United Nations through Ambassador Ghassan Tuwayni, demanding full explanations. It also contacted America and the major powers, cautioning against a complete Israeli occupation of more than one half of the South. The government also contacted some Arab countries, asking for advice and measures to prevent the catastrophe before it happened. Replies arrived from Ambassador Ghassan Tuwayni for 2 days in a row, carrying some optimism. His reports indicated that both United Nations and United States circles had some basic information that it is unlikely that Israel might attempt any permanent occupation of the south or launch any destructive large-scale war for various reasons. Some of these are domestic and some connected with the problem of the autonomy and the failure of the negotiations between Egypt and Israel.

However, Tuwayni at the same time warned the government against complacency, since Israel was determined to retaliate, if only through swift lightning-like military operations.

The government did not stop here, but asked the major powers to define their position categorically with reference to an Israeli incursion into the south. It then decided to submit a prompt complaint to the Security Council after a number of Arab ambassadors in Beirut gave the authorities some information from Arab sources, which prompted deputy prime minister Fu'ad Butrus to say that he did not feel secure about the future.

However, the fact is that the concern shown by the authorities in their complaints against Israel did not conceal the debates which took place within the walls of government agencies about the responsibility of some of the resistance groups for all that happened.

According to the Palestinian resistance circles, the principle of commando operations inside the occupied territory is a sacred principle, which suffers neither discussion nor compromise. Exact details are something else.

On the other hand, according to Western press sources in Beirut, the position of Sa'd Haddad before the Israeli authorities, last week, was very delicate and critical. It was the object of many questions and doubts as to the advantage of his existence and the effectiveness of the huge expenses which burden the Israeli treasury, considering that his protective wall was unable to protect the Israeli settlements and prevent the five commandos from reaching Misgav 'Am.

Furthermore, it is said that direct Israeli investigation of this point was meant to look for elements operating with Sa'd Haddad, and which are believed to have played a part in opening the borders and impairing the alarm system in order to make it easier for the commandos to reach the settlement.

Commenting on all this, Palestinian resistance circles say that what actually happened confirms a basic reality to the Israelis, namely that nobody can continuously and for ever protect them against commando operations; that bypassing Sa'd Haddad and directly assuming the task of protecting their border will not change this fact in the least; and that all these facts help the Lebanese view which constantly reminds the world that Lebanon cannot be more proficient than Israel itself in protecting its own settlements, since Israel--with all its forces and experience--remains totally incapable to perform this task. In other words, the human strip erected by Israel along its borders, otherwise known as the Militia Wall, has fallen down!

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CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 18 Apr 80 p 14

[Article by AL-HAWADITH Beirut Office: "Syrian-Phalangist Dialogue Sets Forth Two Conditions: Phalangist Rejection of Camp David Agreements And Surrender of Perpetrators of Ihdin Massacre"]

[Text] The most important results of the discussions which took place in Damascus recently between the Syrian authorities and the delegation of the Phalangist party consisting of member of parliament George Sa'adah and attorney Karim Baqraduni, were not those publicly mentioned in the comments of political circles and the news media. They have been kept in complete secrecy in compliance with the agreement reached by both parties to keep the details of the dialogue shrouded in complete secrecy.

Before going into some of the points brought up by that visit, it should be noted that attorney Karim Baqraduni, member of the political bureau of the Phalangist party, represents within the party itself a group of Phalangists who have preserved the threads of a private dialogue between Damascus and themselves even during the darkest hours of the relations between them. These reached a climax, 2 years ago, when their forces clashed during the destructive rocket and cannon war over the area of al-Ashrafiyah and its vicinity.

The part played by attorney Karim Baqraduni remained obscure for a long time following the effect which the conflict with Syria had on the party. This conflict opened the way to the predominence of the opinions of those opposed to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, until things started to lean gradually towards the relaxation whose signs have gradually become evident only a few weeks ago.

While attorney Baqraduni did not interrupt his private contacts with the Syrian leaders during his period of suspended animation, he nevertheless did that on his own initiative, looking for the right time to reopen the matter of relations. The time subsequently came when he was given the green light to give a distinctly partisan character to his contacts with the Syrians. He was asked to undertake a pulse-feeling operation in order

to determine the extent to which the Syrian leaders might be willing to renew the dialogue with the party for the purpose of reaching a common agreement about the reinforcement of legal authority; and achieving harmony and mutual understanding about a gradual surrender of authority to the army and domestic security forces, while filling the vacuum left by the gradual withdrawal of the Syrian forces from the Lebanese territory.

It was with that purpose in mind that Karim Baqraduni went to Damascus, as sources of the Phalangist party said. He had general contacts there, and listened to many criticisms, requests and conditions. In addition to all this, these sources said, Baqraduni heard about some of the information which had led the Syrian authorities to accuse the Phalangist party, at the time of some Syrian government clashes with the Muslim Brotherhood, of facilitating the movements of the brotherhood in Lebanon and strengthening their military and material situation.

Although this type of information was circulating as part rumor, part suspicion and part truth, the mere fact that such an impersonal contact was undertaken between Syria and the Phalangists gave both parties an opportunity to exchange points of view about some way to realize a rapprochement. It became clear that, generally speaking, the party had to start modifying its policy both in the military and political fields; gradually demonstrate its good faith and conduct toward both the Syrian and Palestinian presence in Lebanon; adhere to the Arab position which rejects the Camp David agreements and cooperation with Israel; and release the abducted Syrians who have been detained by the Phalangists for months.

The results of those contacts were checked in Beirut, and it was decided to continue the preliminary dialogue between Damascus and the party, dividing this dialogue into three steps. The first step would deal with the clarification of the facts behind accusations and refutation of accusations, with specific reference to the support extended to the Muslim Brotherhood by the Phalangists. The second step would concern the Phalangists' actual position regarding political questions, such as relations with Syria, the Palestinian resistance and rejection of cooperation with Israel. The third step would aim at establishing a new policy of positive cooperation in the future, which might be discussed in a direct dialogue between President Hafiz al-Asad and Pierre Jumayl, and would naturally cover every issue in detail.

The Phalangist delegation went to Damascus during the past 2 weeks, and held frank discussions, chaired by Syrian foreign minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam. Both positive and negative aspects of the currently tense relations were discussed with the Syrian authorities.

What is it that has actually been said in Damascus, and had to be shrouded in secrecy, even temporarily, in the interest of both parties?

According to information obtained about this matter, the Syrian authorities did not categorically refuse to have a dialogue with the Phalangist party. During a review of the history of relations between Syria and the party, they stressed the fact that it was the Phalangists who were responsible for starting the conflagration of the conflict and the fight with Syria, and that they perfectly know why.

The Syrians said that the Phalangist party should take initiatives demonstrating its conviction that it is necessary to change its operating methods. It would be easy to take such steps if the right fundamental political decision were made on the basis of correction of past mistakes; adoption of a new policy in conformity with the decisions of Bayt al-Din [Lebanese presidential palace] on conditions for an accord; abidance by general Arab policy; and denial of opportunity for the proliferation of the activity of those who are opposed to the Syrian regime. It may also be possible to discuss the release of persons respectively detained by both sides as a token of good faith.

The Syrians also said that they naturally have no reason to conduct any discussions of an official or political nature between a state and a party. Such matters usually should be discussed between one government and another, i.e., between the Syrian and the Lebanese governments. However, this is impossible without resuming the dialogue and ascertaining the positive results required to restore stability in Lebanon.

In addition to this, the Syrians mentioned that they will refuse, in any future dialogue or cooperation, to abandon the principle of cooperation with former president Franjiyah. They will also refuse, with reference to the Maronite conflict, to take any position based on ignoring the real causes of this conflict or overlooking former president Franjiyah's point of view. According to the Syrians, this matter may be settled in time, depending on the evolution of the situation, since Syria is willing to fill the gaps in Lebanon without interfering in the least with the rights and opinions of those people whose attitude is considered sound and patriotic.

The matter of the Phalangist prisoners currently detained in Damascus was discussed. The Phalangists were told that it is out of the question to be lenient with the people who killed Syrian soldiers, destroyed Syrian military positions or participated in the perpetration of the massacre in Ihdin. Such acts require the application of legal action against the perpetrators, which is an essential step to forget the past and apply the policy of reward and punishment with all its implications.

In order to prove their good faith, the Phalangists were requested to release the Syrians civilians and military personnel currently detained by them, and to explain whatever happened to those who disappeared in the past. Such a step would be an essential link in the chain of the desired mutual understanding.

Names and events were brought up, and it was agreed in principle that the Phalangist party should immediately start releasing the Syrian prisoners in a discrete way, so that people would not be announced in advance to the press.

Implementation of some points of this agreement started towards the end of last week. According to information published by the Friday morning newspapers, three abducted Syrians were released in the area of al-Ashrafiyah and turned over to the Arab deterrent forces, to be returned to Damascus. Political parties in the eastern section of Beirut washed their hands of responsibility for the detention of these people, and claimed that they knew nothing about their arrest.

Debate in the eastern section about contacts with Damascus are going through a difficult period of confusion and conflicting views. The faction in favor of the dialogue with Damascus insists on giving evidence of good faith to achieve success. But the group opposed to the dialogue is loudly voicing doubts throughout the party, and betting in advance that such an attempt has no chances to succeed as long as basic political positions remain mutually opposed between the two sides. Each group now insists on its own ideas and views, which are altogether very far apart.

It would be premature to assess the fate of this adventure before the completion of all attempts and endeavors, particularly when you realize 2 years have passed since they started talking about a dialogue and a rapprochement between President Camille Shamun and the leadership of the Palestinian resistance, without achieving any practical result in theory or in practice. There were mere periods of truce and occasional exchanges of telegrams of condolences or congratulations.

Observers' attention currently is directed towards the Syrian and Phalangist news media, to find out the extent of the success of the recent attempt to stop attacks exchanged between the two interested parties through the media. Thus, the nature of future relations between the two sides will be revealed by what may be said in the press and on the radio.

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BRIEFS

COUP ATTEMPT--A prominent Sudanese individual told AL-YAMAMAH that four weeks ago a conspiracy to overthrow the ruling regime was discovered. Its leaders were a group of officers in the armed forces who belonged to a forbidden organization in Sudan. This source said that there was a foreign nation behind this attempt and there are currently investigations being conducted to find out the identity of the civilians who collaborated with the officers to stage this coup. The Sudanese source refused to elaborate on further details. [Text] [Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 30 May 80 p 4]

CSO: 4802

FARMERS DISCUSS PROBLEMS FACING AGRICULTURE

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 7, 9 Apr 80

[Article: "Al-Daqdaqah Agricultural Center"]

[7 Apr 80 p 3]

[Text] Agricultural questions in the country are considered among the basic questions that receive everyone's attention and concern since agriculture has been one of the first sectors upon which the state was founded when it came into being. All the groundwork had been laid for the progress and advancement of agriculture. In the height of the wave of development and modernization that swept through numerous sectors of the economy, attention to agriculture suffered a relative decline after the country was steered towards high consumption of agricultural crops--[a situation] which led to increased imports from abroad. We do not think that the dialogue regarding this sector diminishes the accomplishments of the ministry of agriculture. Such a dialogue is in fact a contribution to the ministry's course for advancing and improving agriculture. We know that programs listed in the plans of the ministry of agriculture have been drawn up for this purpose, but this should not prevent anyone from saying what he has to say, whether it be negative or positive.

The ministry is being accused by the farmers of inadequacies. AL-WAHDAH is giving the ministry, represented by the al-Daqdaqah Center, an opportunity to explain its role and its achievements in the al-Daqdaqah Center in particular. In a subsequent installment we will review what the farmers said. AL-WAHDAH met with the deputy director of the center, Brother 'Abdallah Khalafan and with Ja'far 'Abd-al-Khaliq, the agricultural engineer at the center. The latter began the interview by saying:

Lights on the al-Daqdaqah Center

"The work of the center includes supervision, guidance and agricultural development for six agricultural districts. They are: al-Hamraniyah, (Sha'am), Shimal, al-Daqdaqah, (Khat) and (Adhan).

"According to the most recent statistics the area of the six districts is 78,000 donums. Of this area 16,000 donums are planted with palm trees and citrus fruits, and the rest is not utilized either because of a high salt level in the soil or in the water.

"The area is divided among 2,341 farms in the six districts. They are as follows: 116 farms in al-Hamraniyah; 617 farms in Sha'am, 626 farms in Shimal; 402 farms in al-Daqdaqah; 338 farms in Khat; and 223 farms in Adhan.

"The number of farms that produce vegetables is 525, and the largest vegetable-producing district is al-Hamraniyah.

"Sha'am is in the first position in the production of dates: 96 percent of the area is planted with date palms. It is followed by Adhan where 90 percent of the land is planted with date palms. In Shimal [that ratio] is 60 percent; in al-Daqdaqah, it is 60 percent; and in Khat, it is 50 percent.

"The principal crop in the region is dates.

"The area which is planted with vegetables increases and decreases according to circumstances. If there are torrential rains and showers, the cultivated area declines; if there is no rain, the cultivated area increases.

"The history of agriculture in the region is old, but agriculture was not organized till 1972. Before that it was affiliated with the development council. Ever since 1975 the entire area has been growing steadily at a rate of almost 10 percent per year.

"There are four principal technical divisions in the center: agricultural guidance, agricultural loans, rural water and pest control.

"There are coordinating programs among all these divisions."

Technical Services and Agricultural Services

The deputy director of the center said that services were divided into two divisions: a division for technical services and a division for agricultural services.

"Technical services may be presented briefly as the professional and technical assistance that is offered through the professional staff at the center. Regarding agricultural services, some are offered free of charge, and others are offered at half price. The free services are: digging wells in accordance with the sequence of the applications that are submitted and in accordance with the capabilities of the ministry; plowing; installing, repairing and maintaining pumps; spraying with pesticides; and also technical services. Pesticides, seeds, fertilizers and pumps are offered at half price."

Accomplishments

He also said, "We have been able to drill 75 wells from 1976 till now. Approximately 5 percent of them were unsuccessful either because there was no water in the well or because the water was salty. But, thank God, we do not drill wells until we are certain that studies have been conducted to confirm the existence of water which is suitable for irrigation. We also repaired and maintained 2,285 water pumps. Our tractors plowed 45,300 donums, and the same area has been sprayed with pesticides."

Pest Control

Engineer Ja'far speaks about plant diseases and controlling them. He says, "The insect, al-Khamirah, has shown up in the district of Sha'am, and it is still confined to that district. As a result of the continuous spraying with pesticides it has been possible to avoid the insect's attack on vegetables. But we are also saying quite truthfully that the current capabilities do not enable us to spray [all areas] with pesticides, and especially the palm trees. The pesticides are available in the warehouses, but what we need is an airplane with which to spray the pesticide. Several diseases have shown up in the palm trees: some of them are being investigated, and some have been diagnosed. We are asking the ministry to give the center a number of specialists in the diseases of palm trees."

In his conversation Brother Ja'far faults the farmers for spraying [the fields] at random without taking the advice of specialists. It is necessary to notify the agricultural adviser when any instance of plant disease occurs. The agricultural adviser would provide the technical study that would identify the disease and the appropriate pesticide. The danger of random spraying lies in the fact that plants may be harmed because the pesticides may kill other beneficial insects.

Palms and the Problems of Protecting Them

Palms are among the most important sources of wealth for the farmer in the United Arab Emirates. The problem of marketing the crop is one of the most important problems that confronts the farmer. This was what 'Abdallah Khalafan, deputy director of the center said. He went on to add, "There is a marketing project in which several official agencies are participating. Its principal goal is to create a marketing system whose objective, among other objectives, is the development of agriculture and the stability of farms." Khalafan goes on to talk about the date crop and says, "In recent years farmers have suffered tremendous losses because, on the one hand, date prices imposed by middlemen were low and, on the other hand, the costs of producing the crop were high. The only solution in the future is that the state intervene to subsidize the [date] farms so as to reduce the exorbitant costs which the farmer has to bear. The state also is to create an incentive to encourage farmers to improve production [and achieve] record rates. Through its subsidy [of these farms] the state is to contribute the full cost of diesel fuel, and it is to contribute to the wages of agricultural workers whose wages have risen considerably.

Agricultural Industrialization

Agricultural Engineer Ja'far 'Abd-al-Khaliq talks about protecting the crop of the palm trees and says, "Establishing an industry that would provide the ideal use for the crop of the palm trees has become essential because putting the whole crop on the market for regular consumption means that large quantities [are dumped on the market]. Consequently, prices decline. But establishing an industry that would process dates would create variety in the forms of consumption and would absorb a quantity of the crop that would [otherwise] be offered on the market at reduced prices. We thus protect the farmer and spare him the hardships of loss. Besides, creating an industry for processing dates would have numerous benefits."

And Then...

This was a review of what the deputy director of the center and one of the agricultural engineers at the center said. Their statements clarified the role of the ministry, the magnitude of the accomplishments and the function of the center. The statements these two men made generated a dialogue between the farmers and the director of the center. We will print [those statements] in this place tomorrow, God willing.

[9 Apr 80 p 3]

[Text] Since late last March the ministry of agriculture has suspended its services to 236 farmers who have not been paying their debts to the ministry since 1972. The decision was based on this reason, but its implementation implied alienating the farmer from his land and encouraging him to abandon it and to rebel against it. The decision saw to it that those farmers are forced to pay their debts. Although that was the intent of the decision, implementing it will keep the land--at least for some time--without cover. To collect these debts the ministry will destroy a sector to which it has given considerable attention and which it had supported for over 8 years. It was coincidence alone that led AL-WAHDAH to what resembled a debate at the al-Daqdaqah Center. There were two officials, Yusuf al-Bazi, director of the center, and his deputy, 'Abdallah Khalafan, and three farmers who had come to the center because of daily matters of communications that always bring the farmers and the officials of the office together. There was a discussion about what lies at the root of agricultural problems. Other problems from which farmers were suffering emerged as well as similar ones from which the center was suffering. The discussion about agricultural loans and about the indebtedness of farmers began.

Farmers' Debts

Farmer Jasim Muhammad Jasim said that he had suffered a loss this year regarding agriculture. "Farms were subjected to heavy and torrential rains. Production was nothing to speak of, and the crops that were produced did not cover costs, not to mention the debts that have been due from other years. This leads us to ask the ministry to take the condition of loss into its

consideration and not to exert pressure on the farmers to pay the loans. There is no solution but for the ministry to sit with the farmers and discuss this matter. The minstry is to look into all aspects of the problem and to give farmers another opportunity to pay back the sums of money which they owe."

Yusuf al-Bazi the director of the al-Daqdaqah Center says, "The ministry has given the farmers sufficient opportunities to pay back the loans. The decision is not a new one; it was issued 2 years ago. The ministry had no choice after it repeated its claim to the farmers who had borrowed money. The ministry sent the farmers notices urging them to pay, but it received no response from them. This finally led us to carry out the decision. However, the door is still open to the farmers to come to an agreement with in good faith about a method of payment. If one of the brothers who bor money comes to us and explains to us his circumstances and his willingn pay back the loan, we will not even go back to the ministry and we wi a decision here to provide him again with the agricultural servi had before without reducing them. I am personally certain tha farmer will strive for a solution with us."

Hamud ibn Hamud al-Khatir, a farmer from al-Hamraniyah commented Yusuf al-Bazi said. He said, "I have personally paid all my deb farmer is the one who will pay his debts. In its transactions th has to look into the situations of some of those who obtained loans d spent them on other purposes. Among those farmers there are people who so their farms after they obtained a loan. There are also people who used th loan for a business whose capital came from the value of the machines tha had been given to them."

'Abdallah Khalafan deputy director of the center explained the conditions according to which loans are granted to farmers. He said, "First, the farmer submits a loan application to us. We turn this application over to the municipality to verify the farmer's ownership of the land and to determine [its boundaries]. Then the application comes back to us, and a committee goes out to the land to find out its suitability for agriculture and the extent to which the farmer is entitled to the loan. Afterwards, we send all the farmer's papers, with our recommendation attached, to the ministry of agriculture. It is the ministry that offers the loan which comes in the form of equipment and machines. The farmer pays half the amount of the loan, and the state pays the rest."

The Ministry's Services Between What They Are and What They Should Be

"The ministry digs wells for the farmers in accordance with a schedule controlled by the order of applications they submit and the capabilities that are available. It will plow the land free of charge; it will repair and maintain pumps; it will spray pesticides; and it will offer other technical services. Pesticides, fertilizers and seeds are given to farmers at half price." This was what the deputy director of the center said. Farmer Jasim Ahmad Jasim, however, says, "There is a major shortage in agricultural

tractors. The number of tractors is not adequate. On the other hand, most of the tractors are idle because of some damage or because they are awaiting spare parts. Diesel fuel is not always available, and, to protect the land and get a good crop, we are forced to pay for the diesel fuel out of our own private funds. The case is the same with regard to seeds: we have to purchase those too because the seeds the ministry gives us are not good and do not yield any fruits."

The statements that Farmer Hamud ibn Hamud made about agricultural services supported the statements that his colleague Jasim made. He said, "If we ask for tractors to plow the land and to prepare it for planting, they are sent to us 20 days later. If they are sent to us, they usually become the cause for disputes among farmers. The center sends few tractors.

"Besides, these tractors are always damaged and are not suitable for work. The number of tractors that are idle at the center is large. Some of them lack tires and others lack other spare parts which are not available. These are among the reasons for the losses we have suffered for successive years. We complain to the director of the center, and he tells us, 'I've done everything I can; the rest is up to the ministry. Go to the ministry!' Then we go to the ministry of agriculture which uses the difficult financial laws as an excuse. The ministry of finance is also responsible for what happens to us. The bids for seeds, for example, are granted to whoever makes the lowest bid. The result is that we become the victims of cheap seeds that accumulate in warehouses after we ourselves purchase the good quality seeds from the markets."

The director of the center comments on the statements made by Farmer Hamud on the shortcomings of agricultural services and says, "The al-Daqdaqah Center is not at all responsible for these shortcomings. We prepare the applications to request what the center needs, and we send those applications to the ministry. The ministry promises to send us what we requested, but it delays in sending those things to us. The ministry has its own reasons for this delay, and we know nothing about them. The ministry often sends what we had asked for, but it comes to us late or lacking. In brief, our problems in services may be summarized in three points. They are:

*A shortage in the number of tractors and in the spare parts for them.

*A shortage in vehicles [used] for pest control operations.

*The late arrival of seeds.

Together, these three factors have caused services to be inadequate. If these matters were available, there would be no problem.

Farmers Are Losing

Ahmad 'Abdallah Hamur, who is a farmer, said, "The prevailing prices of the crop produced by the palm trees do not cover expenses. Let us take, for

example, the fact that I own a farm that has palm trees. This year this farm cost me about 20,000 dirhams. It yielded 4,000 dirhams in return. This is a loss of 16,000 dirhams this year alone. In view of this loss I will be forced to stop caring for the palm trees. The wages of farm labor have risen considerably, and prices in the market are low. The current marketing [plan] is hurting the future of agriculture, and introducing a new marketing method has become an urgent necessity so as to protect agriculture and ensure its survival. This is because the truth must be said: continued losses in this manner will lead farmers to leave the land or perhaps to utilize it for other purposes. Among the recurrent reasons for losses also is the fact that we continue to purchase diesel fuel, seeds and pesticides, which technicians insist on changing from time to time. If the ministry were to leave us to plant our land as we please without determining the kind [of crop] for us and the area for every variety of crop planted, we would ourselves decide what to plant, and our decision would be dictated by the market. If we plant a crop that loses, we may make up our loss by planting another that makes a profit, according to the needs of the market, and this would cover some of our losses." He also added that the unpaved roads had ruined some plants that were near the roads because of the dust accumulating on them.

Talk About Unity

The demands that are being made by the farmers do not deny the role of the ministry and its support for the agricultural sector. These demands are rather being made in support of the ministry's plans.

The farmers are asking the ministry to look with them into the matter of paying back the debts, and they are certain that they will reach a satisfactory solution.

The farmers are asking the state to intervene in the marketing operations so as to maintain price stability which would enable them to meet their expenses.

They are also asking for good seeds even if good seeds are somewhat expensive. They are asking that diesel fuel and spare parts be provided for the tractors in a more universal manner. They are asking the state for more subsidy to reduce their burden of record expenses. This would in turn reduce the subsidy to the cost figures for agricultural crops.

[9 Apr 80 p 3]

[Text] The wheat harvest in the state has begun. These days the wheat project in al-'Awhah is seeing the outcome of a continuous effort that began last December. The quantity of wheat which the project is expected to produce this year amounts to 800 tons. This is a small quantity, compared with the state's rate of consumption, but it is in fact a large quantity. It signifies much for the future, and it spreads good things and brings news of growth for the eastern district of this country.

This experiment represents a green leap on the road to the future. We will look at it, we will follow up on it, and we will develop it until we achieve more from this important source [to improve] the life of the citizen in his local environment.

His Excellency Muhammad Sultan al-Daramakki, deputy director of the Department of Agriculture and Animal Production in al'Ayn says, "The district has known the cultivation of wheat as a principal crop for a long time. It was planted, produced and consumed locally.

"The process of cultivating wheat at that time was carried out with the primitive experience and knowledge of the population and with the knowledge they had acquired from living in that location and becoming knowledgeable about the conditions of the environment and the nature of the soil. The methods of agriculture, therefore, were old, and the machines that were used were manual and simple. Farmers used to drill wells, for example, with their own hands. They used bulls to get water out of the earth, and then they used the bulls to [help them] plow the soil. There were numerous examples of cooperation among farmers at the beginning of the season and at harvest time. Some of them used to be engaged in agricultural labor during the season and then receive a share of the crop after the harvest. The best locations for planting wheat at that time were those districts that are now close to al-'Ayn such as al-Hayl, al-Qattarah, al-Jimi, al-Su'udi and Mazid. These are areas which have been taken over by residential structures and have become overcrowded with people. But this does not mean that we are standing with our hands tied. Instead, we have turned to other regions so we can begin the cultivation of wheat once again."

Oil and Wheat

His Excellency Muhammad al-Daramakki adds, "The discovery of oil in the area and the onset of the stages of economic and social change have made the population stay away from the cultivation of wheat because it was not economical and did not yield a normal return such as that of the trades, the professions and the other businesses. But the interest which His Highness al-Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nahayyan, the president, gave to the cultivation of wheat and his continuous directives to the department of agriculture constituted the primary incentive behind the studies and the experiments that were begun in 1973 to resume the cultivation of wheat.

"After numerous experiments and studies we did arrive at an ideal method for irrigation and cultivation. It is on the basis of these studies that the al-'Awhah Project was begun. At present other studies are underway, and soil research is being conducted around al'Ayn in different areas which are suitable for agriculture so that wheat production can begin there after the success of the al-'Awhah Project. Most of the areas that are affiliated with al-'Ayn are suitable for agriculture. Today, it is no longer difficult to begin the cultivation of wheat in other locations, now that full agricultural experience is available and modern technical and scientific methods of agriculture and irrigation are being utilized. Among the areas that are being proposed for the cultivation of wheat in the future are Mazid and Maghafah, provided that the areas which had not been cultivated previously [with wheat] be planted so that the land which is being planted at present with other crops would not be affected."

We moved to the wheat cultivation project in al-'Awhah. About 25 kilometers from the city of al-'Ayn the golden colored fields welcomed us. There the ears of wheat stood as evidence of the ability and strong determination of men to produce wheat from the grains of sand.

We saw the ears of wheat patiently awaiting the harvest. They addressed us with logic and with a strong argument, [telling us that] they were there in the land of the emirates and that out of a total farm area of 600 hectares, the wheat crop had ripened this year in an area of 400 hectares planted with wheat.

It was a Saturday, and the occasion was the harvest festival. The automatic harvesting machine moved announcing the beginning of the season which lasts 2 weeks.

From the Beginning Until Now

We met with Mr 'Ali Sadiq al-'Ayyadi, director of the Department of Agriculture and Animal Production. He told us details of the beginning of the project and details of its different stages. He said, "The department began its experiments on the different varieties of wheat in 1973. It planted six donums in the district of Abu Samra, near al-'Ayn.

"These experiments began by using the seeds of local varieties of wheat such as Hamirah, Mahalli Abu Dhabi and Kuli. The results were quick and varied. Experimental centers were multiplied in 1974, and they included the district of al-Sad, the Agricultural Experimentation Station and also the district of Abu Samra.

"It was noticed that year that the yield per donum had increased over the previous year in all the centers. However, the results of these experiments were unsatisfactory because local varieties had been attacked by parasitic diseases. Two varieties of wheat that are not local--(Maxiback) and (Dayr 'Ula)--were also tested that year in al-Sad Center. In addition, 11 other varieties were tested in the Agricultural Experimentation Station.

"The experiments continued in the same four locations throughout 1975. These experiments utilized the same local varieties that had previously been tested, and the fact that these varieties were attacked by rust and bunt was proven. The two foreign varieties, however, resisted these diseases. During the 3 years [of experimentation] irrigation was carried out by flooding the cultivated area.

"In 1976 a decision was made to introduce a sprinkler irrigation system for the first time into the area at the Agricultural Experimentation Station. Experiments continued in the same mode that had been in use.

That year saw the end of the preliminary stage of experimentation. The varieties that were suitable for environmental and soil conditions were adopted and an agreement was reached about the two varieties--(Maxiback) and (Dayr 'Ula).

Mr 'Ali al-'Ayyadi adds, "1977 saw the beginning of wheat cultivation. Production began at the end of the 1977-1978 season. The wheat that was produced was sent for the first time to the Abu Dhabi mill so that the citizen of Abu Dhabi would eat the bread that was produced by his country..

"It was also decided that the cultivation of wheat be expanded that year, and al-'Awhah was chosen for that [purpose]. A sprinkler irrigation system was set up, and the project began with a total area of 200 hectares of which 165 hectares were planted with wheat. But the delay in the arrival of seeds and the fact that there was only one mechanical sowing device made us lose valuable time. The planting operations came to an end in the second half of December 1977. This led to a relative decline in the yield per hectare, and, accordingly, in the total yield from the project. Each donum produced 147 kilograms [of wheat], and experiments began once again at the Agricultural

Experimentation Station on 753 varieties of wheat for the purpose of finding out their suitability to prevailing climatic conditions and their resistance to rust. At present 20 varieties have survived, and experiments are still underway to achieve the best variety.

"In 1978 the total area for the project was increased to 400 hectares, and an irrigation system was set up for the entire area. Agricultural technicians began planting 350 hectares with the (Mexiback) variety of wheat. The sowing process ended early in December 1978; productivity rose from 147 kilograms to 224 kilograms per donum.

"It was noticed that productivity in a specific part of the farm was higher than the general rate by 46 kilograms. This was because that part had been planted with other crops the previous year. Accordingly, it was decided that crop rotation be adopted in the 1979/1980 season.

"The 1979 season saw the increase of the total area of the project to 600 hectares and the cultivation of 400 of these hectares with wheat. The remaining area was to be cultivated with other crops in accordance with the trilateral crop rotation system.

"Production expectations this year indicate a major rise in productivity per donum; it is expected to amount to 300 kilograms. This rate is much higher than that of countries that have specialized in wheat production for a long time."

The Ideal Method

Mr 'Ali al-'Ayyadi affirms that continuing experiments in the cultivation of wheat have firmly established the process of cultivating it. Through these experiments agricultural technicians have been able to achieve an ideal method for the cultivation of wheat. This method may be summarized in five points which deal with the processes of sowing, fertilizing, irrigating, caring for the crop and finally harvesting it.

*Sowing: This takes place in the second half of November. It is best that it not take place after the 25th of November. This year 140 kilograms of seed were sown in one hectare; next year, in the 1980/1981 season, this quantity will be increased to 150 kilograms.

This is because the brevity of the cold period in the winter makes the evolutionary process inadequate. It is during this process that the number of ears that grow from seed is increased. One seedling produces no more than two ears even though it should produce a larger number of ears in climatic conditions that are colder than those of the state. It is for this reason that the quantity of seeds is increased over that of world averages. (In Tunisia, for example, 100 kilograms of seed are used for every hectare).

An automatic sowing device, which can also be used to fertilize the land, is to be used.

*Fertilization: Fertilization takes place in three stages during the season. The land is fertilized before the seeds are sown with 20 kilograms of super phosphate fertilizer for every donum. This fertilizer is necessary for wheat, and it was introduced into the country for the first time in 1978.

When the land is sowed, it is fertilized with 20 kilograms of the fertilizer compound (18/18/5/1.5) per donum. This compound is made up of 18 units of nitrogen; 18 units of phosphorus; 5 units of potassium; and 1.5 smaller units. Then the land is fertilized after the seeds are sown. It is fertilized for the first time 10 days after the seeds sprout with 10 kilograms of ammonium sulphate per donum. The second stage begins when the evolution process begins, 3 weeks after the seeds are sown. Ten kilograms of urea fertilizer are used for every donum. The last stage of fertilization comes at the end of the evolution process (4 or 5 weeks after sowing). The land is then fertilized (a second time) with 10 kilograms of urea fertilizer per donum.

This is in addition to organic fertilizers and to the (karfona) fertilizer which are used at the rate of one ton and 300 kilograms per donum, [respectively]. (Karfona) is a fertilizer rich in bacteria; it helps in the decomposition of the remaining straw.

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The method of irrigation that is being followed is manifested in a system of brief and consecutive irrigations which preserve the fertilizers that were added to the wheat at the roots and give the plants the maximum benefit from the water and the fertilizers. The suitable interval between each irrigation is 6 days during the cold periods in December and January. This interval is not to exceed 4 days during the hot period in February and early March.

The important period in irrigation is that period during which the grains of wheat are growing and the ears are ripening. During this period the wheat is irrigated once every 3 days so it would not suffer from drought early in the hot season in March.

In spite of the well-contrived irrigation system, storms that attack the wheat during that period cause heavy evaporation. This causes the grains to wither, and, consequently, production is affected. Current experiments that are being conducted on the numerous varieties of wheat aim at selecting a variety that is resistant to storms during this critical period and, as much as possible, is not affected by them.

The purpose of watching the plants and caring for them after the wheat is sown in the soil is to eliminate the harmful weeds that absorb the water and the

nutrients from the soil. These weeds began to appear for the first time this year, 3 years after the project began. Controlling these weeds requires that the land be irrigated before the season so that these weeds can grow and then the land can be plowed and the weeds can be buried and uprooted. This method would do away with 90 percent of the weeds.

To control disease the best varieties that are immune to rust are chosen. The variety [of wheat] that is used, the (Mexiback), has proven its resistance to disease in general and to rust in particular.

*The harvest: The harvest begins early in April of every year after a season that lasts between 120 and 130 days.

This Year's Production

Mr 'Ali al-'Ayyadi affirms that the yield this year approaches 800 tons at a rate of almost 3 tons per hectare. This rate exceeds the yield in a number of Arab countries. We hope to achieve a yield of 5 tons per hectare in the future. This can be achieved by using modern agricultural methods and following scientific methods. The entire crop is sent to the mills of Abu Dhabi where it is mixed with wheat that is imported from Australia and used for local consumption.

The manpower for this project is made up of a general supervising engineer, technicians, five foremen and 70 agricultural workers. By comparing the area of the project with the number of workers we can notice that the extent of dependence on modern agricultural methods and agricultural automation is that which achieves good economic standards for the project, approximating cost figures.

The Department of Agriculture depends on cultivating other varieties in the part [of the farm] where wheat is not planted every year. These farms depend on [cultivating] peas, potatoes, beans, tomatoes and other vegetables. They are putting into practice the trilateral crop rotation rule so as not to deplete all of the land in one season and to achieve the maximum benefit from the technical and human capabilities that are available in the project.

The Rule of Food Security

It remains to be said that expansion of this vital project is necessary for the young country, the United Arab Emirates. It would give it the capability of meeting emergencies and would enable it to depend on local wheat production for considered periods of time, and this would give the citizens [a sense of] confidence and security about their food supply.

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SUCCESS OF WHEAT CULTIVATION PROJECT NOTED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 14 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Farid Wajdi: "Wheat Harvest Festival Begins so That Citizen Can Eat Bread Produced in His Own County; Cultivation of Wheat To Begin in Mazid and Maghafah Following Success of al-'Awhah Project; Average Production Rose 15 Percent Over Last Year"]

[Text] The wheat harvest in the state has begun. These days the wheat project in al-'Awhah is seeing the outcome of a continuous effort that began last December. The quantity of wheat which the project is expected to produce this year amounts to 800 tons. This is a small quantity, compared with the state's rate of consumption, but it is in fact a large quantity. It signifies much for the future, and it spreads good things and brings news of growth for the eastern district of this country.

This experiment represents a green leap on the road to the future. We will look at it, we will follow up on it, and we will develop it until we achieve more from this important source [to improve] the life of the citizen in his local environment.

His Excellency Muhammad Sultan al-Daramakki, deputy director of the Department of Agriculture and Animal Production in al-'Ayn says, "The district has known the cultivation of wheat as a principal crop for a long time. It was planted, produced and consumed locally.

"The process of cultivating wheat at that time was carried out with the primitive experience and knowledge of the population and with the knowledge they had acquired from living in that location and becoming knowledgeable about the conditions of the environment and the nature of the soil. The methods of agriculture, therefore, were old, and the machines that were used were manual and simple. Farmers used to drill wells, for example, with their own hands. They used bulls to get water out of the earth, and then they used the bulls to [help them] plow the soil. There were numerous examples of cooperation among farmers at the beginning of the season and at harvest time. Some of them used to be engaged in agricultural labor during the season and then receive a share of the crop after the harvest. The best locations for planting wheat at that time were those districts that are now close to

al-'Ayn such as al-Hayl, al-Qattarah, al-Jimi, al-Su'udi and Mazid. These are areas which have been taken over by residential structures and have become overcrowded with people. But this does not mean that we are standing with our hands tied. Instead, we have turned to other regions so we can begin the cultivation of wheat once again."

Oil and Wheat

His Excellency Muhammad al-Daramakki adds, "The discovery of oil in the area and the onset of the stages of economic and social change have made the population stay away from the cultivation of wheat because it was not economical and did not yield a normal return such as that of the trades, the professions and the other businesses. But the interest which His Highness al-Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nahayyan, the president, gave to the cultivation of wheat and his continuous directives to the department of agriculture constituted the primary incentive behind the studies and the experiments that were begun in 1973 to resume the cultivation of wheat.

"After numerous experiments and studies we did arrive at an ideal method for irrigation and cultivation. It is on the basis of these studies that the al-'Awhah Project was begun. At present other studies are underway, and soil research is being conducted around al-'Ayn in different areas which are suitable for agriculture so that wheat production can begin there after the success of the al-'Awhah Project. Most of the areas that are affiliated with al-'Ayn are suitable for agriculture. Today, it is no longer difficult to begin the cultivation of wheat in other locations, now that full agricultural experience is available and modern technical and scientific methods of agriculture and irrigation are being utilized. Among the areas that are being proposed for the cultivation of wheat in the future are Mazid and Maghafah, provided that the areas which had not been cultivated previously [with wheat] be planted so that the land which is being planted at present with other crops would not be affected."

We moved to the wheat cultivation project in al-'Awhah. About 25 km from the city of al-'Ayn the golden colored fields welcomed us. There the ears of wheat stood as evidence of the ability and strong determination of men to produce wheat from the grains of sand.

We saw the ears of wheat patiently awaiting the harvest. They addressed us with logic and with a strong argument, [telling us that] they were there in the land of the emirates and that out of a total farm area of 600 hectares, the wheat crop had ripened this year in an area of 400 hectares planted with wheat.

It was a Saturday, and the occasion was the harvest festival. The autonomatic harvesting machine moved announcing the beginning of the season which lasts 2 weeks.

From the Beginning Until Now

We met with Mr 'Ali Sadiq al-'Ayyadi, director of the Department of Agriculture and Animal Production. He told us details of the beginning of the project and details of its different stages. He said, "The department began its experiments on the different varieties of wheat in 1973. It planted 6 donums in the district of Abu Samra, near al-'Ayn.

"These experiments began by using the seeds of local varieties of wheat such as Hamirah, Mahalli Abu Dhabi and Kuli. The results were quick and varied. Experimental centers were multiplied in 1974, and they included the district of al-Sad, the Agricultural Experimentation Station and also the district of Abu Samra.

"It was noticed that year that the yield per donum had increased over the previous year in all the centers. However, the results of these experiments were unsatisfactory because local varieties had been attacked by parasitic diseases. Two varieties of wheat that are not local--(Maxiback) and (Dayr 'Ula)--were also tested that year in al-Sad Center. In addition, 11 other varieties were tested in the Agricultural Experimentation Station.

"The experiments continued in the same four locations throughout 1975. These experiments utilized the same local varieties that had previously been tested and the fact that these varieties were attacked by rust and bunt was proven. The two foreign varieites, however, resisted these diseases. During the 3 years [of experimentation] irrigation was carried out by flooding the cultivated area.

"In 1976 a decision was made to introduce a sprinkler irrigation system for the first time into the area at the Agricultural Experimentation Station. Experiments continued in the same mode that had been in use.

"That year saw the end of the preliminary stage of experimentation. The varieties that were suitable for environmental and soil conditions were adopted and an agreement was reached about the two varieties--(Maxiback) and (Dayr 'Ula)."

Mr 'Ali al-'Ayyadi adds, "1977 saw the beginning of wheat cultivation. Production began at the end of the 1977-1978 season. The wheat that was produced was sent for the first time to the Abu Dhabi mill so that the citizen of Abu Dhabi would eat the bread that was produced by his country .

"It was also decided that the cultivation of wheat be expanded that year, and al-'Awhah was chosen for that [purpose]. A sprinkler irrigation system was set up, and the project began with a total area of 200 hecatres of which 165 hectares were planted with wheat. But the delay in the arrival of seeds and the fact that there was only one mechanical sowing device made us lose valuable time. The planting operations came to an end in the second half of December 1977. This led to a relative decline in the yield per hectare,

and, accordingly, in the total yield from the project. Each donum produced 147 kg [of wheat], and experiments began once again at the Agricultural Experimentation Station on 753 varieties of wheat for the purpose of finding out their suitability to prevailing climatic conditions and their resistance to rust. At present 20 varieties have survived, and experiments are still underway to achieve the best variety.

"In 1978 the total area for the project was increased to 400 hectares, and an irrigation system was set up for the entire area. Agricultural technicians began planting 350 hectares with the (Maxiback) variety of wheat. The sowing process ended early in December 1978; productivity rose from 147 kg to 224 kg per donum.

"It was noticed that productivity in a specific part of the farm was higher than the general rate by 46 kg. This was because that part had been planted with other crops the previous year. Accordingly, it was decided that crop rotation be adopted in the 1979-1980 season.

"The 1979 season saw the increase of the total area of the project to 600 hectares and the cultivation of 400 of these hectares with wheat. The remaining area was to be cultivated with other crops in accordance with the trilateral crop rotation system.

"Production expectations this year indicate a major rise in productivity per donum; it is expected to amount to 300 kg. This rate is much higher than that of countries that have specialized in wheat production for a long time."

The Ideal Method

Mr 'Ali al-'Ayyadi affirms that continuing experiments in the cultivation of wheat have firmly established the process of cultivating it. Through these experiments agricultural technicians have been able to achieve an ideal method for the cultivation of wheat. This method may be summarized in five points which deal with the processes of sowing, fertilizing, irrigating, caring for the crop and finally harvesting it.

*Sowing: This takes place in the second half of November. It is best that it not take place after the 25th of November. This year 140 kg of seed were sown in 1 hectare; next year, in the 1980-1981 season, this quantity will be increased to 150 kg.

This is because the brevity of the cold period in the winter makes the evolutionary process inadequate. It is during this process that the number of ears that grow from one seed is increased. One seedling produces no more than two ears even though it should produce a larger number of ears in climatic conditions that are colder than those of the state. It is for this reason that the quantity of seeds is increased over that of world averages. (In Tunisia, for example, 100 kg of seed are used for every hectare).

An automatic sowing device, which can also be used to fertilize the land, is to be used.

*Fertilization: Fertilization takes place in three stages during the season. The land is fertilized before the seeds are sown with 20 kg of super phosphate fertilizer for every donum. This fertilizer is necessary for wheat, and it was introduced into the country for the first time in 1978.

When the land is sowed, it is fertilized with 20 kg of the fertilizer compound (18/18/5/1.5) per donum. This compound is made up of 18 units of nitrogen; 18 units of phosphorus; 5 units of potassium; and 1.5 smaller units. Then the land is fertilized after the seeds are sown. It is fertilized for the first time 10 days after the seeds sprout with 10 kg of ammonium sulphate per donum. The second stage begins when the evolution process begins, 3 weeks after the seeds are sown. Ten kg of urea fertilizer are used for every donum. The last stage of fertilization comes at the end of the evolution process (4 or 5 weeks after sowing). The land is then fertilized (a second time) with 10 kg of urea fertilizer per donum.

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